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The Department of Defense's (DoD's) interest in the cost
and schedule performance of significant acquisition contracts
has heightened significantly over the last two years. In view
of the current fiscal environment, marked by severe constraint
and rapidly declining budget dollars for defense spending, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has launched an all
out effort to bring about better programmatic control of cost
and schedule for defense programs. In addition to "tighter
money", OSD's revised interest in cost and schedule management
is in direct response to the rapid erosion of public and
congressional consensus for higher defense spending, the
uproar over the cost overruns, schedule slippages, and
performance shortfalls evidenced within the U.S. Air Force's
B-2 Stealth Bomber and C-17 Military Airlift programs, and the
U.S. Navy's A- 12 Avenger program.
On 8 January 1991, the A- 12 Avenger program was abruptly
terminated by the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Dick Cheney,
because, among other issues, it was found that both the
contractor and the Navy had made inadequate use of
cost/schedule data to manage and control cost and schedule
parameters. According to Pentagon spokesman, Pete Williams,
"We have lost faith in the ability of everyone to perform
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under this current contract" [Ref. l:p. 1] . As a direct
result of the A-12's demise, the Navy's Program Executive
Officer (Tactical Aircraft Programs) and A- 12 Program Manager
were relieved.
The A-12's termination has sent a clear message to the
Department of Defense. First and foremost, the defense
acquisition community must cultivate improved information flow
and analysis so that decision makers can determine early in
the acquisition process whether program cost targets,
production schedules, and performance thresholds are being
met. Second, the acquisition force must implement steps to
become proactive versus remaining reactive. Third, the
consequences for failure to implement and use effective
cost/schedule management practices can result in program
termination. Finally, the A-12's termination sends the
message that OSD is committed to bringing about greater
realism regarding the projections of cost, schedule, and
performance of both current and new major system starts.
It is obvious, that acquisition in the 90s will be
characterized by ever- tightening controls and increased
congressional and DoD oversight of all major contracts and
subcontracts to ensure strict performance goals are reached
within delineated cost and schedule limits. Therefore, DoD
major program managers must achieve a thorough understanding
of cost and schedule control management such as the
Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria (C/SCSC) and principles
such as "earned value", and then rigorously apply those
principles to the management of their acquisition programs.
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
The objective of this research is to provide the future
program manager with an understanding of the importance of
cost and schedule control management in major acquisition
programs. First, this research will furnish a substantive
review of the Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria (C/SCSC)
process, and aspects of performance measurement and control.
Second, this thesis will address the earned value management
approach and point out its utility. Third, it will provide
the program manager with an understanding of some of the non-
commercial software packages that are available to assist in
cost and schedule management. Fourth, this thesis will
analyze the cost and schedule control management
implementation process, and the impact that the Navy's A- 12
Avenger Program termination has had on the cost and schedule
environnment within DoD. Finally, this research will provide
the program manager guidance on how to achieve successful
program management through cost and schedule control
.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is:
"What should the program manager understand to achieve
successful cost and schedule control in major acquisition
programs and what affect has the Cost Performance Report had
on program cost and schedule performance?"
The following subsidiary questions were formulated to
define the primary research question:
1. What are the key aspects of the DoD Cost/Schedule
Control Systems Criteria (C/SCSC)
?
2. What is the current policy and practice for validating
contractor (cost/schedule) management systems?
3. How does/should the program office/program manager




How does the Government determine an appropriate
threshold to measure cost/schedule variance?
5. What is meant by rebaselining and what affect does it
have on a program' s C/SCSC?
6. What are some of the software packages available
to the program manager to assist in cost and schedule
data analysis?
7. What are some of the major shortfalls associated with
the C/SCSC process and how might it be improved?
8. What impact has the Navy's A- 12 Avenger program
termination had on the DoD C/SCSC environment and are
there any applicable lessons learned?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
1. Scope
This thesis focuses on what the DoD major acquisition
program manager should understand regarding cost and schedule
control management. This document provides a comprehensive
look at C/SCSC, its implementation process, and its
application to cost and schedule control management. This
thesis traces the history of the cost and schedule control
concept and addresses how the cost and schedule management




This thesis is limited in scope to C/SCSC and its




A major program is considered any program in which
C/SCSC is applied. To avoid confusion, the term major program
will be used synonymously with significant program throughout
the paper. Also, contractor performance is measured in terms
of their ability to remain within cost, schedule, and
technical parameters defined by the contract.
E. METHODOLOGY
The research for this thesis was conducted through a
comprehensive literature search encompassing several texts,
papers, articles, DoD regulations, directives, guides,
briefings, and other publications. A series of Defense
Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE) and Defense
Technical Information Center (DTIC) searches were also made.
Further information on C/SCSC, cost/schedule control
management, and cost/schedule performance measurement was
obtained via telephonic and personal interviews with various
personnel associated with cost/schedule control policy
development and implementation, cost/schedule surveillance,
and program management . The personnel interviewed included
representatives within the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition) Acquisition Policy and Program
Integration, members of the Performance Measurement Joint
Executive Group, and C/SCSC experts from the Defense Systems
Management College.
A week long research trip to the Army Aviation Systems
Command (AVSCOM) in St. Louis, Missouri, permitted the
researcher the opportunity to talk with various program
managers, program business managers, program analysts, and
cost/schedule analysts from the AVSCOM matrix structure. The
program offices that were visited include Commanche Light
Helicopter, Longbow/Apache Attack Helicopter, Kiowa Warrior
Helicopter, Aircraft Survivability Equipment, Blackhawk
Helicopter, and Aircraft Avionics. The Cost and Economic
Systems Division within the Systems and Cost Analysis
Directorate of AVSCOM was also visited.
Various trips to some of the Defense Contract Management
Area Operation (DCMAO) offices including Sunnyvale and San
Bruno, California provided the researcher with the opportunity
to talk with several program and technical support analysts
about contract cost and schedule surveillance. Additional
information and expertise associated with cost/schedule
control management was obtained through researcher attendance
at the three day 1991 C/SCSC National Workshop. This workshop
exposed the researcher to a plethora of cost and schedule
control experts from DoD, all military Services, the National
Performance Management Association, the National Security
Industrial Association, and the Society of Cost Estimating and
Analysis
.
F. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Definitions used within this thesis are included as
Appendix A. Abbreviations used within this thesis are
included as Appendix B.
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter I is
a general introduction presenting the research questions,
objectives, methodology, and organization of this study.
Chapter II provides background regarding the evolution of
cost/schedule control management and discusses the C/SCSC
philosophy and the criteria in terms of five categories. This
chapter also introduces the Cost Performance Report (CPR)
,
describing its purpose, structure, and interface with other
higher level reports. Finally, chapter II addresses the key
DoD organizations associated with C/SCSC policy development
and/or implementation. Chapter III provides an explanation of
the C/SCSC process. Specifically, this chapter will outline
the Government's C/SCSC interface during the preaward phase of
the contract, negotiation or competition phase, and the post
award phase. Chapter IV provides a discussion of the Cost
Performance Report (CPR) and concentrates on aspects of CPR
analysis. In addition, this chapter will address Program
Manager (PM) management actions regarding C/SCSC problems and
also will provide insight into some of the CPR analysis
packages that are currently available. Chapter V examines the
U.S. Navy's A- 12 Avenger program termination and analyzes the
impacts that this program's termination has had on the DoD
cost and schedule environment. This chapter also provides a
discussion on some of the key A- 12 "lessons learned." Chapter
VI presents an analysis of selected aspects of the cost and
schedule control process. Specifically the analysis will
center on program preaward activities, demonstration review
process, CPR utility, and the program office's CPR analysis
capability. Throughout the analysis the discussion will offer
recommendations for improvement in the cost/schedule
management process. Finally, chapter VII will provide
conclusions and recommendations generated by this research.
II. EVOLUTION, PHILOSOPHY, AND
ORGANIZATION OF C/SCSC
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION
Declining defense budgets, the rising costs of weapon
systems, and the President's call for substantive reform in
defense acquisition, has placed increased emphasis on cost and
schedule management of major programs. More than ever before,
the Program Manager must thoroughly understand the elements of
the Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria (C/SCSC) and use it
effectively in program execution. This chapter will provide
the Program Manager with a background of C/SCSC.
Specifically, the chapter will describe the historical
development of C/SCSC, discuss the purpose and aspects of the
criteria, and provide an account of the DoD organizations
associated with C/SCSC policy development and implementation.
B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Cost and schedule management is not a new concept within
the Department of Defense. This concept and practice has been
in existence in one form or another for over thirty years.
During the late 1950s through the 1960s, the Government
program manager was confronted with a very complex and arduous
requirement of managing major programs in an environment
characterized by increasing economic inflation, expanded
technological complexity, long lead procurement times, and
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growing uncertainty within the defense industry [Ref. 2: pp.
36-38] . At that time, program managers had neither a
prescribed project control methodology nor an existing DoD
cost/schedule control criteria to manage their programs.
The Navy was responsible for one of the earliest program
control methods by introducing a criteria approach to project
control called Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) .
PERT was specifically developed for use in the management of
the Navy's Polaris Fleet Ballistic Missile Program in the late
1950s and early 1960s [Ref. 3:p. 13]. In response to the
management challenge posed by the Polaris project, the
Department of the Navy's Strategic Systems Project Office
directed that all associated prime contractors and major sub-
contractors would use the PERT process.
The PERT process provided the Navy with a useful method of
linking planned events with tasks, to portray an activity
network throughout the span of the program schedule. A key
product of PERT was the identification of the critical path of
tasks, or the longest sequential path of events through the
program [Ref. 4:p. 23], Careful management of the critical
path meant program completion in the least amount of time and
money. At the center of the PERT process was the concept of
the work breakdown structure (WBS) . The WBS represents the
manner in which a program is structured through successive
levels of detail. The WBS, by definition, is a product
-
oriented family tree composed of hardware, services, and data
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resulting from program efforts during product development and
production [Ref. 5:p. 2]. It defines the product to be
developed and later to be produced. It relates the elements
of work to be accomplished to each other and to the desired
end product to trace costs and facilitate program management.
Shortly after the advent of PERT, an upgraded PERT, PERT-
Cost, was developed and employed by the Government on all
major contracts. PERT- Cost, "added the capability to budget
and report costs by PERT network activities" [Ref. 3:p. 13].
Unfortunately, industry viewed the PERT techniques as largely
impractical, cumbersome, and just another requirement to
fulfill. As a result, contractors created special PERT groups
whose sole purpose was to satisfy Government PERT
requirements. This practice created a couple of problems for
the Government. First, these special groups operated apart
from contractor management teams who were responsible for
planning, scheduling, budgeting, and measuring the program's
performance. This condition resulted in redundant and often
conflicting contractor performance information passed onto the
Government program office. Second, these groups resulted in
increased overhead costs with little or no value added.
Invariably, the PERT-Cost requirements were "negotiated into
contracts on top of perfectly valid existing contractor
management and control systems". [Ref. 3: p. 13]. The
Government eventually concluded that its mandate of PERT and
PERT-Cost was a poor investment. Despite overall success in
11
the Polaris program, PERT was viewed a failure largely because
of poor Government implementation and inadequate computer
technology sufficient to support it.
Concurrent with the implementation of PERT- Cost, the U.S.
Air Force pursued continued work in criteria based approaches
to obtain program status information. In 1963, the Air Force,
as part of the Minuteman Missile Program, instituted a
contractor management control system concept "based on a set
of management criteria to be included in the contract
statement of work" [Ref . 3:p. 14] . This Management Control
System concept, was designated as "earned value". Earned
value refers to the measurement of the program work actually
accomplished compared to the budget spent by the contractor.
The Air Force's earned value added several improvements to
PERT- Cost. It provided a description of what the contractor's
management systems should be capable of accomplishing versus
mandating a specific preferred Government management system.
Also, based on lessons learned from PERT-Cost implementation,
the Air Force instituted the concept of on-site contractor
system demonstrations aimed at eliminating duplicate
contractor management systems [Ref 3. p. 14].
The Air Force expanded upon this management control system
concept by developing a set of simplified standards to qualify
a contractor's internal management systems for defense work
[Ref. 3:p. 14] . The standards incorporated the strong points
of both earned value and the PERT-Cost method concept. These
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standards, called the Cost/Schedule Planning and Control
Specification (or C-Spec) were published in 1966 by the Air
Force Systems Command. The C-Spec standards became the
foundation for DoD's Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria
(C/SCSC) . The C-Spec represented those attributes that a
capable contractor management control system should exibit.
C-Spec permitted the contractor to establish and utilize the
internal processes of his choosing; however, it required that
he demonstrate his process compliance with the C-Spec.
DoD published the C/SCSC in 1967 within DoD Instruction
(DoDI) 7000.2, Performance Measurement for Selected
Acquisitions. DoDI 7000.2 provided policy guidance for
implementing C/SCSC on a DoD wide basis. The DoDI 7000.2
applied to various cost contract types, other than firm fixed
price, within major acquisition programs . A major acquisition
program was defined by the 1987 DoD Directive 5000.1, Major
and Non-Major Acquisition Programs, as one that had an
estimated dollar value for research, development, test, and
evaluation (RDT&E) of more than $40 dollars or had an
estimated dollar value for production of more than $160
million.
The intent of the criteria approach discussed in DoDI
7000.2 was to provide the contractor flexibility in his
internal operations, while providing the Government with a
standard of measure that ensured the contractor's management
system exhibited the characteristics and capabilities
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considered inherent in an effective cost and schedule control
system. The key objectives of DoDI 7000.2 were to:
1. Obtain assurance that the contractor's internal
management systems were adequate.
2. Guarantee the contractor's system provided, reliable,
and integrated cost, schedule, and technical
performance data indicating work progress and
ensuring a practical level of summarization.
3
.
Ensure a single system was utilized for the purpose
of management reporting.
4. Avoid imposition of specific methods or techniques on
the contractor.
5. Maximize use of the contractor's existing system,
minimizing changes to it. [Ref. 4: pp. 313-314.]
DoDI 7000.2 also authorized the development of a joint
C/SCSC implementation guide designed to amplify the concepts
outlined in DoDI 7000.2 and standardize C/SCSC implementation
procedures. As a result, DoD established a tri- service
working group in 19 67 known as the Performance Measurement
Joint Executive Group (PMJEG) . The Cost/Schedule Control
Systems Criteria Joint Implementation Guide (JIG) was issued
in August 1970. It has been updated four times since 1970.
The JIG provided uniform procedures for all DoD components to
be utilized, ". . .during planning and implementation of the DoD
Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria (C/SCSC) and for
surveillance of contractor compliance" [Ref. 6:p. i] . By
1972, all Services were actively using the JIG to implement
C/SCSC on all applicable contracts.
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In February 1991, DoDI 7000.2 was cancelled and
incorporated into DoDI 5000.2, Defense Acquisition Management
Policies and Procedures Part 11, "Program Control and Review".
The C/SCSC is found within part 11, Section B, Attachment 1,
and a series of C/SCSC terms are defined within Attachment 2
of that same Section. Part 11, Section C, outlines the
milestone review procedures and the documentation required by
phase for C/SCSC applied programs. References to the various
reports associated with cost and schedule control are not
discussed within DoDI 5000.2, rather they are covered within
DoD 5000. 2-M, Defense Acquisition Management Documentation and
Reports, part 20, "Cost Management Reports". Part 20 replaces
DoDI 7000.1, Contractor Cost Performance Fund Status and
Cost/Schedule Status Reports and DoDI 7000.11, Contractor Cost
Data Reporting.
No significant differences in C/SCSC policy from DoDI
7000.2 are apparent in DoDI 5000.2; however, there are changes
in C/SCSC applicability thresholds. For example, DoDI 5000.2,
Part 11, requires C/SCSC compliance on all significant
contracts and sub- contracts . A significant contract is an
RDT&E contract valued at $60 million or more, or a procurement
contract with a value of $250 million or more (in FY 1990
dollars) [Ref . 7: p. ll-B-2] . Application of C/SCSC to firm
fixed price type contracts is still not necessary; however,
DoDI 5000.2, Part 11, does state that, "Exceptions may be made
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by the milestone decision authority for individual contracts"
[Ref . 7:p. ll-B-3]
.
C. THE C/SCSC PHILOSOPHY
DoD's C/SCSC policy does not prescribe a specific system to
be utilized by major contractors or sub- contractors for the
purposes of program cost/schedule performance management.
According to DoD Directive 5000.1, "Contractors shall not be
required to revise existing systems except as necessary to
satisfy DoD criteria" [Ref. 8:p. 1-6] . Instead, C/SCSC
prescribes 3 5 criteria to serve as standards for measuring the
acceptability of the contractor's internal management control
systems. Acceptable or adequate contractor systems are those
which provide effective, timely, reliable, and auditable
information for use by both the contractor and the Government
to evaluate cost and schedule performance. C/SCSC gives the
contractor the latitude to organize in a fashion that best
complements company working environment and management
philosophy. In addition, the contractor is free to choose
whatever methods or internal operating procedures they desire.
The contractor's management control systems can be automated,
manual, or some combination of both, provided the end result
is an integrated management system that satisfies DoD's C/SCSC
policy.
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D. THE FIVE AREAS OF C/SCSC
The C/SCSC is composed of 35 criteria which specify the
types of information which the contractor's internal
management control system must provide. The 35 criteria are
grouped into five major categories:
1. Organization- Definition of the contractual effort
through use of a work breakdown structure (WBS) and
identification of those responsible for the
performance of work. All of this must be linked
by means of an integrated contractor
management control system (ICMCS) . (ICMCS refers
to the integration of scheduling, budgeting, work
authorization, cost accumulation systems with one
another, the WBS, and the contractor organization
structure.
)
2. Planning and Budgeting - Establishment and
maintenance of detailed plans, schedules, and budgets
for authorized work. These detailed plans,
schedules, and budgets combined to form the
performance measurement baseline (PMB) . Additionally,
this category identifies such things as physical
products, milestones, and technical performance goals
to be used to measure output
.
3. Accounting - Accumulation, recording, and
summarization of all direct labor and material costs
and all indirect costs such that an earned value
comparison provides an evaluation of the performance
measurement plan (Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled or
BCWS) versus the actual contractor performance
(Budgeted Cost of Work Performed or BCWP) . In simple
terms, earned value is the measure of what is
produced for what is spent. All costs must be
traceable to the WBS and organizational elements.
4. Analysis - Comparison of planned and actual cost, and
schedule performance data. The contractor
identifies, analyzes, and explains significant
differences, or variances, between actual and planned
cost/schedule performance. Addditionally, the
contractor must produce responsible estimates at
completion (EACs) . An EAC refers to a value
expressed in dollars and/or hours which is the sum of
cumulative actuals, or incurred costs to date, and
the realistic cost estimate of work yet to be done
referred to as the estimate to completion (ETC)
.
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Revisions and Access to Data- The contractor must
show the effects of contractual changes to budgets
and schedules. The contractor will incorporate these
contractual changes into the controlled baseline or
Contract Budget Base (CBB) . (The CBB is the
negotiated contract cost or Performance Measurement
Baseline (PMB)
,
plus any Management Reserve (MR) , as
well as the estimated cost of any unpriced,
authorized work.) This category also specifies a
requirement to notify the procuring activity of any
changes made to the PMB and provide authorized
Government representatives access to all contract
information for criteria compliance determination.
[Ref. 6:pp. 2-3 to 2-5]
E. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH C/SCSC
There are a number of Government organizations that
contribute to C/SCSC policy development and implementation.
These organizations include the Acquisition Policy and Program
Integration/Cost Management (AP&PI/CM) section within the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) , the
Performance Measurement Joint Executive Group (PMJEG) , the
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) , and the Defense
Logistics Agency (DLA)
.
The AP&PI/CM is charged with acquisition policy development
and implementation. This office is assigned the
responsibility of implementating C/SCSC throughout DoD, and
oversight of major contractor cost management reports. The
personnel within this office also review contractor cost
performance data submitted by the various Service departments
and submits assessments of the data to senior DoD management
including the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) [Ref.
10] .
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The PMJEG is responsible for providing top level, joint
policy and procedure recommendations regarding C/SCSC. This
group also provides uniform C/SCSC interpretation,
arbitration, and coordination with industry. Each Service
component commodity command is represented on the PMJEG. DLA,
DCAA, and the National Security Agency (NSA) are also standard
members of the group.
In addition to its PMJEG role, the DCAA plays an important
part in the C/SCSC implementation process. This organization
has significant responsibilities in the areas of contractor
systems reviews and contractor performance surveillance.
These responsibilities specifically include monitoring
contractor system integrity, utilizing contractor system
output, coordinating surveillance reviews with the
Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) , and providing risk
assessment of the contractor's Estimate at Completion (EAC)
.
The DLA is also closely involved in the C/SCSC
implementation process. The Defense Logistics Agency, through
its Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC)
,
provides
contract administrative services to the military program
office. The DCMC is organized into five continental Defense
Contract Management Districts (DCMD) . Each DCMD provides
contract administration services for the customers assigned to
it. Each DCMC has several Defense Plant Representative
Offices (DPROs) and Defense Contract Management Area
Operations (DCMAO) . Each of these organizations provides
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contract administrative services, program support evaluation,
contractor performance analysis, and contractor C/SCSC system
surveillance to the DoD buying command. A DPRO is co- located
with a major defense contractor, whereas, a DCMAO will be
given responsibility for a group of contracts within their
geographical area. [Ref 11.]
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Chapter II has provided the evaluation, philosophy, and
organization of the Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria.
It also introduced some of the key C/SCSC documentation
including DODI 5000.2, DOD 5000. 2 -M, and the Joint
Implementation Guide, and focused on the objectives and
details of the C/SCSC. Finally, Chapter II discussed some
of the organizations responsible for C/SCSC policy development
and implementation.
Chapter III will continue to add upon the material
discussed in Chapter II. First, Chapter III will work through
the C/SCSC implementation process. Second, this chapter will
provide the PM with an understanding of the surveillance
process. The surveillance process discussion will focus on
contractor control system validation, the surveillance plan,





Chapter III will give the PM an understanding of his role
in the C/SCSC implementation process. This chapter will
outline the Government's C/SCSC interface with the contractor
during the preaward phase of the contract. The discussion
will focus on the actions that need to be taken to ensure an
adequate program structure is established that will provide
timely, accurate contract cost and schedule information. This
chapter will also discuss the post award phase of the C/SCSC
implementation process. The discussion of post award elements
will concentrate on the performance measurement baseline,
emphasizing its early establishment and maintenance . Finally,
this chapter will address contractor system validation. This
discussion will include a description of the various
validation reviews. In addition, the surveillance plan and
the Memorandum of Agreement will be addressed.
B. PREAWARD: REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL
C/SCSC implementation begins for the program manager with
the contract preaward process. The preaward process is very
important because this is where the PM sets the stage for the
project's cost/schedule control management program.
Activities which occur during the preaward phase affect many
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later activities during the contract's execution. The
competitive process begins through the issuance of a
solicitation or Request -For- Proposal (RFP) to prospective
contractors
.
The RFP is an official procurement document that
communicates the program manager's requirements to potential
contractors. According to LTG Billy M. Thomas, Deputy-
Commanding General, Research, Development, and Acquisition,
U.S. Army Material Command, the RFP is where, "We set the
standard for everything we buy" [Ref. 12:p. 5].
Additionally, RFPs have caught the interest of the USD (A) , the
Honorable Donald Yockey. Currently, the OUSD(A) has
established a policy to examine key acquisition documents,
such as the RFP, for major programs under OSD's review before
RFP release.
The RFP identifies to prospective contractors a series of
items to be addressed in their proposals such as Contract Data
Requirements Lists (CDRLs) , a Statement of Work (SOW) , and a
proposed Contract Work Breakdown Structure (CWBS) . The
Government prepares the CDRL which correlates to the SOW
requirement. It is a listing of data requirements specified
to be provided by the contractor. The CDRLs will generally
include contractor deliverables such as analyses, status
reports, technical drawings, manuals, and manufacturing
management data. The CDRLs will include an explanatory Data
Item Description (DID) for each data item listed. The DID
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describes the purpose of the data item, applications,
interface references, and data preparation needs [Ref. 38 :p.
10-8] . For a C/SCSC applied contract, the PM will include the
Cost Performance Report (CPR) as a required data item. The PM
will specify the CPR submission frequency, the required CWBS
reporting level, and the variance thresholds. A threshold is
a contractually prescribed outer limit cost and schedule
parameter.
The SOW is the RFP's requirements statement. It identifies
to the contractor the required contractual tasks. For example,
the SOW will address several contract aspects such as contract
line items, configuration items, contract work statement, and
the contract specifications. Most importantly, the SOW
provides the contractor with a focus to his organization, and
to plan and allocate his resources.
The importance of the SOW cannot be overemphasized. It is
important, not only because it defines the scope of work, but
also because it clarifies the Government's requirements and
the contractor's responsibilities and obligations throughout
the duration of the contract. Upon contract award,
the SOW will become the standard for measuring the
contractor's technical performance.
The program manager will normally provide a preliminary
contract work breakdown structure as part of the RFP or
solicitation. This initial CWBS is the program manager's
preliminary definition of the product to be delivered. The
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CWBS establishes the structure for reporting and measuring
contract cost and schedule performance. This structure
identifies the WBS levels and elements for which cost and
schedule data will be reported. The CWBS is incorporated into
the CPR for the purposes of program planning and reporting
status. 1 According to DoD policy, CPR reporting is usually
limited to the first three levels of the CWBS; however, the
program manager may elect to extend the reporting level to
lower levels based on his assessment of program risk [Ref.
6:p. 8-1] . The depth of the CWBS levels should be to the
extent necessary to ensure adequate program planning, control,
and support. According to MIL-STD- 881A,
Military Standard Work Breakdown Structures for Defense
Material Items, "the contractor has complete flexibility in
extending the CWBS to reflect how his work is to be
accomplished" [Ref. 39:p. 11].
The RFP will establish various parameters in addition to
the CWBS. Some of the parameters to be established include
the reports required of the contractor, report frequency by
type, report due dates, and variance threshold values. The
RFP will also provide a program schedule. The PM should
ensure that the schedule reflects the CWBS structure and
supports all contract requirements. The program schedule
'The CPR is a monthly DoD report that is generated by the




represents the overall sequence of work and it provides a plan
for how the work will be accomplished in a given time frame.
C. PREAWARD: VARIANCE THRESHOLD ESTABLISHMENT
The contract's C/SCSC variance thresholds should be
addressed in the Government's RFP. Appropriate variance
threshold selection is critical to successful C/SCSC
implementation. According to the C/SCSC, contractor
explanation is required whenever a significant variance
results. A significant variance is any difference between
planned and actual performance that exceeds the prescribed
thresholds. A significant variance can either involve cost,
schedule, or both. Variance thresholds are normally applied
to the project summary level CWBS elements that are specified
to be reported within the contract.
The PM' s selection of meaningful thresholds is important
because they will prevent excessive, counterproductive
variance analysis, while still providing sufficient visibility
of program cost and schedule problems. The Joint
Implementation Guide (JIG) indicates that no particular
threshold, or set of thresholds, is optimal for all
situations. In addition, the JIG recommends that the PM
obtain provisions in the contract for modifying thresholds
whenever they become ineffective or unproductive [Ref . 6:p. 3-
17] .
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There are various approaches the PM can apply when setting
thresholds. One method entails establishing a variance
threshold based on a percentage of the budgeted cost of work
scheduled (BCWS) or budgeted cost of work performed (BCWP) and
a fixed dollar amount. 2 An example of this method would be to
set the variance thresholds at 10% BCWP or BCWS and $100,000.
This method is easy to understand; however, there can be a
pitfall. If a variance threshold is set too high (i.e., 25%
BCWP or BCWS and $500,000) then, significant cost and schedule
problems could arise before the PM gets visibility.
Another approach is to require variance analysis when the
cumulative variances exceed a specified percentage of BCWS or
BCWP for the first half of the program, and a smaller
percentage for the remainder. For example, a PM could set a
10% threshold for the first half of the program and 5% for the
second half. This illustrates a stair-step function threshold
that assumes that the contractor's performance will improve as
he nears the end of the program. OSD has an established "thumb
rule" which indicates that such an expectation may not be very
2BCWS is the value of all work scheduled to be accomplished
plus the amount of level of effort and apportioned effort as of the
CPR's cut-off date. Level of effort (LOE) refers to activities
that are supportive in nature (i.e., project management functions)
and it is normally measured by noting the passage of time (i.e.,
for LOE, BCWP = BCWS) . Apportioned effort may be discrete in
nature, but its accomplishment is directly related to the
performance of other work. Quality assurance activities would be an
example of apportioned effort. BCWP is the value of all completed
work packages and all portions of open work packages, plus the
appropriate amount of LOE and apportioned effort as of the CPR's
cut-off date.
26
realistic. For example, suppose a contract that is 15% or
more completed- to-date has an overrun in cost and/or schedule.
The thumb rule states that the overrun at completion will
either be equal to the overrun to date or the percent overrun
at completion will be greater than the percent overrun to date
[Ref 4:p. 272] . History shows that a contractor's performance
will not improve, rather, it shows that the contractor's
performance will either remain the same or worsen over time.
Another method uses a non- linear variance threshold
throughout the span of the program. An example of this type
of threshold is expressed by the formula:
(.005) x{BAC)x^CumBC"l
BAC
BAC refers to the budget at completion which is the value
of all work packages allocated to the contract. BAC equals
the sum of the BCWS at completion. "CUM" refers to cumulative
or total to date.
This approach avoids the stair-step function pitfall; however,
the formula is complex and may be difficult to follow.
In addition, this approach is limited in that it only
addresses cumulative to date cost and schedule performance.
For example, suppose for a 60 month contract the prescribed
thresholds are exceeded in month 12. The cumulative to date
variances that would be addressed in format five of the CPR in
month 12 would continue to be the same variances addressed in
all succeeding months. [Ref. 13 :p. 13] In essence, all
follow- on CPR narratives would become carbon copies of month
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12. This results in old problems overshadowing new ones. The
PM can improve upon this method by establishing a current
month threshold besides the cumulative to date thresholds.
This modification would provide the necessary visibility of
any new problems.
Finally, the PM could establish thresholds that require
variance analysis for only the top 50% of the cost and
schedule drivers that exceed a prescribed dollar value. This
technique has the benefit of keying in on those contract items
that reflect the greatest risk and/or cost. A variation on
this approach could be to restrict variance analysis to only
the top ten or twenty dollar amount or highest percentage
items. The Air Force Space Systems Division in Los Angeles
California has used this variation with moderate success
[Ref . 14] . According to one OSD analyst this is becoming the
perferred method for threshold establishment [Ref. 10].
In conclusion, it is very important that the PM establish
and maintain meaningful variance thresholds throughout the
program's duration. The PM must recognize the inherent
jeopardy in setting thresholds before the establishment of a
contractor performance measurement baseline (PMB)
.
3 The PM
may discover that the variance thresholds may no longer be
appropriate once the PMB has been established and operated by
the contractor. It is, therefore, recommended that the PM
3The PMB is the time phased budget plan against which
project performance is measured.
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conduct a periodic review (i.e., every six months) of his
variance thresholds and modify them as the situation dictates.
D. PREAWARD: THE RFP C/SCSC SOLICITATION CLAUSE AND COMPLIANCE
PLAN
It is through the RFP that the prospective contractor
begins to understand the PM's concern regarding cost, schedule
and technical risk issues. The various elements of the RFP
set into motion the cost and schedule (C/S) control
implementation process for the contract requiring C/SCSC.
Undoubtedly, a poorly written RFP that doesn't adequately
reflect the program manager's project needs will result in
subsequent contract changes. These changes probably will
translate into excessive costs for the Government regarding
C/SCSC implementation and subsequent C/S management. One
principal way the program manager specifies his requirements
regarding C/SCSC is the inclusion of the C/SCSC contract
clause 252.234-7001. The full text clause is contained in
Appendix C. The C/SCSC contract clause stipulates:
1. A contractor will use only approved C/SCSC management
systems throughout the performance of the contract.
2. A contractor will be ready to demonstrate his system's
compliance with the C/SCSC standards to a Government
Review Team within 90 days (or as otherwise specified)
after contract award.
3. A contractor must ensure all relevant documents, data,
and records associated with his management systems are
readily accessible for Government review and
surveillance.
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4. A contractor will ensure all changes to an already-




Any changes required of a contractor management system
to meet the C/S criteria will be made at the
contractor's expense.
6 When set forth in a contract (mutual agreement between
the Government and the prime contractor) , selected
sub- contractors under the prime's control will meet
C/SCSC standards to include all provisions regarding
system review, demonstration, and surveillance. [Ref.
18:pp. 252.234-2,3]
In addition, each contractor will submit a comprehensive
C/SCSC compliance plan for the management systems they intend
to use to execute the contract. Appendix D contains the exact
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS)
language regarding the C/SCSC compliance plan requirements.
According to the DFARS, the potential contractor's plan must
accomplish the following:
1. Describe the contractor's management system and
explain how his system will interface in all major
function cost areas (i.e., manufacturing, tooling, and
engineering) in relation to the WBS, planning,
budgeting, scheduling, work authorization, cost
accumulation, measurement and reporting of cost and
schedule performance, variance analysis, and PMB
control
.
2. Describe in detail how the contractor's management
system complies with each of the 35 criteria.
3. Name all major sub- contractors, or as a minimum
identify the contractual effort earmarked for sub-
contract and incongruities with C/SCSC.
4. Discuss how C/SCSC administration will be applied to
applicable sub- contractors . [Ref. 18:p. 252.234-1]
In response to the Government's C/SCSC clauses, the
potential contractor will conduct a thorough evaluation of the
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RFP and determine required resources, develop preliminary
schedules, propose budgets, and identify any risks he feels
exist within the contract. Based on these assessments, the
prospective contractor will coordinate his organization's
efforts, develop a negotiation or discussion strategy, and
then submit his proposal.
The PM should ensure that the RFP is complete and clearly
specifies program requirements before submission to
prospective contractors. This is important because contract
award can be made based upon the intial contractor proposal.
In addition, it is important that C/SCSC requirements are
clarified in the RFP and throughout the preaward process. To
do otherwise, could result in contractor misunderstandings
that might cause significant cost and schedule performance
shortfalls later in the program.
E. PREAWARD CONTRACTOR PROPOSALS
In response to the Government's solicitation or RFP, the
potential offeror will conduct a thorough evaluation of the
RFP and determine the required resources, develop preliminary
schedules, propose budget, and identify any risks he believes
may exist within the contract. Based on these assessments,
the prospective offeror will coordinate his organization's
efforts, develop a strategy, and then submit his proposal.
In compliance with the RFP C/SCSC requirements, the
prospective offeror's proposal will provide a detailed
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description of his existing internal cost management systems
and discuss his comprehensive C/SCSC compliance plan. In
addition, the offeror's proposal may recommend changes to the
preliminary CWBS provided in the RFP [Ref. 39:p. 5].
F. PREAWARD: NEGOTIATIONS OR DISCUSSIONS
If contract award is not made based upon the offeror's
initial proposal, then negotiations or discussions will ensue
between the Government and the contractor. It is during this
point of the preaward process that all participants begin "to
develop a common understanding of risk and resource
requirements needed to structure the program" [Ref. 16:p. 3].
Depending on the type of contract in question, a contract
target cost or an estimated contract cost will be established.
The contract target cost or estimated contract cost represents
the base dollar figure to accomplish the contract. This
contract cost will serve both as a point of departure and a
target for the prospective contractor to develop his internal
budgets . These internal budgets are developed at the
contractor's work package level and are summed to the cost
account level. A work package represents detailed, short-span
efforts identified for accomplishing work required to complete
the contract [Ref. 15:p. 11]. A cost account can include
several work packages and it is where functional
responsibility for the work is assigned. As a management
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control point, the cost account is where actual costs are
collected and compared to the budgeted cost of work performed.
The contract target cost or estimated contract cost also
represents the budget base figure from which the prospective
contractor will derive his performance measurement baseline.
The potential contractor develops his PMB through the
integration of the target cost (estimated contract cost) , the
SOW, and the formalized CWBS . Once the contract has been
awarded, the contractor's subsequent contract cost and
schedule performance will be evaluated against the PMB.
G. POST AWARD: ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
BASELINE
The C/SCSC implementation process continues after contract
award. At this point in the process, the contractor will
establish a management reserve (MR) . The MR is a portion of
the negotiated contract target cost or estimated contract cost
that is set aside for management control purposes to cover
contingencies.
The MR is not part of the initial PMB, and the amount of
MR is based upon the contractor's judgment. It will usually-
average between 8% to 12% of the contract target cost or
estimated contract cost [Ref. 16:p. 3]. As a thumb rule, the
greater the risk or cost; or the shorter the contract span,
the higher the management reserve will be [Ref. 8]. Typical
uses of the MR include covering unplanned work within the
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scope of the contract, rework, and cost offsets for rate
adjustments. The contractor must not; however, use MR to
cover cost variances [Ref. 15:p. 15].
The PM should pay close attention to the use of the MR,
particularly during the first half of the contract effort.
Early use of the management reserve could suggest a potential
contractor performance problem. The contractor is required to
report to the PM any change in the MR balance via the CPR.
The contractor's report will specify the amount of MR change,
the WBS elements that require the MR, and the rationale for
its use. Once the management reserve has been established,
the remaining contract budgpt will be allocated down to the
various contractor cost account levels where cost, schedule,
and technical performance responsibilities are delegated.
Once the the contractor has established the MR, he will
establish his detailed PMB and begin to operate within it. A
detailed PMB is essential to successful cost and schedule
management. According to the JIG, a detailed PMB represents
a concrete time -phased budget plan that extends as far out
into the future as is feasible [Ref. 6:p. 3-9] . The PM should
insist upon a PMB level of detail that supports his assessment
of program risk and the contractor's past performance record.
The PM should ensure that the contractor establishes a
detailed PMB as soon as practical after contract award. At
the very least, a detailed baseline needs to be in place for
all near term work (four to six months) . The absence of a
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near term PMB can result in an early loss of accurate contract
performance evaluation. According to an OSD cost analyst,
"Failure by the PM to get the awarded contractor on-line with
an early, concrete PMB will preclude initial, valid cost and
schedule reporting" [Ref. 10].
There are means available to the PM to stimulate a
contactor's urgency to establish a timely, detailed PMB. One
Defense Systems Management College, Cost Performance
Measurement Curriculum Professor advocates using progress
payments and/or contract in progress reviews to motivate
contractors to come on-line early after contract award with a
detailed PMB [Ref 14] . The amount of payment of certain
progress payments can be made contingent upon establishment of
a valid, detailed PMB by a certain time frame. In the other
case, the PM could link the establishment of the contractor's
detailed PMB to a periodic in progress performance review. As
part of the review, the contractor could be asked to formally
discuss his detailed PMB. Either approach can provide the PM
with the means to motivate the contractor to establish a
timely detailed PMB.
H. THE PMB CHANGE PROCESS
Successful program cost and schedule control is not only
tied to effective baseline establishment; but also to its
maintenance. Once a detailed PMB has been established to the
extent that earned value can be determined, the difficult task
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of maintaining its integrity begins. 4 The PMB is a "living
guideline" and should not be thought of as something rigid and
immutable
.
The PMB can change frequently throughout the span of the
contract. It is imperative to the integrity of cost and
schedule performance evaluation, that the PM ensures all
changes are carefully managed and are traceable to their
sources. Contract modifications should be formally documented
and incorporated into the PMB as soon as possible to avoid
distortions in contract performance reporting. The PM should
be aware of some basic rules that apply to PMB control:




The contractor is not authorized to make retroactive
adjustments to budgets for completed work.
Changes to the PMB can involve contractor rebaselining.
Rebaselining can take the form of either replanning or
reprogramming . Replanning involves a change in the original
PMB plan and includes internal and external replanning.
Internal replanning results from a need by the contractor to
compensate for cost, schedule, or technical problems
encountered that have made the original PMB unrealistic [Ref
.
4:p. 518] . The intent of internal replanning is to give the
contractor the flexibility to deal with cost and schedule
problems that arise and that are within the scope of work.
4Earned value is the measurement of the amount of work




For example, the contractor will occasionally find it
necessary to replan tasks into a different time frame, replan
future work in a more efficient manner, or apply management
reserve. The contractor can internally replan without the
PM' s approval if the contract target cost or estimated cost is
not exceeded; however, they should notify the PM.
There are some more general rules that apply to baseline
control under internal replanning:
1. The contractor cannot rebudget in-process work
packages
.




The contractor is prohibited from reopening completed
work packages
.
4. The contractor must not transfer work tasks from one
cost account to another without transferring the
internal budget earmarked for them. [Ref. 4: p. 73]
The PM can protect himself from surprise, by incorporating
up- front in the contract, a requirement for the contractor to
brief his baseline plan during periodic contractor/Government
reviews. In addition, the PM could request that the Procuring
Contracting Officer (PCO) establish a clause within the
contract that directs the contractor to inform the Government
whenever internal replanning occurs
.
External replanning results from Government directed
changes or constructive changes to the contract. This kind of
change may or may not remain within the scope of the original
contact; however, it will quite often result in a change in
the scope of the contract. Under this change condition, the
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contractor will assess the impact of the Government's changes
and provide his cost estimate to the Government. Again, the
PM should verify cost realism. The contractor must not change
his contract budget base (CBB) until the contract change is
authorized formally by the Government through a contract
modification. 5
The result of a directed change or constructive change will
require the contractor to externally replan work effort. When
a contractor externally replans, the previous PMB curve will
be adjusted to accommodate the directed changes.
Consequently, for a cost type contract, increased scope or
added work will probably mean an increase in the contract
target cost or estimated contract cost. On a final note,
contract internal replanning can eliminate schedule
performance variances to date; however, cost performance
variances will continue to be evident on the CPR because the
total allocated budget remains linked to the CBB [Ref. 4:p.
212] .
Reprogramming occurs when the total contract budget base is
insufficient to cover the remaining authorized work. In this
situation, the contractor will seek relief from his current
PMB by requesting Government approval to go to an over target
baseline. 6 A contractor request to go to an over target
5The CBB is the negotiated or discussed contract cost
plus any estimated cost of authorized, yet unpriced work.
6An OTB is a baseline which results from formal
reprogramming approved by the Government.
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baseline is, in essence, a formal declaration of an overrun
condition. At this point, the contractor must formally
request the Government's approval to manage to a higher target
cost or estimated contract cost.
An OTB should not be a frequent event and should only
happen when major problems exist in the contract. Formal
reprogramming or going to an OTB involves a complete, major
restructuring of the remaining effort of the contract and a
requirement for some additional contract funding. Under a
cost -reimbursable type contract, the contractor's profit or
fee probably wil be adjusted to reflect the contractor's now
over target baseline plan.
An over target baseline will affect the contractor's
future performance reporting. It is important that the PM
clearly understands the OTB's impact on contractor performance
reporting. A new baseline will be built on top of the overrun
baseline. In addition, all contract cost and schedule
variances will usually be eliminated or zeroed out; therefore,
for cost and schedule performance reporting, the contract
essentially starts over. Once these variances are made, the
adjustment applicable to each reported WBS element affected,
will be entered in column 12 of format one of the CPR. 7 An
example of the CPR's format one can be found in Appendix E.
7CPR format one provides data to measure cost and related
data for measuring contractor's cost and schedule performance
by summary level work breakdown structure elements. CPR
formats will be discussed in further detail in Chapter IV.
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The total of column 12 will equal the amount shown on the
variance adjustment line in column 11 of format one of the CPR
[Ref. 27:p. 16F] . The elimination of the previous cost and
schedule performance variances is important for management
purposes. If these variances were not zeroed out once the OTB
was established, the contractor's performance reports would
not reflect accurate or meaningful cost and schedule
information. In essence, any new cost and/or schedule
problems would be obscured by the previous cost and schedule
variances. By zeroing out previous cost and schedule
performance variances, the PM can maintain clear visibility of
the contractor's future contract cost and schedule
performance
.
As stated previously in this chapter, the establishment and
maintenance of the PMB are the most significant aspects of
contractor performance measurement. It is important that the
PM start off right regarding the PMB, particularly for a
program that is in the research and development stage of the
acquisition process. The PM can help his management efforts
by identifying key technical review points along the span of
the program during the negotiation process.
The PM should insist that the planning effort continue as
the contractual effort is accomplished. In addition, at each
identified review point, the program's cost, schedule, and
technical performance should be assessed. This assessment
should include provisions to review the adequacy of the
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contract target cost or estimated contract cost, and create a
catalyst for detailed planning for the next review point.
I. C/SCSC VALIDATION
Another step in the C/SCSC implementation process involves
the validation or verification of the contractor's management
control system. Validation represents phase one of the C/SCSC
surveillance process that begins after the award of the
contract and continues through system demonstration and
acceptance. The validation process includes a series of
reviews conducted by a Government review team of selected
representatives from the program office and Defense Contract
Management Command
.
The validation is designed to evaluate or verify that a
contractor's internal control management practices and
procedures are effective, fulfill the C/SCSC, and generate
valid data. There are varying degrees of review application
depending upon whether the awarded contractor has a previously
accepted C/SCSC management system. Contractors who have a
previously accepted system will usually cite in their proposal
the formal notice of prior acceptance of their system and use
a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that states the
contractor's agreement to use his accepted system on all
contracts that require C/SCSC. Based on this, and any
previous experience with the awarded contractor, the ACO
together with the PM and members of his staff, will determine
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the type of review process to be used. Contractors who have
a previously accepted system can expect to undergo a
Subsequent Application Review (SAR) or an Extended Subsequent
Application Review (ESAR)
.
The SAR is a more informal review. It is usually short in
duration (3 to 5 days) . Normally, contractors should expect
to be ready for a SAR within 9 days after contract award.
The purpose of the SAR is not to reassess a contractor's
previously accepted system, but to verify that the contractor
is correctly and effectively applying the accepted system
(revised with any approved changes) on the new contract [Ref
.
6: pp. 7-1 - 7-3]. As a final note on SARs, they are used as
often as necessary, throughout the performance of the contract
to ensure that the contractor's re-validated system is still
being used [Ref. 17]
.
The ESAR also can be applied to a contractor who has had a
previously accepted system. The ESAR differs from the SAR in
that it is more formal and usually requires about ten days to
complete. An ESAR is performed whenever contractor conditions
have altered, such as when programs have moved from one phase
to another (e.g., development to production), whenever
programs are moved or extended or when a contractor's
previously accepted C/SCSC system description has had
extensive revisions [Ref. 6:p. 5-3]. As with the SAR, a
contractor who is designated to receive an ESAR should expect
to be ready within 90 days after contract award.
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For the contractor who does not have a previously accepted
C/SCSC system, a different set of review actions occurs. Upon
award of a contract requiring C/SCSC, the contractor can
expect to receive an Implementation Visit (preliminary review)
followed by a Readiness Assessment Review. Finally, when
ready, the contractor will undergo a Demonstration Review to
validate his system.
The Implementation Visit occurs after contact award
(usually within 30 days) and involves an initial visit by
representatives from the Government C/SCSC Review Team to the
contractor's plant facility. The purpose of this visit is to
accomplish the following:
1. Establish a preliminary dialogue between both parties
and review the contractor's plans for implementation
of his C/SCSC system on the newly awarded contract.
2. Identify any deficiencies or shortcomings regarding
C/SCSC compliance and clarify any misinterpretations
that the contractor may have with respect to the 35




Contractor will normally conduct briefings aimed at
providing to the Government representatives a
preliminary understanding of the contractor's systems
design and operation. Additionally, the Government
will examine several documents (such as
system procedures, budgets, performance reports,
schedules, etc.)
4. Establish a date and schedule for a readiness
assessment review. [Ref 6:p. 5-3]
The Readiness Assessment Review involves a series of
meetings between the Government Demonstration Review Team and
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the contractor. 8 It usually occurs about 30 days after the
Implementation Visit. The purpose of the Readiness Review is
to decide whether the contractor's system is ready for a
Demonstration Review. As with the Implementation Visit,
contractor deficiencies are identified for correction and key
team members of the Government Review Team are further
familiarized with the contractor's management systems in
preparation for the full-scale Demonstration Review. Any
system deficiencies found during the Readiness review must be
corrected prior to the Demonstration Review.
The Demonstration Review is an in-depth examination of the
contractor's management control systems, designed to ascertain
whether the contractor's system complies with the criteria and
is being used. Of all the reviews, the Demonstration Review
is the most complex and intense. The Government's Review Team
is usually composed of 15-20 people who will spend three to
four weeks at the contractor's facility interviewing a series
of different personnel (cost account managers, functional
managers, schedulers, etc.) and examining all pertinent
documents (ledgers, logs, control charts, initial cost
performance reports, etc.) associated with budgeting, work
authorization, and accounting to ascertain contractor C/SCSC
compliance. The Demonstration Review also will investigate
the prime contractor's actions or procedures to ensure, as
8The Government demonstration review team will consist of
persons from the following organizations, program office,
matrix support, DCAA, and the CAO.
44
appropriate, that each of his sub - contractor ' s systems is in
compliance with C/SCSC. According to the Joint Implementation
Guide, "The prime contractor is responsible for the review and
acceptance of each sub- contractor' s management control system
that requires application of C/SCSC unless the Government has
accepted the responsibility because of a request from either
the prime or sub- contractor for the Government to perform the
review" [Ref. 6:p. 5-46].
The Demonstration Review concludes with a formal report
that discusses all team actions and findings. The team's
report will state whether the contractor's management system
is adequate and meets the C/SCSC. If the contractor's system
fails to comply with the criteria, the report will outline in
detail all areas of non-compliance. If the contractor should
fail the Demonstration Review, they must implement corrective
actions and undergo follow-up reviews until their system is
accepted and receives a letter of validation.
After a contractor's management control system has been
either re-validated, or accepted for the first time, the
second phase of the C/SCSC surveillance process involves the
formalization of the surveillance plan and the establishment
of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the Contract
Administration Office and the Program Manager. The
surveillance plan provides a structured, in-depth outline of
surveillance responsibilities, procedures and techniques to be
used in the performance of C/SCSC surveillance on a specific
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contractor management control system. The plan's specific
design is based on the program manager's concerns, contractual
requirements, the nature of the management control system to
be monitored, and the availability of surveillance personnel.
The surveillance plan consists of two parts. The first
part is general in nature and describes such issues as
organization responsibilities, frequency of reports (i.e.,
CPR) , and the review cycle (i.e., SARs every 12 months) . Part
two is very specific and discusses what contractor areas will
be evaluated and surveillance techniques to be used. The end
goal of the plan is to ensure that:
1. The accepted contractor's system continues to be
used.
2. Valid and timely contract performance measurement
information is provided.
3. Actual or potential problems are identified early.
4. Surveillance efforts, between the CAO and the program
manager, remain coordinated. [Ref. 6:p. 6-1]
A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) is established, between the
cognizant CAO and the program office, to ensure that
surveillance responsibilities are understood. The provisions
of the MOA will vary depending upon the Military Department
involved, CAO capabilities, and the PM's desires [Ref. 19 :p.
3-9]
. The MOA is developed in consonance with the
surveillance plan and is normally activated before the finish
of a Demonstration Review or SAR. The MOA should provide a
means for resolving problems and promoting better
communications. In addition, it minimizes duplication of
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efforts, and functions in concert with the surveillance plan
to explain fully, the C/SCSC surveillance to be accomplished.
J. CHAPTER SUMMARY
In chapter III, the C/SCSC implementation process was
discussed. This chapter focused on the Government's C/SCSC
interface with the contractor during the contract preaward,
negotiation/competition, and post award phases. Chapter III
also focused on the establishment and maintenance of the
performance measurement baseline. Finally, this chapter
desribed the contractor C/SCSC validation process. The
"validation process" discussion addressed the various system
reviews and provided insight into the surveillance plan.
Chapter IV will focus on aspects of contract cost and
schedule analysis. This chapter will discuss the Cost
Performance Report, including its format and function. In
addition, it will concentrate on aspects of CPR analysis and
provide the PM with an understanding of earned value methods
.
This chapter will also address some options that the PM can
use when his analysis indicates contractor cost and schedule
management problems. Finally, Chapter IV will expose the PM
to some software packages that are available to assist him in
his performance analysis efforts.
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IV. COST PERFORMANCE REPORT ANALYSIS, MANAGEMENT ACTIONS,
AND SOFTWARE TOOLS
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION
Chapter IV will address contract cost and schedule
performance analysis. The discussion will focus on the Cost
Performance Report, including its format and function. In
addition, it will concentrate on the aspects of CPR analysis.
It will provide the PM with an appreciation of the impact of
this analysis on program cost and schedule management.
Chapter IV also will describe some options the PM can take
when his contractor's performance analysis shows cost and
schedule problems and/or C/SCSC compliance problems. Finally,
Chapter IV will discuss some software packages that are
available to assist the PM with performance analysis.
B. THE COST PERFORMANCE REPORT (CPR)
DoDI 5000.2 does not specify any formal reporting
requirements or formats for the contractor. It does state,
however, that the contractor's management control systems
shall include policies, procedures, and methods that are
designed to ensure that the contractor shall accomplish the
considerations highlighted in Attachment 1, entitled "C/SCSC"
[Ref. 7:p. ll-B-2]. C/SCSC also does not mandate that the
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contractor submit any specific report. Instead, the criteria
require that the contractor's internal management systems will
have the capability to produce and report certain types of
data. For example, Attachment 1, C/SCSC, states that the
contractor's management control systems will, "Identify on a
monthly basis, the cost detail needed by management for
effective control, including cost variances with reasons for
significant variances" [Ref . 7:p. ll-B-1-3] . It is Government
practice to use the Cost Performance Report (CPR) for C/SCSC
applied contracts.
The CPR is the principal Government document to measure
the contractor's contract performance on a major defense
contract. 9 DoD 5000. 2 -M, Part 20, Section 3B states that the
CPR is required on all contracts which must comply with C/SCSC
[Ref. 9:p. 20-7] . The CPR is prepared by the contractor on a
monthly basis and provides structured, summary level cost and
schedule information. This information must be generated
directly from the same systems used for internal contractor
management. The CPR's purpose is to provide the PM with the
status of his program and the impact of any problems. In
addition, the CPR provides the PM with a basis for detailed
9This report is covered within DoD 5000. 2 -M, Part 20,
"Cost Management Reports", pp. 20-7 through 20-8. The CPR
applies to any contract requiring C/SCSC compliance and also
to development and procurement contracts having dollar
thresholds of $60 million and $280 million respectively in FY
1980 dollars.
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analysis of contractor cost and schedule data and a means to
identify any adverse trends. The report should be used by the
Government surveillance personnel to monitor and evaluate
cumulative actual work performed versus planned work, and
cumulative actual costs incurred versus budgeted costs. The
CPR is also used to report to Congress whenever the contractor
exceeds the 15% and 25% thresholds established by the Nunn-
McCurdy Amendment
.
10 When used as a management tool , the CPR
can provide indications of actual and potential cost and
schedule problems, including the impact of previous management
corrective actions. The CPR is also useful in quantifying
problems discovered through DPRO surveillance.
The CPR consists of five different formats. The first
format provides data for the measurement of contractor cost
and schedule perfomance by summary level WBS elements. The
purpose of format one is to show the cost and schedule
variance associated with each WBS element [Ref. 4:p. 233],
The specific data elements discussed in format one include:
1. Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled (BCWS) - This is the
value of all work scheduled to be accomplished plus
10The Nunn-McCurdy Amendment requires a report to Congress
when a system's total program unit cost and/or annual
procurement unit cost exceeds the system's Selected
Acquisition Report's baseline by 15% and 25% respectively.
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the amount of level of effort and apportioned effort
as of the CPR's cutoff date. 11 BCWS is listed by-
each WBS element.
2. Actual Cost of Work Performed (ACWP) - This is the
overall cost, both direct and indirect, incurred and
recorded in the accomplishment of the work performed
within a given period of time. ACWP is listed by
each WBS element
.
3. Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (BCWP) - This is the
value of all work packages completed and portions of
open work packages, plus the appropriate amount of
LOE and apportioned effort as of the CPR's cut-off
date. BCWP is also listed by each WBS element.
4. Schedule Variance (SV) - This represents the
difference between BCWP and BCWS specified work.
5. Cost Variance (CV) - This represents the difference
between BCWP and ACWP for specified work. The current
month CV is the cost variance for a given month and
the present cumulative CV is the total cost variance
for the contract up to date.
6. Budget at Completion (BAC) - This is the value
allocated to each WBS element within the contract.
BAC is also equal to the sum of the aggregate BCWS at
completion.
7. Estimate at Completion (EAC) - This is the estimate of
actual contract direct and indirect costs allocable
to the contract, plus those direct and indirect costs
estimated for any authorized work remaining.
8. Undistributed Budget (UB) - This is the budget
applicable to any known or scheduled work effort that
11 As stated previously in Chapter III, LOE refers to
general or supportive type work which cannot be associated
with a definable end product and is unable to be controlled by
time-phased budgets. Daily contractor program management
would be an example of LOE type work. Apportioned effort
refers to effort that by itself is not readily divisible into
short -span work packages; however, is related directly to the
performance of other work. For example, quality assurance
inspections would be treated as apportioned effort.
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has not yet been linked to a specific WBS element for
detailed planning. UB is recognized as a temporary
holding account.
9 . Management Reserve (MR) - This represents the amount
of money the contractor has witheld from the budget
base for management control purposes . This money is
not part of the PMB, but is part of the contract
budget base.
The second format provides information about the same data
elements addressed in format one; however, the second format
is sorted by the contractor's organizational or functional
structure versus the work break down structure used in format
one
.
Format three shows the performance measurement baseline
(PMB) which reflects the contractor's initial target costs,
projections for the remainder of the program at six month
intervals, and any changes which have occurred to the PMB
during the report period. In essence, this format provides a
summary of the PMB (including changes) , UB, and MR.
Format four uses the same functional categories used in
format two. This format indicates the contract manpower
requirements. It shows actual man months (vs. actual dollar
costs as in format two) consumed for the report period and
cumulative to date, a manpower usage forecast (in terms of man
months) for the next six months, and a total manpower forecast
at completion.
Format five is perhaps the most important format of the CPR
for the program manager. It provides an analysis summary
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report of major problems to date and explains any major
changes to the baseline. Finally, it addresses all
significant cost and schedule variances which exceed
thresholds. As stated previously in Chapter III, whenever
contractually prescribed thresholds are exceeded, a
significant variance results. Each significant variance
requires a separate performance analysis report discussing the
variance's impact on the program. Additionally, each analysis
report will include the contractor's plan to rectify the
significant cost and/or schedule variance problems (s).
The CPR supports the development of other management
oversight reports from the program manager to higher
authority. These reports include the Defense Acquisition
Executive Summary (DAES) and the Selected Acquisition Report
(SAR) . The DAES is prepared by the program office and
submitted quarterly by the PM to the Program Executive Officer
(PEO)
,
and also to the Component Acquisition Executive and the
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) to reflect program
status updates. The DAES report is designed to provide
advance warning of program problems before they become
significant [Ref . 9: p. 16-1] . The data from the CPR is found
within Section 7 of the DAES, "Supplemental Cost Information".
The SAR is also prepared by the program office and is
submitted annually to Congress. The SAR provides a summary of
key costs, schedule, technical baseline information, and
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program variance analysis relative to a baseline total program
unit cost and a yearly unit cost value recorded in the
baseline SAR for the contract [Ref. 9:p. 17-1]. CPR data is
used for completing Section 8, "Threshold Breaches," Section
9, "Schedule," Section 15, "Contract Information," and Section
17, "Production Rate Data" of the SAR. The Integrated Program
Summary report also incorporates CPR data in order to provide
the current execution status of the contract cost estimate-at-
completion (EAC)
,
program schedule, and the program's achieved
performance [Ref. 9:p. 4-A-2]
.
C. CPR DATA ANALYSIS
The CPR provides the PM with the data necessary to evaluate
the contractor's performance. Analysis of these data by the
PM and his staff, should support three objectives. First, the
analysis should focus on identifying any negative trends.
Negative trends will indicate a need for the PM to conduct
further research in order to isolate specific problem areas.
This research may require additional, more detailed
information about various summary level WBS elements addressed
in the CPR. Second, the analysis should concentrate on
evaluating the contractor's performance against his PMB plan.
Finally, the analysis should provide the PM with the ability
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to project how the contract will conclude in terms of cost and
schedule parameters, given current contractor performance.
D. CPR ANALYSIS TOOLS
From a problem solving standpoint, formats one and five of
the CPR will provide all the essential data elements that the
PM and program staff need to analyze the contractor's
performance. These elements were addressed previously in the
CPR format discussion of this chapter. From these elements,
the contract schedule variance, cost variance, cost/schedule
performance indices, and the variance at completion can be
calculated.
The schedule variance (SV) quantifies schedule deviation in
dollars [Ref . 20 :p. 4-5] . This value can also be equated to
time (days, months, etc.) to provide the PM with a clear
understanding of to what degree the project is behind or ahead
of schedule. The SV is calculated as the difference between
work scheduled and work performed (SV = BCWP - BCWS) . If the
variance is positive, then the SV indicates a favorable, or
ahead of schedule status. If the SV is negative, then the SV
indicates a behind schedule condition.
The SV is a measure of in- process work only because the SV
is zero before work is started or planned to start, and zero
after work is finished or planned to finish [Ref. 21 :p. 5]
.
The PM should recognize that the SV may not reflect the
55
contract's critical path. 12 The SV is not a replacement for
time- related scheduling systems such as PERT/CPM and GANTT;
however, schedule status information should be relatable,
regardless of which system is used [Ref. 20:p. 4-5]. For
example, if the time -related system indicates a behind
schedule condition, yet the SV is positive, then perhaps work
which is being done ahead of schedule is counterbalancing
behind shedule work. On the other hand, this situation might
also suggest that the contractor's BCWS and BCWP data are
questionable. If the validity of the BCWS and/or BCWP is in
question, the PM should investigate further by requesting
additional data from the contractor and/or request his DPRO
conduct a special investigation to determine the facts.
Cost variance (CV) is determined as the difference between
budgeted costs and actual costs for all work performed (CV =
BCWP - ACWP) . A positive CV reflects a favorable or cost
underrun condition, while a negative CV indicates an
unfavorable or cost overrun program status. As stated
previously in this chapter, all significant variances must be
investigated, explained and acted upon by the contractor.
However, it should be emphasized that negative CVs are not
always the result of poor contractor performance. Negative
12The critical path is the longest event path in time
throughout the program. Any slippage of an activity or event
on the critical path will impact program completion.
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CVs may result from poor, up-front cost estimates, or economic
factors such as inflation [Ref . 20 :p. 4-6] . In any case, when
significant CVs occur, the PM should investigate the cause (s)
and concentrate his efforts on controlling cost growth
throughout the remaining effort.
There are three key cost/schedule performance indicators
used in analyzing CPR data. These include the Cost
Performance Index (CPI) , the To Complete Performance Index
(TCPI) , and the Schedule Performance Index (SPI) . The CPI
indicates the amount of work that was completed versus the
dollars spent. It is calculated as BCWP/ACWP, and it
represents return on the dollar or cost efficiency. The
higher the CPI, the greater the cost efficiency. For example,
if the CPI equals 1.0, then the program is on cost; however,
if the CPI is equal to .9, then it means that for every one
dollar spent, only $.90 of the work is completed (i.e.,
leading to a cost overrun)
.
The TCPI also represents the return on the dollar. It is
calculated as (BAC - BCWP) / (BAC - ACWP) . The TCPI shows how
efficient the contractor's CPI will have to be on the
remaining contractual effort in order not to experience a cost
overrun. For example, if the TCPI equals 1.2, then the
contractor's CPI must be at least equal to 1.2 for the
remainder of the contract, or the program will result in a
cost overrun.
57
The SPI indicates the schedule efficiency with which work
has been done and is calculated as BCWP/ BCWS . An SPI of less
than one, indicates a behind schedule condition. For example,
if the SPI is equal to .97, then only 97% of the work
scheduled has been accomplished.
The Variance at Completion (VAC) is the projection of the
cost variance at contract completion. The VAC is calculated as
BAC - EAC. A positive VAC equates to an underrun condition at
completion and a negative VAC means an overrun condition at
completion. The VAC value will depend upon how the EAC is
calculated. 13
E. ESTIMATES AT COMPLETION
The EAC is addressed in format one of the CPR. It should
be developed by those contractor personnel who are well
informed regarding anticipated work performance and problems,
future resource costs, and future business requirements [Ref
.
20 :p. 4-7] . During the early phases of the program, the
formula: EAC = ACWP + (BAC - BCWP) is considered to be an
appropriate approach [Ref. 20:p. 3-3]. As time progresses;
13The EAC value can be calculated using a variety of
formulas that can result in significantly different numbers.
EAC's have a tendency to reflect contractor optimism and may
be understated. An optmistic EAC value may not accurately
reflect the contract's performance. Consequently, a VAC value
that is based on an unrealistic or overly optimistic EAC may
also be understated.
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however, there may be reason to believe that past performance
is no longer indicative of future performance. When this
happens, the EAC formula should incorporate any or all of the
cost/schedule performance indices to generate a more realistic
EAC.
There has been considerable debate over which EAC formula
best represents a program at a specific CPR reporting point.
According to a study developed for the Naval Weapons
Engineering Support Activity, the accuracy of an EAC method is
very dependent upon whether a contract is in its early,
middle, or last stages [Ref. 22:p. 5]. The study provided a
recommended template of EAC formulas to use based on the stage
of a contract's completion.
The study proposed that a relevant range of EAC's for early
or middle contract completion stages could be obtained using
the following formulas:
1. EAC (1) = BAC / CPI(cum) 14
2. EAC (2) = ACWP(cum) + [BCWR / (CPI / (CPI cum) X SPI
cum) ] 15
14For each EAC formula, there will be a number in
parentheses following the abbreviation EAC. This number
signifies a specific EAC formula. This identification method
will be used throughout the discussion on the EAC formulas,
proposed by the Naval Weapons Engineering Support Activity
Study.
15BCWR refers to the Budgeted Cost of Work Remaining. It
is the difference between BAC and BCWP(cum). The Naval
Weapons Engineering Support Activity Study introduced this
term.
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3. EAC (3) = ACWP(cum) + (BCWR/CPI*) 16 [Ref . 23 :p. 4]
For contracts in later completion stages, a relevant range
of EAC's could be derived using the following formulas:
1
.
EAC ( 3 ) = same as above
2. EAC (4) = ACWP(cum) + (BCWR/CPI**) 17
3. EAC (5) = ACWP(cum) + (BCWR/CPI***) 18 [Ref. 23 :p. 4]
The reader will note, that there are apparent differences
between the range of EAC formulas calculated for early or
middle stage contracts and those calculated for later stage
contracts. The SPI is the more relevant performance indicator
during the early stages of the contract. This is because the
SPI will eventually equate itself to one, later in the
contract, assuming the contract is not terminated [Ref. 23: p.
5] . Because of this SPI characteristic, SPI is not used to
calculate EACs in contracts that are in their later stages of
completion.
The other significant difference is how the CPI is
calculated for early or middle stage contacts versus later
stage contacts. For early or middle stage contracts, a
cumulative CPI is used; whereas, it is not for the later stage
16CPI* is calculated using the sum of the latest three
months current BCWP, divided by the sum of the latest three
months current ACWP.
17CPI** is calculated using the average of the CPI from
the current period plus CPIs from the last 11 months.
18CPI *** is calculated using the latest six months
current BCWP divided by the latest six months current ACWP.
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contracts. The reason for this is that cumulative cost
variance figures can conceal the effect of recent cost
variances [Ref 23 :p. 5] . Under both circumstances, the study
concluded that EAC(3) was appropriate for use, because it
provides a near term perspective based upon a CPI
calculated using a three month moving average for both BCWP
and ACWP [Ref. 23:p. 5].
The Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) advocates using a
single EAC formula that uses a combination of a weighted CPI
and SPI to date. The AFSC EAC formula is calculated as
follows:
EAC = ACWP + (BAC - BCWP)/(.2SPI + .8CPI) [Ref. 25 :p. 8]
Various Air Force studies have shown the AFSC EAC to be a
reliable forecasting EAC. For example, an Aeronautical
Systems Division study found that the .2/. 8 weighted formula
was found to be more accurate than eleven other EAC formulas
tested. This finding was based on the fact that the .2/. 8
weighted formula had the lowest coefficient of variation or
ratio of standard deviation to the mean [Ref 25 :p. 8] . The
study's data base included 26 programs which ranged in dollar
value from $700,000 to $6,000,000 and ranged in duration from
18 months to 10 years [Ref 25:p. 8].
Another AF study that also supports the AFSC's EAC formula,
examined 15 contracts (13 Research and Development Contracts
and 2 Production Contracts) which ranged in value from
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$600,000 to $72,000,000 and ranged in duration of 15 months to
five years [Ref . 25 :p. 8] . This study is unique in that the
data were gathered at the intervals of 25%, 50%, and 75%
stages of contract completion. Using the AFSC EAC formula,
the following results were obtained:
1. At 25% of contract effort, 77% of the contract EAC's
fell within +/- 15% of the final actual costs.
2. At 50% of contract effort, 86% of the contract EAC's
fell within +/- 10% of the final actual costs.
3. At 75% of the contract effort, 93% of the contract
EAC's fell within +/- 8% of the final actual costs
[Ref. 25:p. 9]
.
The results are quite impressive. The AFSC's EAC formula
provides the PM with reasonable forecasted final cost
information and the lead time necessary to make sound
management decisions.
In selecting which EAC formuls(s) to use, the PM must keep
in mind that they are "quick look" estimates and are not the
absolute truth. Conclusions should not be made from numerical
performance data without regard to program technical
complexity, schedule constraints, and contractor historical
performance [Ref. 22 :p. 4] . A thorough understanding of these
factors will help the PM and his staff to make more meaningful
assessments about current and predicted program performance.
In addition, it will help the PM and his staff to ensure that
the declared EAC is based on data which accurately relect the
contract's performance.
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Regardless of which EAC formula is used, the PM should
ensure that the contractor reported BCWS, BCWP, and ACWP are
graphed or drawn out. According to an OSD analyst, the BCWS
and BCWP projections must intersect at target cost and
completion date. The ACWP must intersect the contractor's EAC
at completion. An illustration of this is found in Appendix
F. If the PM's projections of these relationships (BCWP,
BCWS, ACWP) appear unrealistic, then the accuracy of the
contractor EAC is questionable and possibly misstated. This
graphing drill is a useful tool for the PM, because it serves
to raise a "red flag". According to one EAC expert, "On large
contracts, the absolute impact of cost/schedule variances and
misstated EACs has greater significance, even if the variances
or misstatements are very small percentages of the total
contract" [Ref. 23:p. 5].
F. CPR ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
Having discussed some of the CPR analysis tools, it is
equally important to discuss a CPR analysis methodology. As
an initial step, the PM and his staff should examine format
five of the CPR. The PM should focus his examination on those
areas the contractor's problem analysis has identified as
principal contributors to significant variances. Second, the
PM's staff should validate the C/S performance data in format
one of the CPR and determine if the format one data
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corroborates the contractor's problem analysis in format five.
Third, if the format one validation and format five problem
analysis are in agreement, then the PM should proceed with
determination of CPR analysis factors (i.e., CV, SV, VAC,
etc.) discussed previously in this chapter. If there is a
disconnect between the two formats, then the PM should contact
his DPRO and request their help in determining the facts.
Fourth, the PM or a member of the program's staff should staff
sketch or graph out the BCWP, BCWS, ACWP, EAC and BAC
elements. The data points on a sketch or graph can be
projected out on a straight line basis, thereby permitting the
PM to anticipate any tendency towards a cost overrun and a
schedule slippage 19 [Ref . 23: p. 5]. Finally, the PM should
ask for a second independent assessment of the contractor's
performance should his and the contractor's evaluation of
future contract performance (EAC) greatly differ. The DCAA
can provide the PM with an independent EAC assessment of his
program's performance. The PM can coordinate this support
through his cognizant CAO.
On a final note, it is recommended that the PM obtain
copies of the Air Force Systems Command Pamphlet 173-4, "Guide
to Analysis of Contractor Cost Data," dated 1 September 1989.
19The PM could utilize a CPR data analysis package like
Performance Analyzer to assist in graphing out the various
elements. CPR analysis software packages will be discussed in
greater detail later in this chapter.
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This pamphlet provides great instruction regarding the
generation and interpretation of cost and schedule analysis
information. In addition, the pamphlet is concise, easy to
follow, and an overall excellent desktop reference. The PM
can inquire about obtaining this pamphlet by writing or
calling the Air Force Systems Command. Their address and
phone number can be found at Appendix F.
G. EARNED VALUE
The Honorable Donald J. Yockey, as the keynote speaker for
the 1991 C/SCSC National Workshop, called for a return to
basics in program management. Specifically, he stated,
. . .we need more realism throughout acquisition. .
.realism in our planning, realism in our estimating,
hard-nosed realism at all decision points. Earned
value. . .is one of the best ways I know of to put
realism into the process [Ref. 24:p. 16].
Earned value is central to C/SCSC, and it is an essential part
of any PM' s "early warning" system [Ref. 24:p. 17]. In
addition, earned value offers the PM with a productive,
proactive management approach to program cost and schedule
control. One of the key questions that the PM should ask
regarding program cost, schedule, and performance objectives
is: "Are the expenditures of budgeted funds commensurate with
the progress being accomplished?" [Ref. 26: pp. 71-72] . Earned
value application can provide the answer to the above
question.
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Earned value is used to quantitatively measure planned and
completed work, and it is expressed in dollars. Earned value
equates to BCWP; however, without an established baseline plan
(BCWS/PMB) there is no foundation for determining earned value
[Ref. 4:p. 119]. There are three rules associated with
calculating earned value. They are:
1. Performance measurement must occur at the contractor's
lowest possible level. For C/SCSC contracts, this
means work package level
.
2. The contractor's earned value (BCWP) calculation must
be accomplished in a manner consistent with the way
the plan (BCWS) was originally established. This will
ensure that comparisons between BCWP and BCWS have
minimum distortion.
3. Once BCWP has been reported on the CPR, no
retroactive adjustments can be made by the contractor,
except for legitimate accounting errors. [Ref.
4:p. 120]
Earned value measurement is dependent upon the type of
method used by the contractor to measure his work progress.
As discussed previously in Chapter III, the contractor's
internal management systems are evaluated during the
validation process. During this process, both the PM and his
review team representatives need to gain an understanding of
how the contractor intends to measure work progress for in-
process work. 20 Under earned value management, work that is
complete as of the CPR cut-off date earns 100% of its BCWS;
20In-process work refers to that work in progress; yet,
not completed by the CPR cut-off date.
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while work that has not begun as of the CPR cut-off date earns
0% of its BCWS . The value earned for in-process work as of
the CPR cut-off date depends on which method the contractor
uses to measure in-process work.
Earned value methods are applied to labor, material, and
other direct costs, and are categorized as discrete,
apportioned, and level of effort[Ref. 15: p. 16]. In keeping
with C/SCSC, apportioned and level of effort should represent
only a minimum part of all work; therefore, the majority of
the cost accounts should consist of discrete effort work
packages [Ref. 4: p. 121]. Despite the kind of effort
involved or the method selected by the contractor to measure
earned value (BCWP) , the contract BCWS must be determined by
the same method [Ref. 27: p. 82c].
There are various earned value methods available such as
the "0/100" technique, percent complete, milestone method, and
earned standards. The first three techniques or methods apply
well to engineering or non-recurring type efforts. The final
method favors manufacturing or recurring type efforts.
The "0/100" method establishes that work packages earn no
value until completed. Therefore, 0% is earned when the
package has begun, and 100% is earned when the package is
completed. This technique is not a good approach for effort
that exceeds one reporting period because it would greatly
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distort performance if applied to long work packages [Ref.
15:p. 17]
.
The percent complete method assigns earned value based upon
a subjective estimate of the percent of work completed on the
total work package during a reporting period. In order to
minimize the subjectivity of this method, the contractor can
employ an earned value credit ceiling (i.e., 85% of the total
value of the work package) that can be taken prior to work
package completion. This method is recommended for use on
longer span work packages (i.e., greater than two months) that
do not have interim milestones, or where the establishment of
interim milestones is so scattered or few in number as to
preclude an effective indication of interim performance [Ref.
27:p. 82-0]
.
The milestone method is quite objective in that all earned
value credit is taken when the milestone is achieved. 21
Milestones are selected based on objectivity, auditability,
and stability. This method works well when work packages
exceed three or more months in duration [Ref. 4: pp. 122-123] .
The final method, earned standards, is quite complex.
Earned value is based upon comparison of work package progress
to pre-established operation standards. Earned value credit
21Milestones are objective indicators or events that
indicate a start, stop, or an achievement of a specific stage
of an activity at which point earned value credit can be
taken.
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is not taken under this method in the event of loss or rework.
BCWP or earned value credit, can not be taken until MR has
been applied and the BCWS is planned for the rework. [Ref.
15:p. 20] .
Earned value is a business management tool that the PM can
use to help him with his contract performance measurement. In
addition, the earned value concept can assist the PM'
s
cognizant Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) to evaluate
progress payment requests. Which earned value method is best,
is up for debate. It is the contractor who decides which
earned value method to use, nonetheless, the Government PM
needs to understand the principles behind the chosen method.
Both parties should arrive at an agreement to use an earned




As stated previously in this chapter, the Government PM
must be proactive in his analysis efforts in order to gain a
timely, accurate assessment of the cost and schedule status of
his program. This same proactive philosophy must be carried
forward into PM management actions when program problems
arise. At some point in a program, the Government PM may face
a situation in which a contractor is poorly managing a
contract and/or is not managing the contract in accordance
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with C/SCSC. Under these circumstances, the PM' s program is
quite vulnerable to additional costs and increased risks. The
goal of a proactive PM should be to directly confront "off-
track" contractor efforts by taking early action to turn
around a sustained, unfavorable trend before it erodes beyond
repair. The PM, through his cognizant ACO, has several
actions/remedies available to motivate the contractor to
improve his contract cost and schedule control efforts.
A useful, initial action is simply to talk with the
contractor. Usually a "heart-to-heart" talk with the
contractor will be sufficient to straighten out any perceived
problems. The PM could also express his concerns to the
contractor in writing. The letter is a more formal way for
the PM to further communicate his concerns to the contractor.
Government progress payments can be reduced or suspended
when contract requirements are not met. If warranted, this
method is very effective in getting the contractor's
attention. The contractor's CPR provides the ACO with the
objective measures he will need to support his progress
payment reduction or suspension decision. Often, just the
threat of imposing progress payment reductions or suspensions
is enough to turn the contractor's efforts around". Before
imposing this action, the PM and the ACO would be advised to
evaluate the contractor's current financial capability.
Imposing progress payment reduction or suspension measures on
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a contractor with a weak financial condition could exacerbate
the contractor's current performance problems [Ref . 28 :p. 20] .
Another action available to the PM through the ACO is the
reduction of the contractor billings and/or reduction of
overhead billing rates. The reduction of contractor billings,
can be used when it is found that deliverables for which the
contractor has already been paid are determined to be
unacceptable and payments for these deliverables should be
recouped [Ref. 29 :p. 60] . The other reduction can be applied
"when it is determined that overhead payments to the
contractor for day-to-day management of C/SCSC have not been
earned and should be recouped" [Ref. 29 :p. 60] . Both measures
can be effective motivators, however, the burden of proof is
on the Government and will probably require a "bottoms-up" or
cost account level audit of the contractor's books. 22
A reduction of award/incentive/fixed fee is another remedy
the PM can choose to implement through the cognizant ACO.
This action can be applied when a contractor is in
noncompliance with C/SCSC requirements and it can be shown
that C/SCSC was included as a factor in determination of the
fee. Linking cost and schedule performance to fees can help
motivate contractor ownership of the cost/schedule control
22A bottoms-up audit refers to a thorough, investigative
effort by the Government (such as the DPRO or DCAA) of
contractor incurred costs from the cost account level up to
the summary level WBS structure.
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effort. However, in research and development programs, the
Government (depending on the contract type) normally bears
all, or a significant portion of the development risk [Ref.
30:p. 365]
.
Another action available to the PM, is to request through
his PMJEG focal point that the contractor's C/SCSC system
validation be withdrawn. This action can be imposed when
C/SCSC compliance problems arise with contractors whose
systems have been previously validated. A C/SCSC validation
withdrawal will remain in effect until the contractor
compliance problems are corrected and another satisfactory
demonstration review is completed.
The PM, through his PCO, can negotiate a reduction in
contract price, provide a cure notice, or issue a show cause
notice. A reduction in contract price may be pursued when the
contractor does not comply with C/SCSC requirements, however,
when this tactic is used, the option of progress payment
reduction or suspension may not be available [Ref. 29 :p. 61]
.
A cure notice is an effective "attention getter." This notice
informs the contractor that the Government considers his
C/SCSC compliance problem to be jeopardizing contract
performance. This notice will inform the contractor that he
has a prescribed amount of time (i.e., timeframe as deemed
reasonable and necessary by the PCO) to fix the problem or the
Government may move to terminate the contract for default.
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The show cause notice is the next step following a cure
notice. It will be issued based upon the contractor's failure
to rectify the problem (s) addressed in the cure notice by the
prescribed "get well date." At this point, the Government is
seriously considering termination for default. The Government
has the right to terminate for default if the contractor fails
to make progress that endangers performance and fails to
perform any provision (i.e., C/SCSC management) of the
contract [Ref. 31:p. 15-7]. Obviously, this is a measure of
last resort.
The management actions previously addressed can be imposed
under a variety of circumstances and may be applied either
singularly or in combination. Before recommending any
punitive management actions against a poorly performing
contractor, the PM should thoroughly investigate and
understand. the contractor's performance problems. If over two
review periods, the contractor's corrective action plans have
failed to turn around an unfavorable trend of contract cost
and schedule performance; then, the PM should take immediate
action, using any of the measures previously discussed.
I. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS SOFTWARE
In order to monitor cost and schedule performance, the
Government PM and his staff rely on the contractor's monthly
CPR to determine contract progress and status. According to
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one management survey conducted by Arthur D. Little, Inc.,
"most CPR's are received by Government program offices within
five weeks after the close of the contractor's reporting
period" [Ref. 32, p. 111-56] . As part of this survey, at
least 64% of the program offices indicated that it took two
weeks to complete CPR analysis [Ref. 32, p. 111-63] . After
interviewing various individuals at a major systems command,
more than half of those interviewed indicated that CPR
analysis required at least a week to complete.
CPR analysis is not an easy job. Because of the high
degree of subjectivity involved, CPR analysis is often more
art than science. In order to develop a coherent contractor
performance analysis, the PM and his staff must be able to
blend statistical analysis with graphical trend analysis.
Today's acquisition environment has placed significant
challenges before the Government PM. Today, the Government
PM's world is characterized by a shrinking availability of
staff and a growing demand for greater decision making lead
time. More than ever before, the PM needs a software system
designed to assist him in performing CPR analysis.
The Government PM should be aware of what software packages
are available to assist in cost and schedule analysis. There
are a multitude of commercial vendors that have produced
program management software; much of this software has been
designed with the Defense contractor, not the Government PM,
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in mind. One commercial vendor, Dekker, Ltd. , offers a fully-
integrated system for schedule, resource, cost, and
performance management. Current DoD clients include various
program offices in all three military Services.
The Dekker System, or Trakker Plus, provides an array of
project calculations such as CV, SV, SPI, CPI, TCPI, EAC, and
many others. Trakker Plus also provides preformance analysis
reports such as variance analysis, EAC analysis, and BCWS,
BCWP and ACWP distribution. The Trakker Plus system also
includes an array of performance analysis graphics such as
BCWS, BCWP, ACWP distribution, SPI/CPI distrubution, SV/CV
distribution, and EAC analysis.
The Trakker Plus is compatible with IBM PC XT, AT and PS/2
and has the following computer requirements:
1. 640k RAM
2. MS-DOS 2.1 or higher
3. Hard disk, 20-40 megabytes 28MS access speed
4. Floppy disk 5.25" or 3.5"
5. CGA, EGA, Hercules, or VGA compatible graphics card
6. Printer (laser or dot matrix)
7. Plotter (most popular brands supported)
In terms of user friendliness, Trakker Plus is completely menu
driven and can operate with Microsoft Windows. Dekker LTD.
also offers a Customer Support Service and a C/SCSC on- site
workshop. The support service covers telephone support or
questions relative to the Trakker Plus system. The price of
this service is $450 per year with an unlimited number of
calls per year [Ref. 33:p. 5].
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The Dekker workshop covers setting up the system for a
C/SCSC environment. Users are taught system operations and
interpretation of standard graphs and calculations. This on-
site workshop costs $6000 [Ref. 33:p. 5].
Another noteworthy analysis software package is Performance
Analyzer (PA) . This package was developed by Thomas/Ccifers,
Inc. with the assistance of the Headquarters, Air Force Space
Systems Division, Los Angeles, California. This package was
specifically designed to streamline and automate cost and
schedule reporting analysis. PA can perform various
computations including percent complete by WBS or function,
current and cumulative CV/SV, current and cumulative CPI/SPI,
VAC, TCPI, EACs using weighted indices, and others. PA
displays, prints, and plots graphs that include analysis level
trend data. This aspect of PA also provides briefing class
charts for the Government PM' s use. PA also has automated
data transfer (ADT) capability. This feature enables
automated data transfer from the defense contractor direct to
the PM office. It also provides the PM with real time or near
real time program status.
Performance Analyzer supports IBM/XT/AT compatible
computers and has the following other computer requirements:
1. 485K RAM (approximately, exact memory depends on
the number of WBS elements
2. MS DOS 3.2 or higher for version 3.1 and up
3. EGA, Hercules, and VGA graphic cards
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4. Printer (Epson or compatible, also most Laserjet
types
)
5. Hewlett Packard 755DA plotter
6. Floppy Drive 5.25" or 3.5"
7. Hayes Compatible Modem for ADT
According to OSD and DSMC, PA is fast becoming the front
runner of the contractor data analysis software among many of
the Government offices within the U.S. Air Force, Navy, Army,
and Department of Energy (DOE) . PA comes in a commercial and
in a DoD version. According to one OSD analyst, the
Government is authorized to give the DoD version to the
Defense contractor at no charge [Ref . 10]
.
Performance Analyzer is also user friendly. The menu driven
screens are easy to use for both entering and editing data.
PA is also reasonably easy to install, however the user needs
to ensure that the commands "Buffers = 20 and Files = 20", are
established within the configuration system file root
directory. PA assumes the user has a basic understanding of
DOS and therefore, does not provide step-by- step procedures
for modifying the configuation system file. Finally, PA
maximizes productivity because the user can get to work
immediately and learn as he or she uses the package. [Ref.
34:p. 50]. Despite PA' s many positive features, it still
requires someone who is computer literate. According to Rear
Admiral Vincent, the Defense Systems Management College
Commadant, PA is a solid start. However, further improvements
are needed to make it more user friendly [Ref. 50]
.
77
The Contract Appraisal System (CAPPS) Module was developed
by DAI, Inc. for the Defense Systems Mangement College (DSMC)
as part of their Program Manager's Course. This system was
designed to assist DoD PMs and other Government executives
with analysis of Defense contractor performance. The package
can accommodate any WBS/functional structure required,
stresses bottom- line analysis, and provides high-level,
summarized cost and schedule information [Ref. 35:p. 1-1].
The Contract Appraisal System has the capability to do
various computations such as CV, SV, VAC, CPI, TCPI, and EAC.
It executes very thorough variance analysis and provides
indicators of major problem areas. For example, CAPPS will
provide the following type of indicator narrative:
Actual expenditures through this period are $31,300,000,
which means that to date, the effort is costing more
than expected [Ref. 35:p. 6-15].
It also makes extensive use of color and graphical
presentations and offers a "zoom" feature. This zoom feature
allows the PM to focus on the most current trends by showing
the last six months of data versus the total number of months
of on file data. This capability is helpful because it
provides the PM with greater visibility into BCWS, BCWP, and
ACWP relationships [Ref. 35:p. 6-13].
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This software runs on IBM PC/XT or compatibles. It will
also run on a Zenith 110/120. CAPPS has the following other
computer requirements:
1. MS DOS 3.1 or higher
2. 512KB RAM minimum
3. One floppy disk drive (5.25") and one hard drive
4. CGA, EGA, or VGA board
5
.
Color or monochrome monitor
6. Epson or Hewlett Packard Laserjet printer
The software is very user friendly. It provides the user
with both a "Help" function and "Explain" function. These
functions provide the user with instruction on the various
analysis techniques, explains performance measurement
terminology, and gives detailed information concerning
software and hardware functions. The CAPPS documentation is
easy to read but the installation is cumbersome. For example,
the user may need to remove any memory intensive programs from
the user's hard drive before installing and running CAPPS. It
also has the benefit of allowing the new user to learn how to
operate the system in the course of doing actual work.
The Contract Appraisal System, unlike the previous two
systems, doesn't allow the user to change any of the
performance analysis formulas. In addition, the PM is unable
to evaluate more than one contract at any given time, because
when a new contract base is entered, any pre-existing contact
databases are overwritten. The PM can get around this by
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Cost Performance Report EZ was developed by the Air Force
Cost Center to do detailed CPR analysis. This package was
designed with the analyst in mind, so that they could work at
any level of WBS . This software is essentially a Lotus 1-2-3
application, version 2.01. It also has the capability to do
several different analysis calculations such as CV, SV, CPI,
SPI, and five different EACs . This software will provide
cumulative- to- date, six month, three month, and current month
calucations for all variance indicies. Unlike CAPPS, the
package does not provide indicators of major problem areas.
This software has graphical capability as well but the system
will not print on a plotter as the other systems previously
discussed.
This program works on any IBM compatible PC and has the
following other computer requirements:
1. MS DOS 2.0 or higher
2. 640k RAM
3. Dual floppy (5.25") or Winchester hard drive
4
.
Graphics board within the PC
5. Monochrome or color monitor
6. No specific printer requirements
7. Lotus, version 2.01 [Ref. 36:p. 35]
According to one study, CPR-EZ was not found to be overall
user friendly. For example, the PM user must access several
screens before the user can print the package's summary
report, instead of being able to print the report directly
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after viewing it [Ref. 37:p. 55]. This package does have a
"help" function that provides excellent explanations on how to
operate Lotus 1-2-3 but it does not provide tutoring on
analysis [Ref. 37 :p. 61] . Finally, CPR-EZ does not permit the
new user to get to work immediately. The software
documentation instructs the new user to select the
"instructions" option when using the system for the first time
[Ref. 37:p. 57]. The instructions option provides
information about how the system works and it doesn't offer a
means to work along with the instructions.
K. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Chapter IV has provided the PM with an understanding of
contract cost and schedule performance analysis basics. This
chapter addressed the Cost Performance Report, specifically
focusing on its format and function. In addition, various
aspects of CPR analysis were described and and techniques were
discussed. Chapter IV also addressed the concept of earned
value, and described the various methods in use.
This chapter also discussed management actions in response
to adverse contractor cost/schedule performance and/or C/SCSC
compliance problems. Finally, Chapter IV exposed the PM to
some software packages that are available to assist him in his
performance analysis efforts.
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Chapter V will focus on the analysis of the cost and
schedule control aspects of the Navy's A- 12 Avenger Program
and examine what impacts this program's termination has had on
the DoD C/SCSC environment. Throughout the analysis, the
discussion will look at what initiatives OSD and the three
military services have undertaken to bring about improvements
in their execution of the cost and schedule control process.
82
V. THE A- 12 AVENGER PROGRAM TERMINATION: A CATALYST
FOR C/SCSC PROCESS REVIEW AND IMPROVEMENT
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION
Chapter V will examine the Navy's A- 12 Avenger program
termination and analyze how it has affected the C/SCSC
environment. Specifically, the chapter's analysis will center
on performance management initiatives undertaken by OSD and
the three military Services in response to the A-12's
termination. Finally, this chapter will discuss some "lessons
learned" from the A- 12.
B. A- 12 BACKGROUND
In 1988, the U.S. Navy awarded a $4.8 billion fixed-price
incentive contract to the contractor team of General Dynamics
and McDonnell Douglas Aerospace for the full-scale development
of a medium attack aircraft to replace its aging A-6E Intruder
[Ref . GAO Report, p. 1] . The new attack aircraft , called the
A-12 Avenger, was to incorporate state-of-the-art, stealth
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technology. Because of its stealth technology features, the
A-12 was managed as a "black program." 23
Because of a favorable December 19 89 major aircraft review
(MAR) , the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Dick Cheney, testified to
Congress in April 199 that the first flight of the A-12 was
projected to occur early in 1991. He also declared that the
program's full scale development would be finished within the
contract ceiling price of $4.8 dollars. By 1 June 1990 the
contractor team advised the Navy of major program cost and
schedule problems. Moreover, the full-scale development
effort would overrun the contract ceiling by an amount that
the contractors could not absorb (i.e., over one billion
dollars) . Second, a significant schedule slip of one year in
the A-12's first flight had occurred [Ref. 40: p. 3].
In July 1990, the Navy investigated the A-12 circumstances
to find the facts and resolve A-12 discrepancies. The
investigation focused on the cause of the variation between
the status of the A-12 program and the presentations made to
OSD by the Navy regarding the program during the MAR [Ref
.
41 :p. 1] In addition, the investigation was to focus on
23Black programs are those ACAT 1 special access programs
that are executed under strict security guidelines. As a
result, management oversight of black programs is restricted.
The A-12's special access nature of was found by the Beach
Report to have prevented the operation of normal program cost
and schedule oversight mechanisms within both the Navy and the
Office of the USD (A).
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accountability, and any changes or improvements needed to
ensure that timely information was developed and made
available to appropriate officials [Ref . 41 :p. 1] . The Beach
report established that the Navy was negligent. The Navy had
sufficient information to recognize the A-12's cost, schedule,
and technical problems as early as June 1988, yet made
inadequate use of cost and schedule data. For example, Mr.
Beach, the Navy Inquiry Officer, indicated in his report that
CPRs, since the first quarterly CPR issued in June 19 88,
showed developing problem trends such as weight growth, late
drawing releases, and tooling problems [Ref. 41:p. 9].
Because of the Beach Report findings, the Secretary of
Defense gave the Navy until 4 January 1991 to provide a cogent
argument why the A- 12 program should not be canceled. On 7
January 1991, it was announced by the Secretary of Defense
that the Navy had terminated the A- 12 contract for default
because of contractor difficulty in executing the contract
[Ref. 42 :p. 1] . The termination decision was based upon Navy
projections that made two assertions. Those projections
asserted that the contractor team would overrun the $4 .
8
billion contract ceiling price by $2.7 billion. Second, the
A-12's first flight would be delayed by at least two years.
[Ref. 42:p. 1]
The A-12's termination has sent out a threefold message to
the DoD community. First, program managers are accountable
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for cost and schedule control management on their programs.
Second, cost and schedule management is so important, that
programs that fail to use prudent management practices can and
will be canceled [Ref. 65:p. 2]. Finally, that the cost and
schedule performance measurement and management process needed
improvement
.
The A- 12 termination's impact on the DoD community has been
profound. It has produced the realization that the failures
suggested in the Beach Report are not unique to the Navy, and
that an "A- 12 incident" could have happened just as easily in
the Air Force and/or the Army. Most importantly, it has
provided the catalyst for both OSD and the military Services
to engage in meaningful introspection and evaluation regarding
their approaches to the C/SCSC process.
C. USD (A) /DOD INITIATIVES
Perhaps one of the most significant impacts of the A-12's
termination was the change of leadership that occurred in the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) . On 12
December 1990, just eight days after the Beach Report's
release, the incumbent USD(A), Mr. John Betti announced his
resignation. It was asserted that Mr. Betti erred in judgment
by relying on general assurances from the A- 12 contractors,
plus earlier Navy assurances, that developmental costs would
stay under the ceiling price [Ref. 43 :p. 25] . In addition, it
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was suggested that Mr. Betti focused more on the contractors'
plans for recovery, than he did on the implications of their
actual record of eroding cost and schedule performance [Ref.
41:p. 35]
.
In all fairness to Mr. Betti, it is also asserted that
because of his efforts, the A- 12 Investigation was initiated.
According to one of his military associates, Mr. Betti, after
a walk- through of contractor facilities in the Spring of 1990,
noted an apparent lack of tooling and manufacturing
facilities. It was Mr. Betti 's belief that at this point in
the program, the A- 12 contractors should have been ready to
begin aircraft assembly based upon a December 1990 first
flight date. Because of this discrepancy, Mr. Betti
immediately initiated an investigation.
Mr. Betti 's deputy, Mr. Donald J. Yockey, was selected by
the Secretary of Defense to become the new Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition) . Mr. Yockey, both an "expert" on C/SCSC
and a fervent advocate of earned value performance
measurement, was intent on spreading the word that C/SCSC was
a good, common sense business management approach. As the
keynote speaker at the 1991 C/SCSC National Workshop, Mr.
Yockey carried his message to 641 attendants from both
Government and industry. His address emphasized the value of
C/SCSC, indicating that it helps both Government and industry
to plan programs realistically and maintain clear management
87
visibility of cost, schedule, and performance. Mr. Yockey's
address also emphasized his support to the acquisition
community and his determination to discipline and improve the
C/SCSC process.
Mr. Yockey has recently instituted a major program RFP and
contract review. The review is part of Mr. Yockey's new
emphasis on proper up- front planning and a "back to basics"
approach with regard to C/SCSC implementation. Mr. Yockey and
his staff are selectively reviewing key documents that explain
a major program's acquisition strategy [Ref. 24:p. 17]. The
review focuses on many aspects including a program's overall
acquisition strategy, contract type, SOW, specifications,
earned value, fee arrangements, and whether the program is
fully funded.
From an earned value standpoint, Mr. Yockey and his staff
are ensuring that a major program's C/SCSC provisions provide
the PM and senior level management with ample control and
oversight information, without getting bogged down with
unnecessary, non- value added requirements. For example, since
April 1991, Mr. Yockey and his staff have reviewed seven RFP's
and two contracts. As a result of this review they have found
WBS, C/SCSC implementation, and performance reporting
problems. Some problems include the following:
1. Two cases in which WBS levels were too low (below
level three) . In one situation, there were ten
elements at level three, while there were 70 elements
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at level four or below. According to one OSD
analyst, this creates the potential for excessive
variance analysis, because of a multiplier effect
[Ref. 10]. Essentially, this variance multiplier
effect increases as the WBS levels are lowered. As
stated previously in chapter III, CWBS reporting
should be at level three or higher except in high-
risk or known problem areas. Low CWBS reporting





One case in which C/SCSC was inappropriately
required on a level of effort contract.
3. One case in which the CPR and C/SSR were required.
4. Two cases in which a PERT- Cost type system was
required. According to DoDI 5000.2, Part 11,
Section B, "Contractor Performance Measurement,
the Government is imposing specific control systems
[Ref. 7:p. 11-B-l] .
5. Eight instances in which CPR variance analysis levels
were fixed with no provision for later adjustment of
variance thresholds.
6. One case in which there was a duplication of effort.
The contract not only required a CPR, but also
required the contractor's internal management report.
This internal management report was the document from
which the contractor created the CPR. [Ref. 10]
In each case, where Mr. Yockey's staff have found problems
with major program acquisition documents, they have worked
with the procuring offices to improve the documents and the
process that created them. Mr. Yockey has emphasized that he
and his staff do not intend to usurp the authority and
responsibility of those in charge of managing and overseeing
major programs. Nonetheless, he does intend to demonstrate to
all concerned that he is very serious about thorough, proper
planning for major acquisition programs. [Ref. 24 :p. 17]
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Mr. Yockey's review initiative is not only aimed at new
contracts, but also on-going contracts. Mr. Yockey also
intends to tackle the big issue of how to improve the
contractor systems that DoD is "living with" today. Mr.
Yockey's goal in this regard, is to improve contract cost
management, while reducing contractor reporting to minimum
essential levels. Through a combined effort of DoD, the
military Services, and industry, Mr. Yockey believes that a
major "reset" in current contracts can improve contract
management, yet reduce current reporting burdens. For example,
Mr. Yockey's staff just recently reviewed a current major
contract with IBM. After careful scrutiny and evaluation, a
major paperwork and dollar expenditure reduction was achieved
without any detriment to cost and schedule performance
reporting. Essentially, various reports, documents, or other
data deliverables that were found duplicating and/or providing
no significant value were eliminated. According to one OSD
analyst, this elimination resulted in a monthly cost savings
to the Government of $800,000. [Ref. 10]
Undoubtedly, the military Services are not pleased about
this intense oversight focus by the USD (A) . It is quite
possible that many Service PMs and senior level managers view
this review initiative as another step toward DoD
micromanagement
. It is this researcher's opinion that Mr.
Yockey's initiative is best described as "micro-watch" versus
90
micromanagement . Mr. Yockey's goal is not a commitment to
manage Service programs, but rather a commitment to make major
program managers better business managers.
Another initiative of Mr. Yockey's is to ensure that the
contractor surveillance plan and MOA are completed and in
place as a condition of Milestone II, Engineering and
Manufacturing Development Approval. 24 Currently, Mr. Yockey
is trying to incorporate this as a requirement of acquisition
planning within the DFARS [Ref . 10] . In addition, he intends
to make the contract surveillance plan and MOA a specific
report item on the Acquisition Strategy Report for ACAT I
programs [Ref. 10] . 25
Mr. Yockey has also resolved the problem of special access
regarding black programs. Members of Mr. Yockey's staff, the
Deputy Director for Cost Management, Mr. Gary Christie, and
another cost management analyst, LTC Bob Reuter, have been
cleared for special access programs to conduct independent
assessment of contractor cost and schedule performance [Ref.
10] . This measure is in response to a Beach Report
24This initiative directly supports a Beach Report
recommendation that calls for the requirement for a detailed
surveillance plan in place, and a completed program
office/DPRO MOA as a condition of Milestone II approval.
25An ACAT I program is a major program that is designated
by the USD (A)
,
RDT&E of more than 200 million dollars, and/or




recommendation to "review the operation of OSD- level oversight
mechanisms for all ACAT I special access programs, and resolve
any shortfalls in oversight due to security requirements [Ref
.
41:p. 32]." It is felt that qualifying these two individuals
for special access programs is a positive step. This
clearance arrangement will fulfill the spirit of the Beach
Report's recommendation, however, there are some shortfalls.
First, neither individual is authorized oversight access
for the same black programs. By virtue of this condition, the
OUSD (A) has limited its flexibility in conducting special
access oversight responsibilities. Second, OUSD (A) is not
given a "blank check" regarding oversight access to all black
programs, current and future. Both individuals in question
are only cleared for certain special access programs, not all.
The researcher was not able to determine a rationale for this
other than security clearance is granted on a "need-to-know
basis." Ironically, the Beach Report has suggested that OSD
does in fact have a need to know [Ref. 82]
.
Both individuals should be cleared for the same programs in
order to gain greater flexibility in conducting independent
cost/schedule performance assessment of special access
programs. Obviously, the current OSD arrangement has been
improved over what it was previous to the A- 12 termination.
Nonetheless, it is the researcher's opinion that further "fine
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tuning" is in order, so that independent assessment of special
access programs is truly effective.
Mr. Yockey is resolved to improve cost and schedule
performance management education and training among the
acquisition workforce. He is attempting to accomplish this
objective in a couple of ways. First, he is sending his own
staff to various military commands and schools to conduct
seminars on C/SCSC concepts. 26 Secondly, Mr. Yockey has
established a staff officer position within the Office of
Acquisition Policy, Program Integration, and Cost Management.
This position is currently filled by an Army Lieutenant
Colonel. He has been given the assignment by Mr. Yockey, to
review all cost and schedule performance measurement education
and training within DoD and find out what training existed and
who conducted it [Ref. 41:p. 18].
At Mr. Yockey' s direction, his staff officer coordinated
the formulation of an Earned Value Review Group. Besides the
OUSD(A) staff officer, the group membership includes the PMJEG
focal points and representatives from the C/SCSC curriculum at
both the Defense Systems Management College (DSMC) and the Air
Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) . The group's review of
DoD C/SCSC education and training has revealed a serious
26In FY 90, Mr. Yockey' s staff conducted 20 presentations.
The number of presentations tripled in FY 91 and is expected
to continue to grow in FY 92.
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weakness in terms of earned value education. It was found
that earned value was not in the "main stream" of program
management. 27 For example, one of the review group's findings
showed that often a DoD PM's first formal training in contract
cost and schedule performance management occurred while
attending the DSMC Program Management Course [Ref. 44]. The
review group felt that a DoD PM should have iterative cost and
schedule management development throughout his or her
acquisition career versus receiving formal C/SCSC instruction
for the first time at the 05/06 or comparable GS/GM- 14/15
acquisition workforce level [Ref. 44].
The review group noted that most of existing DoD C/SCSC
and/or cost performance measurement education and training is
given at DSMC and AFIT. The two principal cost/schedule
courses provided by DSMC are the Program Management Course
(PMC) and the Contractor Performance Measurement Course
(CPMC) . The Program Management Course provides 13 hours of
cost and schedule instruction plus six hours of cost and
schedule practical exercises. The CPMC provides 35 hours of
instruction on cost and schedule related topics. The course
focuses on techniques of contract cost and schedule data
analysis for the purposes of determining current contract
27This main stream of program management refers not only
to the career field of program management, but also to the




status, identifying performance trends, and forecasting
estimates at completion. The CPMC has been attended by more
people (approximately 6,500 to date) than any other DSMC
course. [Ref. 44]
The Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright -Patterson
Air Force Base, Ohio, provides the remainder of the formal DoD
cost and schedule instruction. There is a collection of three
cost and schedule management courses offered at AFIT: systems
361, 262, and 363. The surveillance of C/SCSC (systems 361)
course focuses on the role of the CAO and techniques for
performing contractor surveillance. This course has two
offerings annually with a class size of 35. Currently the
class size is expected to be reduced to 25 in FY 93 and
beyond. The C/SCSC (systems 362) course emphasizes procedures
used to review contractor systems for determination of
compliance with C/SCSC. This course is offered four times
annually, with 30 students in each class. The Analysis of
Performance Data course (systems 363) is intended to acquaint
students with management control systems theory, performance
measurement terminology, and the earned value concept.
Systems 363 is offered twice annually with a class size of 30.
During the earned value review group's inspection of the
currently available DoD cost and schedule management education
and training, an interesting condition was noted. The group
found that there was a noticeable difference between cost and
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schedule course demand and supply. For example, it was found
that despite the fact that requests for the Contract
Performance Measurement Course at DSMC have at least doubled,
annual CPMC offerings have been reduced from ten in FY 91 to
seven in FY 92 because of funding constraints. In addition,
it was discovered that AFIT was only able to fulfill about 25%
of the enrollment requests for its triad of cost and schedule
courses, again largely because of funding constraints.
The DoD cost and schedule training and education review
group's efforts supported the development and release of three
important DoD publications. The first publication, DoDD
5000.52, Defense Acquisition Education, Training, and Career
Development Program, was published on 25 October 1991. This
directive updates both policy and responsibilities associated
with Acquisition Workforce Career development. Specifically,
this document directs that the USD (A) establish the mandatory
and desired education and training, and experience standards
for each acquisition position within each functional career
field [Ref. 58:p. 2] . 28 This document also directs the
secretary of each military department to establish an
Acquisition Career Program Board (ACPB) to advise each Service
28There are seven acquisition functions, 12 career fields,
and 14 position categories in the DoD Acquisition, Education,
Training, and Career Development Program. Each career field
has three career levels: level I (entry), level II
(intermediate) , and level III (senior)
.
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Acquisition Executive in the management of the career
development of both military and civilian personnel within the
Acquisition Corps. The ACPB also supports the selection of
individuals for the Acquisition Corps [Ref. 58:p. 4].
The second publication, DoD Manual 5000. 52 -M, Career
Development Program for Acquisition Personnel Manual, was
issued on 15 November 1991. This document outlines the
Department of Defense Career Development Program for
Acquisition personnel. Specifically, it establishes the
education, training, and experience standards for specific
acquisition workforce position categories and career fields.
It further provides for the certification process of
acquisition workforce personnel and also the Acquisition Corps
career paths [Ref. 59:p. 1-1]. 29 This manual also directs
that Service Component Heads will ensure that their
acquisition workforce members receive, as a minimum, the
specif ied mandatory education, training, and experience . This
includes required or desired cost and schedule performance
management training and experience. The manual states that
the acquisition workforce education, training, and experience
29Certif ication is a process that determines whether an
individual meets all the education, training, and experience
standards established for his or her acquisition career field
or position, or for membership in a Service Acquisition Corps.
Career paths refer to the range of opportunities at each
career level and also the optimum pathways for vertical and
horizontal movement within a career field.
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standards must be met by 1 October 1993, however, standards
for critical acquisition positions must be met by 1 October
1992. 30 [Ref. 59:p. 1-2]
The third publication, DoDI 5000.58, Defense Acquisition
Workforce, was published on 14 January 1992. Specifically,
this instruction "establishes policy, assigns responsibility,
and prescribes procedures and criteria for designating
acquisition positions and critical acquisition positions for
management of the acquisition workforce and for establishing
and managing the Acquisition Corps [Ref. 60:p. 1] . " Most
importantly, this identifies acquisition positions based on
seven acquisition functions and provides for the establishment
of DoD functional boards for each of the seven acquisition
functions, effective 1 January 1992 [Ref. 60:p. 11]. Each
functional board is chartered by the USD (A) . These functional
boards are charged with providing the oversight of management
and program execution of their particular functional area
career management programs [Ref. 60:p. 12]. Specifically,
each functional board is responsible for certifying annually
to the USD (A) the education, training, and experience
standards and career paths specified. Each board is
30A critical acquisition position refers to those senior
positions (GS/GM-14 and above or military grade 05 or higher)
carrying significant responsibility, primarily involving
supervisory or management duties in the DoD Acquisition System
(i.e., PEO, PM, Deputy PM)
.
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responsible for ensuring that their respective career field is
properly developed and implemented, and will make
recommendations on the establishment or disestablishment of
mandatory courses. In addition, each board will review
education and training requirements, allocations, quotas,
student attendance, priorities and funding to ensure that the
goal of attaining a fully qualified workforce is supported
[Ref . 60:p. 12]
.
The OUSD(A) Cost and Schedule Education/Training Review
Group has now become one of the three standing committees for
the Business Cost Estimating and Financial Management
functional boards [Ref. 44]. Despite the change in status,
the group will continue to concentrate a large part of its
efforts on cost and schedule performance management education
and training improvement, in support of all functional boards.
The review group coordinator suggested, that because of the
Defense Acquisition Education, Training, and Career
Development Program, there is a strong effort at the DoD level
to "fence" funding for acquisition education and training,
including cost and schedule performance management courses.
This effort would serve to make less severe the education and
training constraints at both DSMC and AFIT, however, until
this effort becomes a reality, shortfalls in cost and schedule
performance management education will probably remain.
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It is the researcher's opinion that OUSD (A) ' s efforts to
review and improve cost and schedule performance management
education and training is both a good idea and is in keeping
with Title XII (Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act)
of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 91.
Essentially, Congress has mandated that DoD get the
acquisition process (people and training) under control and
professionalized. The establishment of the Defense
Acquisition Education, Training, and Career Development
Program has provided the vehicle to entrench cost and
schedule performance management education and training
throughout the various Acquisition Functional Area Career
Fields. Currently, there is evidence of some degree of
mandatory cost and schedule education and/or training
programmed for level II and/or level III personnel for ten of
the 14 acquisition position categories. 31 This represents a
positive step forward in terms of increasing cost and schedule
performance management "literacy" among the acquisition
workforce
.
The researcher offers two criticisms regarding the current
mandatory cost and schedule education and training as
31Acquisition position categories are functional subsets
of acquisition positions. Examples include program
management, PM oversight, contracting, auditing, quality




presently structured. First, there is no evidence of
mandatory cost and schedule education/training at level I
(GS-5 to GS-7 and 01 to 03 military grades) among any of the
14 acquisition position categories. The cost and schedule
performance management educational process should begin at
this entry level. Second, many level II and III acquisition
position categories do not receive a significant amount of
mandatory cost and schedule performance management education
or training. For example, contracting level III courses only
offer about three hours of cost and schedule performance
management training.
D. U.S. ARMY INITIATIVES
In response to the Navy's A- 12 Avenger Program termination,
the U.S. Army, under the direction of the Honorable Stephen K.
Conver, the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) , commissioned a
special study group to assess the Army's current cost and
schedule management practices and to identify possible
improvements. The study was conducted in two phases. Phase
I solicited input from senior Army leadership, Army Program
Executive Officers (PEOs) and senior Army staff members,
resulting in 63 pages of information that was formulated into
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ten issue areas. 32 Phase II of the study involved identifying
an Army expert for each issue area. Each expert was provided
the pertinent phase I input for their respective issue area,
given the mission to conduct an analysis, and asked to provide
their comments.
The study concluded that the Army acquisition community
deserved an overall "passing grade" regarding its current cost
and schedule management practices [Ref. 45:p. 1] . The
researcher was surprised by this finding because he was
informed by a Department of the Army official that about two-
thirds of the Army's major programs had cost/schedule problems
[Ref. 48] . Specifically, the study decided that no additional
oversight controls were needed and that the current thrust of
the Army acquisition community should continue [Ref. 45 :p.
7] , 33 In addition, it concluded that PEOs and PMs are the
Army's best first line of defense against unfavorable
circumstances like the Navy's A- 12 Avenger Program.
32The ten issue areas include: independent assessments,
contractor performance data, contracting strategies, realistic
estimates, DCMC support, Army Acquisition Corps,
responsibilities of program participants, special access
program oversight, DAB issues, and other observations [Ref.
45:p. 7] .
33The current thrust refers to improvement in the use of
C/SCSC data, using contract strategies better designed to
avoid cost and schedule problems, and effective, timely
implementation of the Army Acquisition Corps. Also, as part
of this thrust, the Army is advocating the use of Performance




Nonetheless, the study did call for greater sensitivity to and
vigilance of cost and schedule management. The study
recommended the implementation of four actions to fulfill this
call
.
The first recommendation proposed that all PEOs and PMs be
required to establish and maintain local reading files. The
purpose of the file would be to promote greater awareness of
C/SCSC issues and concerns among Army acquisition personnel.
The reading file would contain both AAE directed documents and
any other documents selected by the individual PEO/PM. From
a cost and schedule perspective, the AAE directed documents
would include the Beach Report, the A- 12 PM' s Congressional
Testimony, Mr. Gary Christie's Earned Value Analysis Paper,
and AAE Policy Memorandums [Ref . 45 :p. 12] . 34
The second action recommended a revision in the language of
PEO/PM charters. 35 The purpose of this action was to clarify
duties and to bring increased focus on a PEO's or PM'
s
responsibility for adequate cost and schedule control
management [Ref 45:p. 10]. The third recommendation called
for special management of contractor joint ventures [Ref.
34Mr. Gary Christie is the USD (A) ' s Deputy Director of
Cost Management in the Office of Acquisition Policy and
Program Integration/Cost Management.
35The PEO/PM charter is a Memorandum of Understanding
between the PEO/PM and his superiors. It defines the PEO/PM'
mission and responsibilities, and describes his relationship
with other organizations and activities [Ref. 46:p. 2-6].
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45 :p. 8]. Specifically, the proposal suggested that
contractor joint ventures are not the preferred method of
Government contracting. This proposal is in response to the
USD(A)'s current view on contractor joint venture
arrangements. Mr. Yockey does not favor contractor joint
ventures because he believes they represent an inherent
"command and control" risk. In other words, he is convinced
that it is extremely difficult to affix clear responsibility
and accountability for contract performance between two prime
contractors. As far as Mr. Yockey is concerned, the A- 12
Avenger program termination has served to confirm his view.
Therefore, it is the researcher's opinion that any future
contractor joint venture arrangements will not only be
discouraged but will also require justification.
While the researcher can understand this point of view, it
is probably not completely realistic. Major cutbacks in
defense spending will prompt contractors to opt to join forces
in order to share cost and development risks, and in some
cases, just to stay in business. While there are risks
associated with joint venture arrangements, there are also
benefits. For example, some benefits would include
strengthening the industrial base and capitalizing on the
expertise and talents of both contractors.
The final recommendation proposed the development of an
independent program assessment capability at the AAE level
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[Ref 45 :p. 8] . This capability would involve a team of
functional experts to conduct program assistance reviews. The
assistance reviews would be structured to provide detailed,
on-site analysis and field support. The assistance reviews
would be done at the AAE's direction, at PEO request, prior to
DAB reviews, in response to a Nunn-McCurdy breach, and/or at
periodic intervals [Ref. 45:p. 9].
Mr. Conver approved the implementation of three of the four
actions. The independent assessment team idea was not
implemented for two reasons. First, it was believed that the
assessment team represented an unnecessary layer of oversight
micromanagement . Second, Army budget constraints would not
support the creation and maintenance of this team [Ref. 48]
.
Mr. Conver summarized the results of the Army study in an
AAE policy memorandum number 91-7 titled, "A- 12 Lessons
Learned," dated 7 October 1991. Mr. Conver further
articulated his concerns regarding cost and schedule
management in the September- October 1991 issue of the Army
RD&A Bulletin. Mr. Conver said that the Army could no longer
afford to bail out programs that exceed schedules or overrun
budgets. He emphasized that such programs are likely targets
for Army, OSD, and Congressional budget cutters [Ref. 49 :p.
45] . Mr. Conver also reiterated the value of C/SCSC
principles. He indicated that cost/schedule management
techniques can help avoid "surprise" program cost and schedule
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overruns, but only when those responsible for program
management fully understand and pay attention to the
information provided in the contractor's CPRs [Ref . 49 :p. 45] .
Finally, he stressed an enthusiastic commitment to the C/SCSC
process by Government PEOs and PMs, not just from the members
of their staffs, is the key to successful program cost and
schedule control [Ref. 49:p. 45].
It is the researcher's opinion, that the Army's actions in
response to the circumstances surrounding the Navy's troubled
A- 12 aircraft program, are lackluster. The results of the
study reflect only an interest in investigating potential
acquisition process shortcomings and identifying possible
improvements. The recommendations concerning the PEO/PM
charters will probably not provide significant improvement in
the awareness of cost and schedule issues. Overall, these
measures reflect minimal substance and contribute very little
to the improvement of cost and schedule management skills.
It is the researcher's opinion that the recommendation not
implemented, would probably have provided the greatest payoff.
The independent program assessment idea would prove to be a
valuable tool for the Army. The program assessment team would
provide the AAE with a proactive/objective mechanism to
evaluate and confirm a major program's "health" before
reaching the scrutiny of the DAB. According to one Department
of the Army official, having greater certainty of a program's
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cost and schedule well-being, strengthens the milestone review
process [Ref . 48] . In addition, this team could also conduct
assistance visits for various major programs showing a
beginning adverse trend in cost/schedule performance. The
team could be tailored to provide the kind of help a given
program may require (e.g. surveillance, analysis, cost
estimating, etc.).
Despite the potential benefits, the Army Secretariat
insists that the creation of its own independent assessment
capability cannot be justified given current budget cuts. In
addition, the Army also suggests that there is no need for new
oversight mechanisms, given that there will be fewer programs
to oversee. It is the researcher's belief, that if the Army
wants to improve its cost and schedule performance, that it
must show greater commitment to that effort.
E. U.S. AIR FORCE INITIATIVES
The U.S. Air Force has long been recognized as the C/SCSC
stalwart among the U.S. military Services. As previously
discussed in Chapter II, the Air Force was the originator of
both the earned value concept and the cost/schedule planning
and control specification (the C/SCSC predecessor) . The Air
Force, unlike the other Services, assesses entry grade
officers directly into the program management field. An Air
Force officer assessed into program management, is carefully
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trained and developed throughout his or her career in cost and
schedule management and other aspects crucial to successful
program management
.
Despite the Air Force's strength in C/SCSC, the Navy's A- 12
Avenger Program termination has caused the Air Force to
increase its emphasis on cost and schedule management. The A-
12
' s termination struck a nerve within the Air Force, serving
as an unpleasant reminder of its own cost and schedule
management program problems including the current B-2 Bomber
and the C-17 Transport Aircraft programs.
The B-2 Bomber program's cost estimates rose from $32.7
billion in 1981, to $70.2 billion in 1989 [Ref . 51:p. 2] . In
addition, the B-2's program schedule was delayed each year
after the establishment of the program's 1986 baseline [Ref.
51:p. 2]. The B-2 Bomber program was characterized by slow
development progress, test and evaluation setbacks, and
overruns. In early November 1991, Congress all but "closed
the book" on the B-2 by deciding that production would
terminate at 15 aircraft versus the 132 originally planned
[Ref. 52:p. 50] .
The C-17 Transport Aircraft program, in many respects is a
mirror image of the Navy's A- 12 Avenger program. The C-17,
like the A- 12, has shown a history of cost growth. The C-17
program began in 19 85 with an estimated program acquisition
cost of $34.5 billion. By 1989, the program acquisition cost
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rose to $41.8 billion, a 21% increase [Ref. 53:p. 5]. The C-
17, like the A- 12, slipped its program schedule. In addition,
the C-17 aircraft program has encountered weight problems that
will undoubtedly affect the attainment of contract performance
requirements. In response to these program developments, OSD
and the Air Force have decided to reduce the number of C-17
aircraft purchases from 210 to 120 [Ref. 53:p. 4].
The Air Force's B-2 and C-17 programs represent striking
examples of poor contractor program cost and schedule
performance. In view of these program performances and the
ramifications resulting from the Navy's A- 12 Avenger program
termination, the Air Force has sought to develop a new
approach to program management. This innovative approach is
evidenced by the Air Force's F-22 Advanced Tactical Fighter
(ATF) Aircraft program. 36
As a first step in the F-22 program, the Air Force
conducted a prototype fly- off between two vying contractor
teams led by Northrop and Lockheed. The Air Force started the
competition by informing both teams that each had to invest
part of their own money to develop their own ATF prototype. 37
36The F-22 incorporates stealth technology similar to that
found in the B-2 Bomber and A- 12 Avenger.
37Each group eventually received $818 million dollars in
tax funds for R&D, however, each spent roughly one billion
dollars of their own money [Ref. 52 :p. 51]
.
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In return, the Air Force freed the contractor groups from
binding design specifications [Ref. 52:p. 51]. The single
contractual requirement for the prototype was for it to take
off, fly/ and land. 38 Freed from rigid Government
specifications, each group devised its own design, emphasizing
the aircraft performance features of their own choosing.
The Air Force considered this approach viable for two
reasons. First, it was believed that rigid specifications
would discourage contractor innovation [Ref. 52:p. 50].
Second, if the contractors were to perform some R&D at their
own expense, the Air Force then reasoned that the contractors
would be motivated to find cost-effective techniques [Ref.
52:p. 50] .
As a second step in the F-22 program, the Air Force
authorized both contractor groups to decide for themselves how
to test or demonstrate their prototype's performance. This
aspect permitted a wide open, innovative environment that
resulted in two completely different aircraft designs that
flew virtually problem free [Ref. 52:p. 51]. The ATF "fly-
off" resulted in the award of a sole production contract to
the "Lockheed led" contractor group.
38Although the contractors were freed from binding design
specifications, their respective prototypes had to meet the
Air Force's performance specifications.
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The third step of this new approach was to institute a set
of comprehensive C/SCSC initiatives. These initiatives
included a "flash" report, an integrated product team concept,
real-time subcontractor data management, a C/SCSC steering
committee, and a management /technical information system
(M/TIS)
.
The "flash" report is a quick look Contract Performance
Report (CPR)
.
39 It consists of format one of the CPR and it
is due ten working days after the accounting period closes.
The data provided in the "flash" report is not audited and is
subject to correction in the full team CPR that is due 30 days
after the close of the accounting period [Ref . 54] . Despite
the fact that the data is not audited, it is satisfactory to
provide early insight into potential problem areas.
Historically, prime contractor provided cost and schedule data
has taken data upwards of two months to be submitted.
Subcontractor data has often taken three months to be
submitted [Ref. 55:p. 1] . The goal of the "flash" report is
to overcome this trend and supply managers with early and
timely visibility into potential contract cost and schedule
performance problems.
The team concept involves forming integrated product teams
(IPTs) at the cost account level. Each team has prime
39Each team consists of two prime contractors and two
principal subcontractors that provides "flash" report input.
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contractor, principal subcontractor, and Air Force
representation. Each team functions like a "mini -program,
"
designed to bring all functional disciplines together. Each
team has responsibility for all aspects of assigned program
components, ranging from blueprints to cost/schedule and
performance aspects [Ref. 52:p. 51]. The IPT approach
espouses a philosophy of integrity, logic, and teamwork. For
example, IPT leaders are charged to seek consensus versus
issuing orders. In addition, IPT members vote on senior level
management decisions, with more votes assigned to the "working
level troops" than the "flag" rank officers [Ref. 52:p. 51].
Real time subcontractor reporting is provided for all major
subcontractors (i.e., there are ten to twelve) . Each of these
major subcontractor's current month CPR data is incorporated
into the same month- end overall team CPR. This arrangement
provides two key benefits. First, it ensures "across the
board" consistency of month- end data. Second, it improves
timeliness of subcontractor reporting thereby creating a real-
time data effect [Ref. 54].
The C/SCSC steering committee is chartered to oversee
integration/implementation of C/SCSC throughout the F-22
program. The committee is composed of representatives from
the prime and each principal subcontractor, DPROs and the ATF
system program office. The steering committee is responsible
for reporting periodically to the F-22 program senior
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leadership. The committee's objective is to ensure that
C/SCSC is fully used as a management tool [Ref . 54]
.
The final C/SCSC initiative involves the introduction of an
integrated management/technical information system. The M/TIS
is comprised of five subsystems that include an integrated
production system, support system, information system,
development system, and management system. The M/TIS
management subsystem provides integrated program cost and
schedule performance information and data analysis capability.
The M/TIS is significant because it provides "the glue" for
all F-22 program operations. M/TIS links all program
participants to a central data base/operation system. 40
Besides the F-22 teaming approach, the Air Force has also
sought to emphasize and reinforce the C/SCSC process by two
other means. First, the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) has
reorganized its cost management division. This reorganization
has resulted in the inclusion of an analysis branch and the
implementation of a cost and schedule management training
program. Second, the AFSC commander, LTG Thomas R. Ferguson,
Jr., has issued a memorandum, dated 17 December 1990,
"Inspector General Report on A- 12." This memorandum
emphasizes the need to learn from the A- 12 program errors.
40The M/TIS users include the Air Force, prime contractor,
principal contractors, major subcontractors, suppliers, and
DPROs/DCMAOs.
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It is the researcher's opinion that the Air Force, in
response to the A- 12 program termination, has made a
substantive effort to improve upon its C/SCSC management
practices. The ATF acquisition approach principally embodies
this effort. The ATF acquisition approach has created a
totally integrated management structure that promotes
innovation, efficiency, commitment, and teamwork at the lowest
program levels. In addition, the "flash" report concept has
much merit. A report that can provide integrated, real-time
visibility of potential cost and schedule problems is an
invaluable management tool . The ATF program bears careful
watching by the other services.
According to Rear Admiral Vincent, DSMC Commandant, the Air
Force's F-22 program will be closely studied by the
acquisition community [Ref. 50]. He also suggested that if
the F-22 program results in an overall success, then it will
serve as model of efficiency and af fordability for future
weapon system programs [Ref. 50] . The ATF acquisition
approach may seem unorthodox, but success speaks for itself.
Unlike the B-2, the F-22 program produced two prototypes that
took to the air in about half the time it took for the first
B-2 flight [Ref. 52:p. 50]. In addition, the ATF prototypes
flew nearly twice as many times in two months as the B-2 did
in two years [Ref. 52:p. 50]. Finally, the cost to develop
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and fly the first four F-22s was $3.9 billion versus $33.2
billion for the first three B-2s [Ref. 52:p. 50].
F. U.S. NAVY INITIATIVES
Because of its A- 12 Avenger program termination, the U.S.
Navy is "under the gun" to take significant action to
strengthen its existing cost and schedule management
practices. The Beach Report concluded that the Navy's
existing cost/schedule control mechanisms, if properly
operated, would have been sufficient to identify the nature
and degree of the cost and schedule problems in the A- 12
Avenger contract [Ref. 41 :p. 33] . The Navy now fully
recognizes that oversight and review mechanisms should have
worked better in the A-12's case and actions should be taken
to ensure these mechanisms work better in the future.
Consequently, the Navy has ongoing efforts to revitalize
current cost and schedule performance roles, responsibilities,
and processes.
Pursuant to the Beach Report, the Navy Acquisition
Executive (NAE) , the Honorable Gerald A. Cann, chartered a
cost performance analysis working group (CPAWG) on 14 March
1991. The CPAWG was given the mission to identify and report
recommended actions necessary to revitalize Navy cost
performance measurement and analysis [Ref. 56:p. 4].
Specifically, this group scrutinized cost performance analysis
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policies, capabilities, and those processes currently in
place. They also conducted extensive interviews with PEOs,




The study group was broken into five process action teams
that included cost and schedule performance planning,
implementation, analysis, integration, reporting, and
independent assessment. As a first step, each team conducted
research and analysis within their respective area of concern.
The results of the research, analysis, and interviews formed
the basis for the findings and recommendations of the CPAWG's
draft report dated 4 December 1991. 41
The draft report cited 22 recommendations to improve cost
and schedule performance measurement throughout the Navy.
These recommendations were organized into four separate, yet
mutually supporting management areas. These four areas
include leadership commitment, policy guidance, training, and
resources
.
One key leadership commitment recommendation centers on the
formulation of a cost performance analysis (CPA) alert system
for all Navy PMs, PEOs, and other senior acquisition
41This report is not as yet official. All recommendations
within this report may be revised pending final review and
approval by the NAE.
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executives. 42 The goal of the alert system is to place early-
management focus on cost and schedule performance indicators.
The system is expected to be electronic and it is proposed
that it would incorporate a red, yellow, and green assessment
criteria. These assessment criteria would be based upon CPI,
SPI, and VAC percent. The proposed methodology of the system
would be very simple. For example, a yellow alert condition
would cause a report to be generated by the PM to his next
higher management level. In addition, the yellow alert
condition would also result in independent assessment by the
DPRO/DCMAO until the condition changed to green. Similarly,
a red condition would require the same report transmitted, not
only to the next higher management level, but also to the
milestone decision authority. This report is expected to
resemble a combination format one and format five of the CPR
with the inclusion of earned value charts. The report would
explain the nature of the problem and highlight a corrective
action plan. [Ref . 56:pp. 17-20]
Two other key leadership recommendations would involve the
issuance of a cost performance measurement (CPM) expectations
policy memorandum and the development of a generic Navy
standard for an integrated, real-time program information
system. The expectations policy memorandum will probably
42The alert system would focus primarily on significant
contracts [Ref. 56:p. 17].
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include a directive requiring PEOs and PMs to develop CPM
expertise. It also charges them to provide realistic program
cost and schedule status, projections, and risk assessment at
all formal program reviews. In addition, the memorandum is
expected to emphasize greater interaction between on-site
surveillance personnel and the PM office. The integration
information system development was proposed based on the
current success of the U.S. Air Force F-22 Program's M/TIS.
The study group believed that a generic, integrated
information system would provide uniform, real-time management
data, while allowing contractors to develop their own systems.
[Ref. 56:pp. 17-20]
From a policy standpoint, the report proposed the
establishment of an integrated WBS coordination process. The
CPAWG's findings confirmed that there was a frequent tendency
at the program office level to develop a cursory program WBS.
As previously stated in Chapter III, an inadequate WBS does
not support adequate performance management oversight. This
process would be focused on the integration of all functional
disciplines ranging from program management to contracting.
In addition, this process would be coordinated through a
central CPM office of the appropriate Systems Command
(SYSCOM) . This recommendation was based upon the success of
Naval Air Systems Command's (NAVAIR) WBS development process.
NAVAIR is the only SYSCOM currently using a central CPM office
118
to coordinate WBS development [Ref. 56:p. 23]. According to
the CPWAG's findings, NAVAIR's integrated WBS coordination
process has been responsible for the development of very-
successful program WBSs for many years [Ref. 56 :p. 23]
.
Another key policy recommendation proposes that PMs use
their SYSCOM's central CPM office (if available) to help them
with the preparation and review of CPM aspects of key preaward
program planning documentation such as the RFP. This proposal
is in line with Mr. Yockey's initiative to refine key program
acquisition documents and is supported by the 9 May 1991 Joint
DoD/Industry TQM Report for Program Management on the Cost and
Schedule Management Process. This report identified that the
preaward process is the most important area in need of
improvement [Ref. 57:p. 3.3-1]. As previously addressed in
chapter IIT, early program office planning for cost
performance management is a critical pre- requisite to
successful cost performance measurement. Many of the CPWAG's
interviews support this, however many of those interviewed
said that they had inadequate knowledge or experience with CPM
at the early planning stages of their programs. Therefore,
many said that working through a SYSCOM's central CPM office
during the preaward process was vital to the success of the
Navy's revitalization effort. [Ref. 56 :p. 24]
The CPAWG's report also supported the need for a review of
currently existing C/SCSC training. This aspect is also in
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line with Mr. Yockey's initiative to evaluate and improve cost
and schedule performance measurement education and training.
Specifically, the report proposes that the Navy establish a
CPM education/training template for its acquisition personnel.
The CPAWG's findings showed repeated evidence of deficient
program office CPM input during program preaward planning. In
addition, it was suggested that many acquisition personnel
were unable to participate effectively in CPM implementation
and analysis. Frequently, it was found that program office
personnel who were functionally responsible for program CPM
leadership were often placed in their jobs untrained or poorly
trained in the C/SCSC process. [Ref. 56:pp. 27-29]
One major resource recommendation proposed by the report
called for the establishment of centralized cost performance
measurement organizations within each SYSCOM to provide matrix
support. The CPAWG found that there was a considerable
difference between SYSCOMs, PEOs, direct reporting program
managers, and program offices with respect to staffing and
priority for CPM. CPAWG findings indicated that there was
evidence of insufficient CPM support throughout the Navy.
Those interviewed by the CPAWG indicated that they need and
want more CPM support than is currently available. In
addition, it was suggested that frequently inadequate CPM
resources had prohibited satisfactory CPM implementation
and/or analysis. The report proposed that CPM staffing across
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the Navy be reviewed, and where insufficient, prioritize staff
allocation to ensure adequate support for all programs.
Obviously this measure is highly dependent on funding
availability [Ref . 56:pp. 30-33]
.
Another key resource recommendation calls for the
distribution of the most current Performance Analyzer (PA)
program throughout the Navy. The CPAWG found that there was
very little standardization across the Navy regarding the
format/content of contract cost and schedule performance
analyses. According to the findings, the quality of the
various cost/schedule performance analyses varied greatly.
The Navy believes that Performance Analyzer (PA) should become
the standard, both because of its comprehensive analysis
capability and its automated data transfer feature. The
CPAWG' s report proposes that the NAE direct the Navy SYSCOMs,
PEOs, and PMs to give highest priority to funding PA. [Ref.
56:pp. 30-33]
The recommendations contained within the CPAWG' s report
currently await final review and approval of the NAE. During
the group's interviews it was discovered that the Beach Report
and the NAE's subsequent actions have significantly increased
awareness of the need for effective cost/schedule performance
analysis and reporting. It was also discovered during the
CPAWG' s review that several SYSCOM revitalization efforts were
already in progress. For example, NAVAIR has established and
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performed an internal CPM and analysis training program for
PEOs, PMs and their staffs, and other senior management
personnel [Ref . 56 :p. 4] . It is the researcher's opinion that
the Navy has taken a serious step forward in finding
weaknesses in its C/SCSC processes. According to one OSD
analyst, "The Navy is coming on like "gangbusters" with regard
to C/SCSC [Ref. 10] .
"
The CPAWG recommendations look promising. The major
hurdles to these recommendations are resources and commitment.
The Navy will need to devote additional time and resources
just to work out the implementing details. This will not be
an easy task, given scarce funding resources.
The CPA alert system appears to be a good idea, however it
probably will require the incorporation of an expensive and
very complicated management system. For the system to operate
effectively, it would require an integrated computer system
similar to the Air Force's M/TIS, in which all users are
electronically linked. It is the researcher's belief that the
red, yellow, green alert criteria would be both hard to
quantify and standardize. Similar to variance threshold
establishment, alert criteria establishment may require
periodic adjustment to retain its usefulness as a management
tool. Finally, it may be difficult for the Navy to keep its
alert criteria system "honest." It is the researcher's
opinion that for the system to be fail-safe, it would have to
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be automatic. In other words, a computer system and not a
human operator, would have to recognize a breach in the
criteria by category and then automatically transmit the alert
to the next appropriate higher level (s). Overall the system
sounds good, but it is felt that the current DAES and SAR
procedures appear adequate for use as early warning devices
for senior level Navy program management oversight, provided
that the problem of special access is resolved. The Beach
Report indicated that the existing Navy program cost and
schedule management controls were adequate and that they
should have identified the A- 12 program's cost and schedule
problems [Ref. 41:p. 29].
The bulk of the Navy's revitalization plan hinges on
increased mandatory CPM education and training. It is the
researcher's experience, that in times of scarce financial
resources, training and education are among the first to be
curtailed. Perhaps the reason for this is that it is
difficult to quantify return on investment on education and
training. CPM training and education is not sufficient to
guarantee program success. However, without it, the
likelihood of fielding a quality product on time and within
budget, is slim. Therefore, it is the researcher's opinion
that the Navy should pursue its goals to upgrade the CPM
knowledge and skills of its acquisition workforce.
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G. A- 12 "LESSONS LEARNED"
One key A- 12 "lessons learned" is that there is an "abiding
cultural" problem throughout DoD. The Beach Report suggests
that this problem has to do with the disinclination of
bringing forward and/or receiving from below adverse program
news [Ref. 41: p. 35]. The researcher believes that the
problem goes beyond this. Specifically, this problem
primarily involves the question of ownership of program
cost/schedule performance management.
Program cost/schedule performance management belongs
primarily to the PM. According to one OSD analyst, in the
past, the way we taught cost and schedule performance
management to PMs at DSMC was to tell them to "get a good
person to manage it for them [Ref. 10]." According to the
USD (A), PMs have viewed C/SCSC as "an offshoot, a sidebar,
nothing they needed to devote much time to or even
understand very well [Ref. 24 :p. 16]." The researcher
believes that PMs must become intimately involved with C/SCSC.
They must understand what cost performance can do for them
and/or more importantly, what it can do to their career.
Although cost/schedule performance management belongs only to
the PM, he or she alone, as the C/SCSC advocate, cannot be
successful. The PM also must make cost and schedule
performance management belong to everyone else that plays some
part in the program's success or failure. This includes the
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deputy PM ; the program's business/financial manager, program
department heads, senior level acquisition management, the
contractor, and most important, the Congress/DoD. All
functional skills (e.g., engineering, logistics, and test and
evaluation) in the program management environment must be
involved in cost and schedule control management. In
addition, all senior level acquisition management must be
involved in making cost and schedule work.
The Government contractor also shares in the ownership of
program cost and schedule control management. It is
imperative that the Government contractor take seriously, his
responsibility for his program's cost and schedule
performance. It is not unreasonable for the Government to
expect that the contractor will pursue sound program planning,
conduct realistic risk assessment, and implement proactive
measures in order to deliver a product that is on schedule and
within the contract ceiling cost. Previously discussed
programs such as the A- 12 and C-17, reflect a clear lack of
cost and schedule control commitment and responsible
management by the Government contractor. For example, the C-
17 contractor continually missed major assembly milestones.
This resulted in an eleven month schedule delay [Ref. 53 :p.
8] . The GAO report indicated that this was caused by late
engineering drawings which, in turn, caused the late delivery
of tools and parts [Ref. 53 :p. 8] . This report further stated
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that these problems still exist and have caused work that was
planned to be completed earlier in the assembly process to be
postponed [Ref. 53:p. 8]. At the time of the report, the
contractor's plans did not address when or how the deferred
work would be accomplished. As a result, the GAO report
stated that it would be difficult to predict when the C-17's
first flight would occur. The researcher feels that this is
irresponsible program management on the contractor's part.
Finally, the Congress and DoD also have responsibility for
sharing in the ownership of cost and schedule control
management within Government acquisition. Neither really
supports stable, full funding of programs. In all fairness to
the Government PM and the contractor, it is next to impossible
to develop a cohesive program development/production plan and
then manage to it successfully when funding is incomplete
and/or unstable. The 1986 Packard Commission Report suggested
that impressive savings could be achieved by eliminating
"hidden costs" that program instability brings [Ref. 78 :p. 1]
.
According to a former Government PM, "There is a mindless
bureaucracy out there that will rip you off for ten percent
before funds are appropriated and you will lose another ten
percent to valid, higher priorities [Ref. 77:p. 40]." The
researcher believes that both Congress and DoD need to truly
get behind the Government PM. If Congress and DoD want
effective cost and schedule control in Government acquisition,
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then they can't support a program one day, and not support it
the next. The answer, although not simple, is clear fully
fund programs with merit and keep its funding stable. Perhaps
a way to increase the stability of funding would be to
implement biennial budgets
.
Another subset of the "abiding cultural" problem is the
failure to recognize that there is a problem. From a DoD
standpoint, the circumstances leading to the A-12's
termination are not unique to the Navy. It is the
researcher's opinion that the failures evident in the A- 12
Avenger Program can be expected to occur again in a similar
fashion perhaps to another department or U.S. agency. As
previously discussed in this chapter, one Service conducted an
appraisal of its C/SCSC operations, and despite evidence to
the contrary, gave itself a "thumbs-up" regarding its
execution of C/SCSC processes.
This abiding cultural problem subset also belongs to the
Government contractor. Often, contractors will paint an
overly optimistic picture of how they are performing and/or
how they will fix program cost and schedule problems.
Frequently, this contractor optimism is unwarranted and is the
result of sheer ignorance or the refusal to accept the fact
that cost and schedule problems exist. This kind of
unwarranted optimism was evidenced in both the A- 12 and C-17
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programs. The researcher can understand a contractor "can do"
attitude, but it must be tempered with reality.
Another key "lessons learned" is that the PM should never
rely on "general assurances" over hard, C/SCSC data. The
problems associated with the A-12's program were not new or
surprising. Leading indicators (i.e., CPI, EAC, TCPI, SPI)
were available at least one year prior to April 1990 when Mr.
Betti, the then USD (A) , was briefed on the one billion dollar
overrun/one year slip [Ref. 43]. How could such unrealistic
evaluations of the A- 12 program have been given out and
believed despite overwhelming data to the contrary? Perhaps,
the answer is, in part, the previously discussed problem
concerning C/SCSC ownership. Perhaps the answer is also, in
part, inadequate C/SCSC or earned value education and training
among both DoD and industry. The Joint DoD/Industry TQM
Report on the Cost/Schedule Management process called for the
urgent need to evaluate and improve cost and schedule
management education and training at all levels [Ref. 57 :p. 4-
12] . One DoD program manager quoted within the TQM report
said, "The level of non- training is almost criminal [Ref.
57:p. 3.5-12] .
"
It is fortunate that OSD has assumed the leadership role
regarding cost/schedule performance measurement education and
training. The efforts of the OSD Review Group, previously
described in this chapter, are laying the ground work for
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improved cost and schedule performance measurement education
and training for all acquisition position categories within
all career fields. However, there are a couple of problems
which might hamper the improvement of cost and schedule
performance education and training. These problems include
time and money constraints.
Today, Government program offices are austerely staffed.
These offices don't have a lot of flexibility in terms of
overlapping expertise. Therefore, losing a cost analyst or
some other functional expert for a five to ten day CPM course
at DSMC or AFIT is difficult to support. There is, of course,
matrix support to help offset program office shortfalls, but
even this isn't always adequate. The researcher found that
matrix support sections are often understaffed and/or over
committed. CPM education and training improvement could be
implemented using correspondence materials, but the researcher
feels this would not be very popular among the acquisition
workforce. It is reasonable to say that the last thing the
average person wants to do is to go through a CPM
correspondence course during their free time. C/SCSC
education and training must be somewhat convenient, otherwise
it is unlikely that it will be supported beyond that mandated
by DoDD 5000.52, DoDD 5000. 52 -M, and DoDD 5000.58. Perhaps
desired acquisition education and training improvement could
be implemented using visiting instruction teams. These teams
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could provide routinely scheduled courses on-site at the
various buying commands. Program office personnel could then
spend part of the work day in class and the remainder within
the program office. A variation on this method would be to
establish satellite DSMC and/or AFIT campuses at the various
commands. The Army Aviation Systems Command in St. Louis,
Missouri, has such an arrangement.
Another key problem hampering the improvement of CPM
education and training is funding constraints. As stated
previously in this chapter, both DSMC and AFIT, in response to
budget cuts, are reducing course offerings. In order for
OSD's acquisition education and training goals to become a
reality, adequate resources will need to be fenced strictly
for this purpose. Despite Congress's passing of the Defense
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act, the researcher
questions whether the Congressional appropriations will ever
measure up to the task.
Another A- 12 "lesson learned" focuses on senior level
military department and OSD level oversight mechanisms
regarding special access programs. The Beach Report noted
that, "A critical OSD oversight mechanism, OSD staff review of
contractor CPR data, would have focused attention upon the
full scale development contract status, but was not employed
until March 1990 in the A- 12 program due to security concerns
[Ref. 41:p. 30] . " All military departments in OSD have taken
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measures to ensure that program oversight mechanisms are not
"side- tracked" in the future because of security concerns or
classifications
.
Was the decision to terminate the Navy's A- 12 Avenger
program a good one? It can certainly be said that there were
substantial cost and schedule problems, but by terminating the
program what else has DoD lost? Doesn't the U.S. Navy still
have a mission need for an aircraft like the A- 12? If not,
then why was the A- 12 program initiated in the first place.
Strangely enough, the U.S. Navy is currently involved with
another contract to replace the faltered A- 12 program, the AX
Program. The replacement program is expected to cost twice as
much as the originally conceived A- 12 program and the desired
aircraft performance characteristics may have been reduced.
In addition, the replacement aircraft is not expected to be
fielded for another ten years. Perhaps, despite the cost and
schedule problems, the A- 12 program termination will have cost
the taxpayers more money in the long run. This alone should
be an example to exercise prudent business acumen in program
management and decisions to terminate programs.
Although much may have been lost in terms of the Navy's A-
12 Avenger program termination, perhaps something has also
been gained. The Navy A- 12 Avenger program has put cost and
schedule control management in the forefront of the
acquisition community's collective mind. It has sensitized
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DoD major program managers to the ramifications of poor
program cost and schedule control. In addition, the A-12's
termination has provided an incentive to get back to program
management basics such as earned value, integrity, and cost
realism. Most importantly, it has become a catalyst for
review and improvement of currently existing C/SCSC processes.
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Chapter V has examined the Navy's A- 12 Avenger program
termination and has analyzed how it has affected the DoD
C/SCSC environment. Specifically, the analysis has centered
on the various cost and schedule performance management
initiatives undertaken by OSD and the three military Services.
Finally, Chapter V has provided addressed both OSD and the
military Services' cost/schedule performance management
perspectives and has discussed some of the A- 12 "lessons
learned"
.
Chapter VI will examine selected aspects of the
cost/schedule control management process. The analysis will
focus on program preaward activities, C/SCSC validation and
surveillance and the CPR. Throughout the analysis, the
discussion will offer suggestions for improvement in the
cost/schedule control management process.
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VI. ANALYSIS OF SELECTED ASPECTS
OF THE C/SCSC PROCESS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION
Chapter VI will analyze selected aspects of the cost and
schedule control management process. The analysis will
specifically focus on program preaward activities, C/SCSC
demonstration review process, CPR utility, and program office
CPR analysis capability. Throughout the analysis, the
discussion will offer suggestions for improvement in the
cost/schedule control management process.
B. THE PROGRAM PLANNING PROCESS
One of the key preaward activities is the PM's program
planning. A great deal of time and effort has been spent in
the development of program planning and controlling
mechanisms . A few of these mechanisms include C/SCSC
implementation, work breakdown structures, schedules, and
organization/responsibility matrices. Many program managers
make use of these mechanisms and devote considerable time to
program planning. Yet, despite their best efforts, many
programs continue to face significant problems (e.g., cost and
schedule control) which are directly attributable to
incomplete and/or inaccurate program planning. The researcher
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believes that this condition is, in part, the result of no
established, integrated framework or process to guide the PM's
program planning activities. The Government PM needs a
planning framework to help him manage the planning phase of
his program. This planning framework would serve to both
eliminate planning uncertainties and help increase the
likelihood of program success.
The researcher found, in the course of his research
efforts, a program planning process which could serve as a
model. This model involves a pre-defined sequence of generic
planning steps which are iterative in nature. These steps
include:
1. Review/finalize the contract baseline- This refers to
review and finalization of all contract baseline
documents (e.g., SOW, CDRLS) . This is both an
essential step in initiating and planning the program.
2. Define overall program approach- This is the
identification of the key program participants and the
top level flow of work amongst these participants.
This serves to facilitate the communication and issue
identification process among all concerned.
3. Define discipline approaches- Each discipline is
identified in the program structure and a simplified
flow diagram of key work steps is prepared. This step
also facilitates the surfacing of issues that must be
resolved to complete program technical planning.
4. Develop detailed WBS, program organization,
responsibilities, and cost collection levels- This
involves the iterative development of the WBS and
program organization. It also fixes responsibilities
and identifies within the contractor's organization,
the levels at which cost will be budgeted and
cost/schedule status collected.
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5. Develop program network/schedules- This step develops
the needed correlation of the program WBS, the
networks, schedules, and the C/SCSC.
6. Finalize WBS and cost collection structure- At this
point issues affecting the WBS and the cost collection
structure will surface. Therefore, these will need to
be addressed, resolved, and updated prior to
establishment of the contractor's cost/schedule
control system.
7. Define resource requirements and develop budgets- The
contractor should identify labor, materials, and other
costs for cost accounts and work packages.
8. Set-up cost/schedule control system- The contractor's
C/SCSC is established and reviewed for the initiation
of program cost and schedule performance reporting.
9. Define and implement program status process- Describes
how the program cost and schedule performance status
will be collected and what reports will be generated
and who will review them. [Ref. 79: pp. 49-54]
It is the researcher's opinion that this model can be
applied by the PM to the planning of all programs. This model
clearly defines the overall flow of planning activities and,
most importantly, it promotes the iterative development of
those activities throughout the program planning process.
Finally, this model serves to initiate early, internal program
communication that raises, discusses, and resolves key program
issues which often lie dormant until well into the program's
execution phase.
C. THE REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL
The Joint DoD/Industry TQM Report on the Cost/Schedule
management process suggested that a great opportunity for
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waste reduction and process improvement fell within the area
of preaward activities [Ref. 57:p. 1-5]. It is the
researcher's judgement that many poorly performed preaward
requirements create future problems affecting cost and
schedule management. One key area of concern during preaward
is the development of the RFP.
The RFP, as previously described in Chapter III,
articulates the program requirements to the prospective
contractor. Through the RFP, the Government virtually decides
all the characteristics of the program and resultant
equipment. According to one senior military officer, the
Government designs in the RFP what will be designed by the
contractor; therefore, the Government must ensure that quality
is incorporated throughout [Ref. 12 :p. 5] . It is important to
note that often the RFP represents the only significant
contract preaward communication between the Government and the
prospective contractor. If the RFP is poorly developed, then
effective communication between the Government and the
contractor may be prevented, resulting in unclear C/SCSC
requirements and poor baseline development. One study
suggested that because of competition, the Government often
fears talking to contractors about the RFP during preaward.
The study also went on to say that contractors were equally
afraid of providing input about the RFP. Apparently,
contractor fear of being non- compliant discouraged comments.
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It is important to stress that a contract can be awarded based
upon initial contractor proposals, without any discussions or
negotiations. Though a good RFP will not guarantee cost and
schedule control management success, a poor RFP will likely-
result in cost and schedule performance problems "downstream.
"
One key RFP supporting document is the Statement of Work
(SOW) . As previously discussed in Chapter III, an ineffective
SOW exposes the Government to unplanned and unnecessary cost
and schedule performance risks. The SOW ultimately becomes
the standard for measuring contractor performance effective-
ness. Based on the results of a survey of over 2,000 program
managers, 61% of the respondents said that the Government did
an inadequate job of preparing SOWs [Ref . 62 :p. 25] . SOW
development represents one of the most difficult, significant
tasks performed by the program office in support of the RFP.
Unfortunately, SOWs have become too complex, vary in content,
and are largely ambiguous. Clear, uniform guidance must be
implemented to cause more effective SOW development. SOW
guidance should emphasize the need to keep to a systems
engineering approach regarding organization and development of
SOW statements. The guidance should provide a set of actions
and/or directives for SOW development. The researcher
believes that the PM should select an experienced individual
to lead the SOW development effort and review and approve
himself, the final SOW.
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The PM also would be advised to ensure that the SOW
preparation team be composed of functional experts from each
discipline that have taskings in the SOW. This will help to
ensure that all potential aspects of the program are
considered. The researcher believes that it is imperative
that all team members understand the program objectives,
acquisition strategies, user requirements, and areas of
responsibilities. This will serve to eliminate conflicts and
redundancy of effort and "plant the seeds" for cost and
schedule performance management ownership. The researcher
recommends that the PM direct his team to use the WBS as a
tool to develop and manage SOW requirements. The WBS will
help to identify cost and schedule program interfaces, areas
of responsibility, and provide a framework for integrating
total program requirements. The PM is also advised to develop
a new SOW versus copying or modifying another program SOW.
Between one program and another, there are likely to be
differences in program objectives, program scope, contract
type, and cost, schedule, and technical risk.
The researcher recommends that the program manager's SOW
undergo a final review for consistency and applicability
before it is formally released. This action could be
undertaken by the program' s data requirements review board
(DRRB) or a centralized buying command office (e.g., NAVAIR's
central CPM office) . MIL-HDBK-245B, Preparation of the SOW,
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strongly encourages using the DRRB for reviewing SOW
content. 43 According to one article, the U.S. Army has had
reasonable success using the DRRB to help review SOWs before
formal release [Ref . 63 :p. 25] . Whether the PM chooses to use
a review mechanism like the DRRB or not, the PM has the
responsibility to do the final review/approval of the SOW.
D. CONTRACTING FOR COST/SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE
Frequently within programs there is no clear provision for
direct linkage between the contractor's cost and schedule
performance and his fee/profit (depending on contract type)
.
It is the researcher's opinion that clearly delineating this
relationship in the RFP, will motivate prospective contractors
to avoid "buy- in" bidding and, later during contract
execution, will keep the winning contractor aware of his
cost/schedule performance. Typically, contractor profit (in
a fixed-price type contract) or fees (in a cost type contract)
are based on a sliding scale (e.g., 60/40 share line) that is
43The DRRB is responsible for reviewing all data
requirements for consistency throughout all sections of the
RFP. Specifically, the DRRB ensures that the SOW and CDRL are
properly cross referenced and that task requirements are in
the SOW and data preparation instructions are in the CDRL.
[Ref. 63:p. 25]
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a function of the final contract cost. 44 This final cost
aspect, because it can seem quite distant, may not likely
enter the contractor's daily decision making process as often
as it might, were the contractor to receive interim parts of
his profit or fee throughout the contractual effort. The
researcher recommends that the RFP include a profit/fee
arrangement clause that provides for the receipt of interim
earned profit/fee based upon the contractor's cost and
schedule performance progress. This arrangement could be best
structured for any contract type, but particularly best are
the fixed price incentive, cost plus incentive fee, and the
cost plus award fee contracts. This kind of arrangement would
motivate contractors to be more proactive in the management of
cost and schedule performance because it would directly link




^This sliding scale, or shareline, is a ratio of cost
sharing or savings between the Government and a contractor
based upon the final contract cost. For example in an
incentive fee contract, a 60/40 share line would indicate that
the contractor will receive a target fee increased by 40 cents
for every dollar by which the total allowable cost is less
than the target cost. It also indicates the potential for a
decrease of the target fee by 40 cents for every dollar by
which the total allowable cost exceeds the target cost. [Ref.
64:p. 19]
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E. C/SCSC DEMONSTRATION REVIEW PROCESS
The C/SCSC demonstration review process is a necessary-
mechanism for the implementation of C/SCSC for a first time
contractor validation. However, the researcher believes that
this process is exceedingly long and not as effective as it
could be. As stated previously in Chapter III, the
demonstration review process begins within thirty days after
contract award with a Government implementation visit.
Normally, thirty to sixty days later the Government conducts
the readiness assessment visit, followed by the demonstration
review which occurs within sixty days of completion of the
readiness assessment visit. Should the contractor not pass
the demonstration review, then a follow-up review will be
scheduled (based upon an agreement between the contractor and
the review team director) to examine at the contractor's
corrective actions. Follow-up reviews will continue to be
scheduled until such time that the contractor's system has
been completely validated.
According to one matrix analyst, a first time contractor
validation may take as long as a year to complete. The
analyst went on to say that one of the contractors that she
has been involved with has yet to be validated four years
later [Ref. 17]. Another source indicated that for one
contractor it took seven reviews and 33 months after contract
award to get his system validated [Ref. 66:p. 5]. The
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researcher feels that this process is inefficient and provides
no real incentive for the contractor to get validated (unless
the contract type is a cost plus award fee contract) . 45
Theoretically, the contractor could potentially perpetuate
this validation review process until the contract is complete.
This is unsatisfactory! The whole point of the validation
process is to ensure that the contractor's system meets the
C/SCSC and thereby provides the Government with reliable,
timely contract performance data. If the Government permits
the contractor to operate under a nonvalidated system for a
period greater than six to nine months, it is questionable
whether the Government can be certain that the contractor's
system is providing reliable cost and schedule performance
data. If this reliability cannot be confirmed, then the
Government's ability to oversee and manage the program is
difficult at best.
The researcher suggests that the Government eliminate both
the implementation visit and the readiness review. It is the
researcher's opinion that C/SCSC has become an institution or
the "norm" so much so that contractors wanting to do business
with the Government should by now understand the process. The
burden of preparation for a demonstration review should be
placed on the contractor and not the Government. If the
450ne of the evaluation criteria for the award fee could
be timely system validation.
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contractor is doubtful that his system is ready to pass a
demonstration review, then he should hire a consultant to
assist him in that regard. The researcher also believes that
any contractor requiring more than one follow-up to a failed
demonstration review should be issued a "cure" notice and/or
charged in full for every extra follow-up review. 46
F. CPR UTILITY
The CPR's utility has long been a point of criticism
concerning the C/SCSC management process . According to one
study, it was found that a large number of Government PMs used
alternate means to the CPR for determining cost and schedule
status [Ref. 32:p. 111-24] . The researcher believes that
there are two primary reasons for this attitude among
Government PMs. First, the contractor CPR narrative analyses
are poor in quality. Second, the CPR is not timely.
Government PMs frequently complain about the quality of CPR
narrative analysis (format five) that they receive from the
contractor. According to one study, PMs felt that variance
analyses were misleading, too vague, and did not identify
program impacts. In addition, the study said that PMs believe
that the contractor variance analyses tended to be overly
optimistic and resembled "legal fiction" [Ref. 57:p. 3.7-11].
46To bring this about, the Government will need to state
this in the RFP.
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The U.S. Army PMJEG focal point believes, in part, that poor
contractor variance analyses are perpetuated by the lack of
Government feedback concerning his CPR's quality [Ref. 80].
The Army focal point said that he has frequently been asked by
contractors whether the CPR is worthwhile [Ref. 80].
According to the focal point, many contractors doubted that
the Government PM ever used the CPR [Ref. 80]
.
In addition to the lack of feedback, the researcher
believes that excessive variance analysis is a contributing
factor to the poor quality of contractor narrative analyses.
According to one survey, many contractors said that because of
excessive variance analysis, it required as many as three
weeks (after numerical data was available) for them to put
together a reasonable narrative analysis [Ref. 32:p. III].
According to one OSD analyst, Government program offices
frequently don't manage their data flow. In other words, they
don't adjust variance thresholds when no longer meaningful
[Ref. 10] . Excessive variance analysis burdens the
contractor, often resulting in a contractor narrative analysis
that is deemed by the Government PM as "non-useful." The
researcher believes that CPR narrative analysis can be
improved by both providing feedback to the contractor and by
periodically evaluating CPR thresholds so that a manageable
amount of narrative analyses are obtained.
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The other area of criticism concerning the CPR's utility is
its lack of timeliness. A frequent complaint by Government
PMs is that the contractor's cost and schedule performance
data reported within the CPR is nearly two months old by the
time it is briefed to them [Ref . 67 :p. 7] . One major program
manager at AVSCOM indicated to the researcher that the CPR is
a belated management tool. In addition, a deputy program
manager from another major program at AVSCOM related to the
researcher that the monthly CPR was usually "too little, too
late" to assist in effective management. According to one
survey, 55% of the Government PMs interviewed were not
satisfied with CPR timeliness [Ref. 32:p. 111-23] .
There are currently measures available to the Government to
make the CPR more timely. One way is to implement the Air
Force F-22 program's CPR "flash" report idea. As previously
discussed in this chapter, the "flash" report has made the CPR
data more real-time, resulting in better lead time for program
decision making purposes. Currently, about half of the Air
Force System Command's program offices are using a "flash"
reporting method of one type or another to improve timely
visibility of contract cost and schedule status.
A variation on this method is phased submission of the CPR
formats. Essentially, this would involve the submission of
individual CPR formats to the program office earlier than the
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due date for the entire CPR. It is the researcher's opinion
that PMs should permit and encourage phased CPRs because it
means that the numbers arrive earlier, allowing earlier
program management attention.
Another avenue available to the Government PM in order to
improve CPR timeliness is to use electronic data interchange
(EDI) for CPR submission. Currently, advancements in
telecommunications and computer technology have made the
analysis and transfer of contract performance measurement data
available via an automated data network system. This system
provides dynamic, real-time interchange between the Government
and the contractor. According to one source, this system
allows read only access to the lowest level, dynamic variance
analysis, and bulletin board (E- Mail) correspondence for all
involved in performance measurement on the program [Ref . 70 :p.
169] .
On 24 May 1988, a Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum
said that when EDI is included as a requirement in a contract,
the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) X12 EDI
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Standard Transaction Sets would be used. 47 The X12 839
transaction set supports the transfer of all CPR formats [Ref
.
71 :p. 13] . Although transaction set 839 has been approved, it
is not expected to be available until December 1992.
G. PROGRAM OFFICE CPR ANALYSIS CAPABILITY
The Joint DoD/ Industry TQM Report said that the CPR is not
being used or analyzed effectively [Ref. 57:p. 3.7-14]. The
study further said that many PMs view the CPR as only a
reporting tool versus a management tool. The researcher's
research efforts confirmed this. It is the researcher's
opinion that this perception may be the result of a lack of
time on a PM' s part to analyze the data or it may be that many
PMs simply do not fully understand the data provided. One
researcher interviewed more than 2 Air Force program managers
regarding CPR analysis within their program offices. Most of
the group interviewed expressed concern that their own offices
lacked sufficient capability or expertise to conduct effective
47ANSI is the coordinator for all National standards in
the United States. In 1979, ANSI chartered a new committee
known as the Accredited Standards Committee (ASC) to develop
uniform standards for EDI business transactions. The ASC
recently approved two EDI X12 transaction sets. They are 806
(project schedule reporting) and 839 (project cost reporting)
The X12 translation software standard is integrated into the
transaction sets, permitting both the contractor and
Government to send and accept cost and schedule information
electronically regardless of the computer system at either
end.
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contractor cost/schedule performance analysis [Ref. 74:p. 15].
For example, many PMs believed that their internal analyses of
the contract cost/schedule problems were nothing more than
non-value added restatements of the contractor's format five
narrative analysis [Ref. 74:p. 15].
Perhaps a major contributor to the ineffective use and
analysis of the CPR is a general lack of training and
education. As previously discussed in Chapter V, DoD
recognizes this fact and is trying to rectify these training
and education shortfalls. Various reports such as the Joint
DoD/Industry TQM Report have emphasized that the Government PM
wants and needs real-time, insightful cost and schedule
performance information. Currently, software systems like
Performance Analyzer are helpful, however, they are not always
easy to use, nor do they provide advice or recommended
courses of action to the user. It is the researcher's
opinion, that the PM and his staff need to be provided with an
interactive personal computer system that not only analyzes
CPR data, but also provides the user with a program diagnosis
(trend and/or forecasting) and a "what if" capability. 48
48This "what if" feature would permit the PM or a member
of his staff to determine the real-time validity of contractor
corrective action plans. In other words, the user can run an
immediate simulation on the contractor's "fix" and determine
if it works.
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Sufficient technology and expertise exists for the
development of a cost and schedule performance management
expert system. This system would greatly enhance the PM'
s
capability to locate cost and schedule problems and forecast
trends. In addition, it could provide expert cost and
schedule advice and permit the PM and his staff to "what if"
various courses of proactive corrective action.
An expert system is a sophisticated decision support system
that has a built-in knowledge/rule base and a separate
reasoning capability. In addition, the system provides for
system/client communication and has the capability to deal
with uncertainty. An expert system also has the capability
for dynamic growth and tailoring to specific needs. In other
words, it is simple to add, delete, or modify both the
knowledge base and the rules.
Many microcomputer based expert systems have been built
and used in many fields ranging from engineering to medicine.
For example, an experienced civilian project manager informed
the researcher of an expert project management system that he
helped to develop. The system was designed for the management
of small scale engineering and construction projects. The
project manager indicated that his system permitted him to be
proactive. Specifically, his system was able to confirm the
validity of "fixes" proposed by his subordinate engineers.
The project manager also stated that his system was simple to
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use, requiring only the skills of a secretary to operate.
[Ref. 81]
The shortage of time, staff, and CPR analysis expertise
within the program office supports the development and
provision of a simple to use diagnostic computer system that
assists in the analysis of contract cost and schedule
performance data. Current software programs don't provide the
ease of use or the reasoning capability features that the
program office needs and wants. The researcher believes that
a cost/schedule performance management expert system should be
developed and provided to the Government PM and his staff to
assist them in their efforts to oversee and manage their
programs
.
Currently, RADM Vincent, the DSMC Commandant, is focusing
a part of DSMC's efforts to develop and provide for the DoD PM
and his staff, a new program management performance analysis
software system that is expected to be both interactive and
require only novice computer skills to operate. According to
RADM Vincent, a comprehensive, user friendly program
management software tool doesn't currently exist within DoD
that really helps the PM do his or her job. He said despite
Performance Analyzer's popularity, it isn't user friendly
enough nor are its capabilities sufficient to fulfill all of
the PM's analysis needs [Ref. 50].
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H. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Chapter VI has examined selected aspects of the C/SCSC
process such as preaward activities, C/SCSC demonstration
review process, CPR utility, and program office CPR analysis
capability. Throughout the analysis, several proposals for
future cost and schedule management initiatives were provided.
Chapter VII will provide a thesis summary,
conclusions/findings, and answers to the research questions.
The chapter will also offer recommendations and suggest areas
for further C/SCSC research.
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VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS,
AND AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
A. SUMMARY
The DoD's interest in major program cost and schedule
performance has heightened during the past two years. This
interest has been sparked, particularly by the concern over
the cost/schedule performance problems reflected by the U.S.
Air Force's B-2 Stealth Bomber and the C-17 Military Airlift
programs, and the U.S. Navy's A- 12 Avenger program. Because
of reduced defense spending and in view of these programs, the
OSD has significantly increased its efforts to bring about
more effective cost and schedule control management among
DoD's major acquisition programs.
This thesis has provided the major system program manager
with an understanding of the importance of cost and schedule
performance management. In addition, it has provided the PM
with the necessary cost and schedule control management
principles and perspectives to allow them to become more
effective program cost and schedule performance managers.
First, Chapter II furnished the reader with the background
regarding the evolution of cost and schedule control
management, and an understanding of the organization of C/SCSC
and its philosophy. Additionally, this chapter acquainted the
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reader with the key DoD organizations associated with C/SCSC
policy development and/or implementation.
Chapter III outlined C/SCSC implementation, highlighting
the PM' s role and the various C/SCSC interfaces throughout the
contract award process. Chapter III also described the C/SCSC
validation, focusing on the various validation reviews
including the demonstration, subsequent, and extended
acquisition reviews. Finally, this chapter provided insight
into the C/SCSC surveillance plan and the memorandum of
agreement between the program manager and the cognizant CAO.
Chapter IV concentrated on contract cost and schedule
analysis, PM management actions, and CPR analysis software
packages. Specifically, this chapter provided the reader with
an understanding of the CPR's format and function, and
provided instruction on CPR data analysis tools including the
CPI, SPI, TCPI, and EAC. Chapter IV also took the reader
through a CPR analysis methodology and discussed several
different earned value techniques such as the "0/100, " percent
complete and earned standards methods. Chapter IV addressed
the various PM management actions available to motivate the
contractor to improve contract cost and schedule control
efforts. Finally, this chapter provided the PM with insight
into four software packages which are currently available to
assist the program office in its cost and schedule performance
data analysis efforts.
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Chapter V examined the U.S. Navy's A- 12 Avenger program
termination and analyzed how it affected the DoD C/SCSC
environment. Specifically, this chapter's analysis
concentrated on the cost and schedule performance management
initiatives undertaken by OSD and the three military Services
in response to the A-12's termination. Finally, this chapter
also articulated some of the key "lessons learned" from the A-
12 termination.
Chapter VI provided an analysis of selected aspects of the
cost and schedule control management process. This chapter's
analysis focused on program preaward activities, the C/SCSC
Demonstration Review process, CPR utility, and the program
office's CPR analysis capability. Throughout the analysis,
the researcher offered suggestions for improvement to the cost
and schedule control management system.
B. ANSWERS AND FINDINGS TO THESIS QUESTIONS
What should the program manager understand to achieve
successful cost and schedule control in major acquisition
programs and what affect has the Cost Performance Report had
on program cost and schedule performance?
This thesis focused on several key cost and schedule
control aspects that the DoD major program manager needs to
understand in order to achieve effective cost/schedule
performance management. First and foremost, the PM must
154
clearly comprehend C/SCSC and its objectives. The C/SCSC does
not represent a management control system. Rather, C/SCSC
provides a set of minimum standards that contractor management
control systems must satisfy in order to qualify for DoD major
program contracts. The criteria do not prescribe a specific
contractor system. Specifically, the goal is not to revise
existing contractor systems except as necessary to satisfy
C/SCSC. According to DoDI 5000.2, Part 11, "Contract
Performance Measurement", a contractor system that meets
C/SCSC should provide effective, timely, reliable, and
auditable information that will enable the major system PM and
staff to evaluate contract cost and schedule performance.
Secondly, the PM should understand his role in the C/SCSC
implementation process. The researcher determined that
activities which occur during the preaward phase affect many
later activities during the contract's execution. The
preaward process is very important because this is where the
PM sets the stage for his cost/schedule control management
program. Proactive PM involvement and leadership throughout
the various preaward activities can make a significant
difference in "downstream" program cost and schedule
performance. Various preaward activities that directly impact
program cost and schedule management include the development
of the statement of work, establishment of variance
thresholds, determination of Contract Data Requirements Lists,
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and proposal of a contract work breakdown structure. Chapter
III, Sections B and C discussed these aspects in detail.
Third, the PM needs to understand the C/SCSC validation
process and the importance of establishing a C/SCSC
surveillance plan. Validation involves the verification of
the contractor's management control system and it represents
phase one of the C/SCSC process. This process begins after
contract award and continues through contractor system
demonstration and acceptance. The validation process includes
a series of reviews conducted by a Government review team of
selected representatives from the program office and Defense
Contract Management Command. The PM needs to ensure that the
team is comprised of experienced personnel because they will
be the ones who determine whether the contractor's system is
adequate.
The surveillance plan establishment is absolutely key to
C/SCSC implementation. This plan describes DoD surveillance
measures, the review cycle, and organizational
responsibilities. As part of this plan, a Memorandum of
Agreement is established between the cognizant Contract
Administration Office and the program office to ensure that
surveillance responsibilities are understood. The lack of a
firm surveillance plan and a Memorandum of Agreement can
create confusion and result in ineffective C/SCSC surveillance
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of a contractor. Chapter III, Section I, discussed C/SCSC
surveillance
.
Fourth, the PM needs to understand the impact of contractor
post-award actions on the program's cost and schedule control
management. One of these key actions include the contractor's
establishment of his performance measurement baseline (PMB)
.
The PMB represents the contractor's time-phased budget plan
for the accomplishment of the contractual effort. The PM
needs to ensure that the contractor establishes a detailed PMB
as soon as practical after contract award. This has
frequently been a problem. Not establishing a PMB early on in
the contract (e.g., within four to six months) can result in
an early loss of accurate contract performance evaluation.
Equally key is the maintenance of the PMB. A PMB can
change frequently throughout the span of the contract. It is
imperative to the integrity of cost and schedule performance
evaluation that the PM ensure all changes are carefully
managed and are traceable to their sources. Chapter II,
Sections G and H discuss the establishment and maintenance of
the PMB in detail
.
Fifth, the PM needs to understand the format and function
of the Cost Performance Report (CPR) . The CPR is comprised of
five formats, is usually prepared monthly by the contractor,
and provides structured, summary level cost and schedule
information. The PM should be familiar with the CPR's formats
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and be aware that the CPR supports the development of other
management oversight reports form the program manger to higher
authority. These reports include the Defense Acquisition
Executive Summary Report and the Selected Acquisition Report.
Chapter IV, Section, B, provides a detailed discussion of the
CPR.
Sixth, the PM needs to have an in depth understanding of
CPR analysis factors, estimates at completion, and earned
value methods. These factors include Cost Variance, Schedule
Variance, Cost Performance Index, Schedule Performance Index,
and the To Complete Performance Index. These factors provide
the PM with a good indication of the contractor's current cost
and schedule performance. The estimate at completion (EAC)
provides the PM with an estimate of cost at completion for the
contract. The PM needs to be aware that there are several
ways to determine an EAC. Moreover, the PM must keep in mind
that EAC's are "quick look" estimates and are not the absolute
truth. Conclusions should not be made from numerical
performance data without regard to program technical
complexity, schedule constraints, and the contractor's
historical performance.
Earned value is central to C/SCSC and is an essential part
of any PM' s "early warning" system. Earned value methods
permit the PM to quantitatively determine whether the
expenditures of budgeted funds are commensurate with the
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contractor's progress. Chapter IV, Sections C, D, E, F, and
G discussed these aspects in detail
.
Seventh, the PM needs to be aware that there are CPR
analysis software tools available to assist the program office
in its analysis efforts. Based upon a shrinking availability
of staff and a growing demand for greater decision-making lead
time, the PM, more than ever before, needs a software system
designed to assist him in performing CPR analysis. Chapter
IV, Section I provided a detailed discussion of four CPR
analysis software packages.
Eighth, the PM needs to understand the importance of
implementing proactive management actions when the contractor
is poorly managing a contract and/or is not managing the
contract in accordance with C/SCSC. The goal of a proactive
PM should be to directly confront "off-track" contractor
efforts by taking early action to turn around a sustained,
unfavorable trend before it erodes beyond repair. The PM,
through his cognizant Administrative Contracting Officer
and/or Procuring Contracting Officer, has several
actions/remedies available to motivate the contractor to
improve contract cost and schedule efforts. Chapter IV,
Section H, discusses these actions in detail.
Ninth, the PM needs to have an understanding of the impact
that contract replanning and reprogramming can have on
contract cost/schedule performance mangement . Both replanning
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and reprogramming will affect the performance measurement
baseline. It is essential that replanning and, in particular,
reprogramming are carefully managed to prevent distortions in
cost and schedule reporting. Chapter III, Section H, provided
a detailed discussion of the performance measurement baseline
change process and provided some basic rules that the PM needs
to keep in mind regarding replanning and reprogramming.
Finally, the PM needs to understand how the U.S. Navy's A-
12 Avenger Program termination has impacted the DoD C/SCSC
environment. The A- 12 termination has brought C/SCSC to the
forefront of program management and has provided a message to
all DoD PMs that they must become intimately involved with
C/SCSC. Specifically, PMs must understand what cost and
schedule performance management can do for them and what it
can do affect their career. Current initiatives taken by OSD
and the three military Services to improve cost and schedule
performance management will have an impact on future DoD major
program management . These initiatives involve improvements in
cost/schedule performance management education/training and
place a greater emphasis on proper up- front planning and
"back to basics" approaches with regard to C/SCSC
implementation. Chapter V discussed these initiatives and
their implications to major program cost and schedule
performance management.
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In general, the Cost Performance Report has not had a
significant impact on cost and schedule performance
management. The researcher found that the CPR was used more
as a reporting tool versus a mangement tool. Additionally,
the researcher found that many program managers used alternate
means to the CPR for deterrmining cost and schedule status.
Two primary reasons for this attitude among PMs include poor
quality contractor narrative analyses and a lack of CPR
timeliness. There are measures available to the PM to help
correct these shortfalls. Some measures to improve narrative
anlysis quality involve the PM providing feedback to the
contractor and adjusting the variance thresholds in order to
preclude excessive contractor variance analysis. Some
measures to improve timeliness include phased submission of
the CPR formats and/or implementing a "flash" reporting
system. Chapter VI, Section F, discussed the CPR's utility in
detail
.
What are the key aspects of the DoD Cost/Schedule Control
Systems Criteria (C/SCSC)
?
The CPR consists of five formats; format one (Work
Breakdown Structure) , format two (Functional Categories)
,
format three (Baseline) , format four (Manpower Loading) , and
format five (Problem Analysis Report) . Format one provides
data for the measurement of contractor cost and schedule
performance by summary level WBS elements. Format two
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provides information about the same data elements addressed in
format one, however, the second format is sorted by the
contractor's functional structure versus the WBS used in
format one.
Format three provides a summary of the PMB (including
changes)
,
undistributed budget and management reserve. Format
four, using the same functional categories used in format two,
indicates the contractor manpower requirements. Finally,
format five provides an analysis summary report of major
program problems to date and explains major changes to the
baseline. This format also addresses all significant cost and
schedule variances which exceed thresholds and includes the
contractor's corrective action plan. Chapter IV, Section B,
provided a detailed explanation and discussion of all items
contained within the CPR.
What is the current policy and practice for validating
contractor (cost/schedule) management systems?
The validation process includes a series of reviews
conducted by a Government review team of selected
representatives from the program office and Defense Contract
Management Command. There are varying degrees of validation
review application depending upon whether the winning
contractor has a previously accepted C/SCSC system. Normally,
a contractor with a previously accepted C/SCSC system will
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undergo a Subsequent Application Review (SAR) or an Extended
Subsequent Application Review (ESAR)
.
The SAR is a three to five day, informal review which is
designed to verify that the contractor's previously accepted
system is correctly and effectively applying the C/SCSC on the
new contract. A SAR may also be used periodically throughout
the span of a contract to "spot check" the contractor's system
for C/SCSC compliance. The ESAR usually requires ten days to
conduct and is more formal than the SAR. An ESAR is conducted
whenever a program has moved from one phase to another (e.g.,
development to production) , whenever a program has been
extended, or when a previously accepted system has had
significant revisions. In both a SAR and an ESAR, the
contractor is expected to be ready to receive the review
within 9 days after contract award.
For a new C/SCSC applied contractor system, the validation
process is more involved. The process begins within 30 days
after contract award with an Implementation Visit. This visit
establishes a preliminary dialogue between the Government and
the contractor, and lays the groundwork for the Readiness
Assessment Review. This review occurs about 30-60 days after
the Implementation Visit. Its purpose is to decide whether
the contractor's system is ready for the Demonstration Review.
This review is a formal in-depth examination of the
contractor's management control system for C/SCSC compliance.
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Should the contractor pass the Demonstration Review, a formal
notice of acceptance will be issued. Should the contractor
fail to pass this review, discrepancies will be noted in a
formal report and a follow-up review will be scheduled at some
future date, mutually decided between the review team and the
contractor. Chapter III, Section I, discussed C/SCSC
validation in detail.
How does/should the program office/program manager utilize
the data provided in the Cost Performance Report?
According to DoD 5000. 2 -M, Part 20, "Cost Management
Reports," the CPR is the principal document used by the
Government to measure the contractor's contract performance on
a major defense contract. The CPR's intended purpose is to
provide the Government PM and program office with the cost and
schedule performance status of their program and the impact of
any problems. Analysis of the CPR data should permit the
Government PM and program office to forecast EAC's and
identify any adverse performance trends. This information
enables the PM to make informed program management decisions
and implement necessary corrective actions to bring about
improvements in contractor performance. Chapter IV, Sections
C, D, E, and F discussed CPR analysis in detail.
The Government Program Office also uses the CPR to support
the development of other reports such as the Defense
Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) and the Selected
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Acquisition Report (SAR) . Additionally, the CPR is also used
to report to Congress whenever the contractor exceeds the 15%
and 25% unit cost thresholds prescribed by the Nunn-McCurdy
Amendment. The CPR is also used by the Government program
office and PM to confirm and quantify problems discovered
through DPRO/DCMAO surveillance efforts.
Although the CPR was partially designed as a contract cost
and schedule performance management tool, it is frequently
used only as a reporting tool by the Government PM. This is
directly related to the belief that the CPR has minimum
utility as a management tool. Many PMs feel that contractor
narrative analyses are of poor quality and that the CPR
emphasizes history and current status, but not future
planning. Consequently, some PMs sometimes use other means
(e.g., contractor internal reports, DPRO input) to augment the
CPR in order to better manage their program's cost and
schedule performance.
How does the Government determine an appropriate threshold
to measure cost/schedule variance?
Variance thresholds are normally applied to the project
summary level CWBS elements that are specified to be reported
within the contract . There are various approaches available
to the PM regarding the determination of appropriate
thresholds for measurement and evaluation of contract cost and
schedule variances. One method entails establishing a
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variance threshold based on a percentage of the BCWS or BCWP
and a fixed dollar amount (e.g., $200,000). Essentially, any-
cost and/or schedule variance that breaches the threshold
percentage/fixed dollar amount would require a contractor
variance/narrative analysis for only the top ten or twenty
highest cost and/or schedule critical items of the contract.
This approach ensures that the PM receives a manageable amount
of variance analysis information, yet provides sufficient
visibility over the most important cost/schedule performance
problems
.
It is very important that the PM establish and maintain
meaningful variance analysis thresholds throughout the span of
the program. Should the PM discover through a periodic review
that the thresholds are no longer meaningful or appropriate,
then the PM should modify them. It is essential that the PM
put provisions for threshold modification capability within
the contract RFP, otherwise, it could be construed by the
contractor as a constructive change to the contract. Chapter
III, Section C, addressed thresholds in detail.
What is meant by rebaselining and what affect does it have
on a program' s C/SCSC?
Rebaselining refers to contractor PMB replanning or
reprogramming . Replanning involves a change in the original
PMB plan for accomplishing authorized contractual
requirements. There are two types of replanning, internal and
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external. Internal replanning results from a need by the
contractor to compensate for cost, schedule, or technical
problems encountered that have made the original PMB
unrealistic. The contractor can internally replan without the
Government PM's approval if the contract target cost or
estimated cost is not exceeded. Under this condition, there
is no change in the scope of the contract. Finally, internal
planning can eliminate schedule variances to date, however,
cost performance variances will continue to be evident on the
CPR because the total allocated budget remains linked to the
contract budget base.
External replanning results from Government directed
changes or constructive changes to the contract. These kinds
of changes will often result in a change in contract scope
which will probably mean an increase in the contract target
cost or estimated contract cost. The contractor must not
change his contract budget base when externally replanning
until the contract change is formally authorized by the
Government through a contract modification.
Reprogramming , also referred to as over- target baselining,
occurs when the total contract budget base is insufficient to
cover the remaining authorized work. Under this condition,
the contractor will seek relief from his current PMB by
requesting Government approval to go to an over- target
baseline. A request to go to an over- target baseline is a
167
formal declaration of an overrun condition. This involves a
complete, major restructuring of the contractor's efforts,
resulting in a major change to the baseline. Reprogramming
results in the resetting of current cost and schedule
variances to zero. The variance adjustments are made to each
reported WBS element affected and will be entered in column 12
of format one of the CPR. The total of column 12 will equal
the amount shown on the variance adjustment line in column 11
of format one of the CPR. By zeroing out previous cost and
schedule variances, the PM can maintain clear visibility of
the contractor's future cost and schedule performance.
Chapter III, Section H, discussed rebaselining in detail.
What are some of the software packages available to the
program manager to assist in cost and schedule data analysis?
CPR analysis is not an easy job. In order to develop a
coherent contractor performance analysis, the PM and his staff
must be able to blend statistical analysis with graphical
trend analysis. Currently, there are software packages
available to assist the PM and his staff in their CPR analysis
efforts. Four software packages were discussed and include
Trakker Plus, Performance Analyzer, Contract Appraisal System,
and CPR-EZ. Chapter IV, Section I, addressed these software
packages in detail.
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What are some of the major shortfalls with the C/SCSC
process and how might it be improved?
Some of the major shortfalls associated with the C/SCSC
process include preaward activities, the C/SCSC demonstration
review process, CPR utility, and program office CPR analysis
capability. One of the key preaward activities is the PM'
s
program planning. A great deal of time and effort has been
spent in the development of program planning and controlling
mechanisms such as C/SCSC implementation, work breakdown
structures, and schedules. Many program managers make use of
these mechanisms and devote considerable time to program
planning, yet despite their best efforts, many programs
continue to face significant cost and schedule problems that
are directly attributable to incomplete and/or inaccurate
program planning. Currently, there is no established,
integrated framework or process to guide the PM's program
planning activities.
A planning framework would serve to eliminate planning
uncertainty and help increase the likelihood of program
success. An example of such a framework is contained in the
following sequence of steps:
1. Review/finalize contract baseline.
2. Define overall program approach.
3. Define discipline approaches.
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4. Develop detailed WBS, program organization,
responsibilities, and cost collection levels.
5. Develop program network/schedule.
6. Finalize WBS and cost collection structure.
7. Define resource requirements and develop budgets.
8. Set-up cost/schedule control system.
9. Define and implement program status process.
Chapter VI, Section B, discussed this framework model in
detail
.
The RFP development is a key area of concern during
preaward. Through the RFP, the Government virtually decides
all the characteristics of the program and resultant
equipment. Therefore, a poorly developed RFP may create
future problems affecting cost and schedule performance
management. Frequently, because of the "rules of
competition, " the Government is hesitant to communicate during
preaward with the prospective contractor about the RFP.
Similarly, the prospective contractor is discouraged from
providing feedback about the RFP because of a fear of being
found non- compliant . Consequently, effective communication is
prevented between both parties, frequently resulting in
unclear C/SCSC requirements and a poorly developed baseline.
A draft RFP is a good way to stimulate dialogue and diffuse
problems up- front in the program planning period.
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One key supporting document is the SOW. The SOW ultimately
becomes the standard for measuring contractor performance
effectiveness. Therefore, an ineffective SOW can expose the
Government to unplanned and unnecessary cost and schedule
performance risks. SOW development guidance is needed to
emphasize a systems engineering approach. In addition, this
guidance should provide a set of guidelines and/or directives
for SOW development. A final review of the SOW by a program
review board (e.g., DRRB) for consistency and applicability is
a must before formal release. Chapter III, Section B, and
Chapter VI, Section B, discussed the RFP and SOW.
Frequently there is no clear provision for direct linkage
between the contractor's cost and schedule performance and the
contractor's fee/profit (depending on contract type) . Clearly
defining this relationship in the RFP can motivate prospective
contractors and avoid "buy- in" bidding and, during contract
execution, keep the contractor's cost and schedule performance
"on track." The RFP should contain a profit/fee arrangement
clause that provides for the receipt of interim earned
profit/fee based upon the contractor's cost and schedule
performance. This arrangement could be structured for any
contract type, but particularly for fixed price incentive,
cost plus incentive, and cost plus award fee contracts.
Chapter VI, Section D addressed this aspect in detail.
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The C/SCSC demonstration review process is exceedingly long
and not as effective as it could be. Since contractor follow-
up reviews continue until such time as the contractor's system
is validated, theoretically, a contractor could potentially
perpetuate this validation process until the contract is
complete. This process does not provide adequate incentives
for the contractor to pass validation requirements.
The Government should eliminate the Implementation Visit
and the Readiness Review Assessment. Also, any contractor
requiring more than one follow-up review should be issued a
"cure" notice and/or be charged the cost to the taxpayers for
every extra follow-up review required. Chapter III, Section
I, and Chapter VI, Section E, discussed this review process.
CPR utility has been a point of criticism concerning the
C/SCSC management process. Many PMs believe that the
contractor's CPR narrative analyses are inadequate and they
believe that the CPR is not timely. A major contributing
factor to the poor narrative analysis is excessive variance
analysis brought about in part, by inadequate or poorly
established variance thresholds. The CPR narrative analysis
could be improved by both providing feedback to the contractor
and by periodically evaluating CPR thresholds to ensure the PM
receives a manageable amount of narrative analyses.
Because of the CPR's lack of timeliness, many PMs don't use
the CPR as a management tool . There are various measures
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available to the PM to make the CPR more timely. Some
examples include phased submission of the formats, a "flash"
type report, and electronic data interchange. By making the
CPR more timely, the CPR can become a more proactive
management tool. Chapter VI, Section F, addressed CPR
timeliness in detail.
A Joint DoD/Industry TQM report indicated that the CPR is
not being used or analyzed effectively. It is possible that
the CPR is not used or analyzed effectively because PMs and
their staffs may lack time to adequately analyze the data
provided. It is also possible that program offices have low
CPR analysis expertise, and do not fully understand the CPR
data provided. A major contributing factor to the ineffective
use of the CPR is a general lack of education and training.
Also, there is not a comprehensive, user friendly, interactive
cost/schedule performance analysis software system yet
available to assist the program office's management efforts.
A tailored expert system could provide the PM office with the
needed analysis capability. DSMC is currently working to
provide the PM and his staff with a new program performance
analysis software system that is both interactive and "user
friendly." Chapter VI, Section G, discussed the program
office staff's CPR analysis capability and a proposed
cost/schedule control management expert system.
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What impact has the Navy's A- 12 Avenger program termination
had on the DoD C/SCSC environment and are there any applicable
lessons learned?
The termination of the Navy's A- 12 Avenger Program has put
cost and schedule control management in to the forefront of
the acquisition community's collective mind. Specifically, it
has sensitized DoD major program managers to the ramifications
of poor program cost and schedule control and it has provided
an incentive to get back to program management basics.
Finally, it has become a catalyst for review and improvement
of currently existing C/SCSC processes among OSD and the three
military Services.
From an OSD standpoint, the A- 12 termination has indirectly
brought about a change in leadership in the USD (A) ' s office.
The former USD (A) , Mr. John Betti, resigned shortly after the
A- 12 Administrative Inquiry (Beach Report) and was replaced by
his deputy, Mr. Donald Yockey. Mr. Yockey, in response to the
A- 12 termination, has called for a return to proper up- front
planning an a "back to basics" approach to program management.
In addition, Mr. Yockey has emphasized the need to review and
improve DoD cost and schedule control (earned value)
management education and training, and has created a staff




Mr. Yockey's education and training review efforts have
revealed shortfalls in earned value education which include
both course content and course funding resources. These
shortfalls are currently being addressed at the OSD level. In
addition, Mr. Yockey's review efforts have contributed to the
development and publication of three DoD publications which
are focused on DoD acquisition education, training, and career
development. Chapter V, Section C, addressed these
publications and OSD initiatives.
The U.S. Army's reaction to the Navy's A- 12 Avenger Program
termination has been to conduct a study. The purpose of the
Army study was to assess its current cost and schedule
management practices and to identify possible improvements.
The study resulted in the development of recommendations and
resulted in the implementation of three initiatives. Chapter
V, Section D, discussed these initiatives in detail.
The U.S. Air Force response to the A- 12 Avenger Program
termination has primarily centered on an innovative approach
to acquisition management which it has implemented through its
F-22, Advanced Tactical Fighter Aircraft Program. The
principal focus of the Air Force's approach has been to
develop integrated, real-time information and management tools
in support of program cost, schedule, and technical
performance. Potentially, the F-22 approach could become a
175
role model for other future DoD acquisition programs. Chapter
V, Section E, discussed Air Force initiatives.
Since the A-12's termination, the U.S. Navy's cost and
schedule control management review and improvement efforts
have centered around its Revitalization Plan. The major
thrust of the plan is to upgrade policies, procedures,
education, and training to bring about a comprehensive
improvement in the Navy's cost and schedule control management
practices. The focal point for this plan, the Cost
Performance Analysis Working Group, identified 22
recommendations to revitalize cost and schedule performance
management. The Revitalization Plan's recommendations are
currently awaiting final approval by the Navy Acquisition
Executive, Mr. Gerald Cann. The Navy's Revitalization Plan
was discussed in detail in Chapter V, Section F.
Chapter V, Section G, addressed some key "A- 12 lessons
learned." One of these lessons involves the recognition DoD-
wide of an "abiding cultural" problem. This problem refers
principally to the question of ownership of program cost and
schedule management. Essentially, the PM owns cost and
schedule performance for his or her program, however, that
ownership must be shared by other "players" who have a stake
in the program's success. Some of these other players include
the program office staff management, senior level acquisition
managers (e.g., PEOs) , the contractor, Congress, and DoD.
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Another key "lesson learned" involved the PM's reliance on
general assurances from the contractor over hard, C/SCSC data.
Unrealistic evaluations of the A-12's program were given out
and believed, despite overwhelming data to the contrary. It
is surmised that this condition was the result of inadequate
C/SCSC or earned value education. OSD has taken on the
leadership role regarding C/SCSC education/training, and is
focusing part of its efforts to bring about improvement in
cost and schedule management education and training.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
DoD should institute a provision in the RFP that requires
the contractor to submit earned value charts or graphs as part
of the monthly CPR.
These charts or graphs would provide a simplified "quick
look" at the contractor's performance versus his performance
measurement baseline. Frequently, PMs complain about the
CPR's utility because contractor narrative analyses is
believed to be misleading and/or overly optimistic.
Additionally, PMs do not always have sufficient time to review
and/or analyze a CPR. The earned value charts or graphs would
provide the PM and his staff with a valuable tool that would
help them spot program cost and schedule performance trends
and problems. In addition, these graphs or charts could also
help the program office verify the quality of the contractor's
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CPR and qualify the contractor's optimism through comparison
with the PM's own statistical charts and forecasts.
DoD needs to establish a generic, integrated program
planning framework to assist the PM in his program planning
efforts.
Inaccurate and/or incomplete up- front PM program planning
is often the culprit behind "downstream" contract cost and
schedule problems. Consequently, the PM needs a generic,
integrated planning framework that helps him clearly define
the overall flow of program planning activities. The
framework should be constructed such that it promotes the
iterative development of the program planning activities
throughout the program planning process. A planning framework
of this type will serve to initiate early, internal program
communication and eliminate planning uncertainties, thereby
increasing the likelihood of program success.
The PM needs to utilize a draft RFP.
The Government virtually decides all the characteristics
and success of a program through the RFP. Because a contract
can be awarded based upon initial contractor proposals,
without discussions or negotiations, a poorly written RFP that
doesn't clearly articulate the PM's program needs can often
translate into cost and schedule performance problems
downstream. A draft RFP is a useful tool because it can
promote contractor/Government communication. This
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communication helps to both clarify RFP requirements and
identify RFP shortfalls which could potentially contribute to
program cost and schedule performance problems
.
DoD needs to mandate that PMs include a contract clause in
the RFP that provides for the periodic review and adjustment
of CPR variance thresholds.
This measure gives the PM flexibility to change
unmeaningful variance thresholds without resorting to a
constructive change to the contract. Variance thresholds
which result in excessive variance analysis can create an
unmanageable condition, potentially resulting in ineffective
Government oversight of the contractor's performance.
Secondly, it forces the PM to stay cognizant of his program
thresholds. It is a mistake to assume that every PM with some
experience knows the correct variance thresholds to apply for
the duration of a contact.
The PM needs to use a review group such as the program'
s
Data Requirements Review Board (DRRB) to review the SOW for
consistency and applicability before it is formally released.
The SOW is a major supporting document for the RFP,
therefore, a poorly developed SOW may expose the Government to
unplanned an unnecessary program cost and schedule performance
risk. Frequently, the leadership for SOW development is
delegated to an inexperienced program office member. In
addition, when a SOW development team is used, it is possible
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that members of the team do not clearly understand program
objectives, acquisition strategies, user requirements, or
areas of responsibility. In both instances, an inadequate SOW
may result. A final review with a DRRB will provide a
necessary quality check, along with close PM involvement.
DoD needs to require that a program' s RFP include a
profit/fee arrangement clause that provides for the receipt of
interim earned profit/fee based upon the contractor's cost and
schedule performance progress.
This kind of arrangement would motivate contractors to be
more proactive in the management of cost and schedule
performance because it would directly link his interim
performance to interim potential profit/fee. This arrangement
could be structured for any contract type, but particularly
for fixed price incentive, cost plus incentive fee, and cost
plus award fee contracts.
DoD needs to eliminate both the Implementation Visit and
the Readiness Review Assessment from the
demonstration/validation review process. In addition, DoD
should state in the RFP that contractor's requiring more than
one follow-up to a failed demonstration review will be issued
a "cure" notice and/or charged the cost to the taxpayer for
every extra follow-up review.
The current demonstration review process requires too much
time to complete, is inefficient, and does not provide a
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serious incentive (except in the case of a cost plus award fee
contract) for the contractor to pass validation. It is not
unusual for first time contractor validations to require as
long as a year to complete. As a result, the Government's
ability to oversee and manage the program becomes difficult at
best with non-validated information.
DoD needs to mandate use of a "flash" reporting system or
phased submission of the CPR formats.
A frequent criticism of the CPR is its lack of timeliness.
PM's want and need real-time contractor cost and schedule
performance information in order to effectively oversee and
manage their programs. Using a "flash" report or a phased
submission of the CPR will greatly improve the CPR's
timeliness. As a result, this improvement should prompt
earlier PM attention to program cost and schedule problems.
DoD needs to continue development and provide the PM with
a Cost/Schedule Performance Management Expert System.
The shortage of time, staff, and CPR analysis expertise
within the program office supports the continual development
and provisioning of a "user friendly, " diagnostic computer
system that assists in the analysis of contact cost and
schedule performance data. Current DoD software programs do
not provide the ease of use or reasoning capability features
that the program office needs and wants, in order to be
comfortable with daily use of such automation. A
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Cost/Schedule Performance Management Expert System could
provide the PM user with a program diagnosis (trend and/or
forecasting) and a "what if" feature. In addition, this kind
of system has the capability for dynamic growth and tailoring
to specific program office needs.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Further research should focus on the tracking and continued
developmental details of a cost/schedule performance
management expert system. The research should investigate
what elements are presently available and should be contained
in such a system by surveying program managers . This research
could also explore alternative developmental approaches such
as a non- developmental item, expansion of a current system
(e.g., Performance Analyzer), or new system development.
Further research could also focus on the feasibility of
developing a uniform, DoD C/SCSC desk reference guide. The
researcher discovered that many CPR analysts and
business/financial managers desired such a guide. This
research could determine the best mode for the guide, (e.g.,
a book format or a set of floppy disks) . Additionally, this
research could develop the content and structure of the guide,
as well as determining a guide proponent within DoD.
Future research could also involve case study analysis of
the U.S. Air Force's F-22 program. The research should focus
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on this program' s approach to cost and schedule control
management and determine its suitability as a role model for
future DoD programs. The research could generate a cost and




Actual Cost of Work Performed (ACWP) - The cumulative actual
costs (direct and indirect) of work accomplished as of the
reporting cut-off date listed by each work breakdown structure
element [Ref. 83:p. B-3]
.
Apportioned Effort - Effort that by itself is not readily
divisible into short -span work packages; however, is related
directly to the performance of other work [Ref. 15 :p. 57].
At Completion-Budgeted - The total budget identified to each
work breakdown structure element (including any contract
changes, application of management reserve, or internal
replanning [Ref. 15:p. 57].
At Completion-Variance - The difference between the Budgeted
Cost at Completion and the Latest Revised Estimate [Ref. 4:p.
503] .
Bottoms -up audit - A thorough, investigative effort by the
Government of contractor incurred costs from the cost account
level up to the summary level WBS structure [Ref. 10]
.
Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (BCWP) - The sum of the budgets
for completed work packages and completed portions of open
work packages, plus the appropriate portion of the budgets for
level of effort and apportioned effort. Also known as earned
value [Ref. 4:p. 504].
Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled (BCWS) - The sum of the budgets
for all work scheduled to be accomplished within a given time
period [Ref. 4:p. 504].
Buy- in - Submission of an offer by a contractor, usually
substantially below estimated cost, with the expectation of
winning the contract [Ref. 83:p. B-13].
Contract Budget Base - The sum of the current target cost and
the estimate of authorized, unpriced work [Ref. 83:p. B-19]
.
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Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL) - A listing of data
requirements specified for a contract [Ref. 4:p. 505].
Contract Target Cost - The negotiated estimated cost excluding
profit or fee [Ref. 4:p. 505].
Contract Target Price - The negotiated estimated cost including
profit or fee [Ref. 4:p. 505].
Contract Work Breakdown Structure (CWBS) - The contract's
product -oriented family tree of hardware, software, and
services that organize and defines the product in accordance
to the statement of work. It is the basis for collecting and
correlating schedule, budget, cost, and performance
measurement [Ref. 15:p. 58].
Cost Account - An identified management control point at which
actual costs can be accumulated and compared to budgeted cost
for work performed. It represents the work assigned to one
responsible organizational element on the contract work
breakdown structure [Ref. 4:p. 505].
Cost Performance Report - A Department of Defense management
report generated by the contractor and utilized by a project
manager to manage cost and schedule status on major (or
significant) contracts [Ref. 4:p. 505].
Cost/Schedule Status Report (C/SSR) - A Department of Defense
management report generated by the contractor and utilized by
a project manager to manage cost and schedule
status on non-major contracts [Ref. 4:p. 507].
Cost Variance (CV) - The difference between the Budgeted Cost
of Work Performed and the Actual Cost of Work Performed [Ref.
4:p. 507]
.
Critical Path - The longest event path in time throughout the
program. Any slippage of an activity or event on the critical
path will impact program completion [Ref. 15 :p. 60]
.
Demonstration Review - An in-depth examination of the
contractor's management control system, designed to ascertain
whether the contractor's system complies with C/SCSC criteria
and is being used [Ref. 6:p. 5-3].
Estimate at Completion (EAC) - Actual direct and applied
indirect costs of a contract to date, plus the estimate of
costs for authorized work remaining [Ref. 4:p. 509].
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Extended Applications Review (ESAR) - A formal review performed
in lieu of a full C/SCSC demonstration when contractor
conditions have changed, i.e., when programs change from one
phase to another, when contractors move from one facility to
another, or when contractors make significant changes to their
C/SCSC systems description [Ref . 4:p. 510]
.
Focal Point - Major command responsible for facilitating the
appropriate application and implementation of the C/SSR,
through policy and procedural guidance and assistance to the
PM, procuring contracting officer, and the administrative
contracting officer [Ref. 6:p. 4-1].
General and Administrative (G & A) - Indirect costs incurred in
the general management of the company, not related to product
output [Ref. 4:p. 511].
In-process work - Work in progress; yet, not completed by the
CPR cut-off date [Ref. 4:p. 121].
Latest Revised Estimate (LRE) - The total dollar value of work
to date plus the contractor's estimate of the cost for work
remaining listed by work breakdown structure element [Ref.
15:p. 61]
.
Level of Effort - General or supportive type work which cannot
be associated with a definable end product and is unable to be
controlled by time-phased budgets [Ref. 15:p. 61].
Management Reserve - The portion of the contract budget base
that is held for management control purposes by the contractor
to cover the expense of unanticipated program requirements
[Ref. 15:p. 61]
.
Management System Description - A formal written documentation
of the contractor's data development process, identifying such
aspects as baseline development, periodic control cycles, and
baseline changes [Ref. 6:p. 5-1],
Milestones - Objective indicators or events that indicate a
start, stop, or an achievement of a specific stage of an
activity at which point earned value credit can be taken [Ref.
15:p. 61]
Non-manor contract - A research, development, test, or
development, test, or evaluation contract with a value
of less than $60 million, or a procurement contract
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with a value of less than $250 million (in fiscal year
1990 constant dollars) . Also referred to as a less than
significant contract [Ref. 7:p. ll-B-2]
.
Performance Measurement Baseline (PMB) - The time phased budget
plan developed by the contractor against which project
performance is measured [Ref. 4:p. 515].
Progress Payments - Payments made to a prime contractor,
normally on a fixed-price type contract, on the basis of a
percentage of his incurred costs [Ref. 4:p. 517].
Project /Program Manager (PM) - The person (Government or
contractor) who is assigned the prime responsibility for the
overall management of a development/acquisition
project/program [Ref. 4:p. 517].
Readiness Assessment - A meeting or series of meetings by
selected members of the customer C/SCSC review to a
contractor's plant, to review contractor plans and progress in
implementing C/SCSC in preparation for a full demonstration
review [Ref. 6:p. 5-3].
Reprogramminq - The baseline rebudgeting activity which occurs
when the contractor formally notifies the PM that the Total
Allocated Budget must exceed the Contract Budget Base.
Essentially, it is a recognition by the contractor of a
contract overrun [Ref. 15 :p. 15].
Request for Proposal (RFP) - A soliciatation document used to
request proposals from potential contractors [Ref. 83 :p. B-
95] .
Schedule Variance (SV) - The difference between the Budgeted
Cost for Work Scheduled and the Budgeted Cost for Work
Performed [Ref. 4:p. 519].
Significant Variances - Those differences between planned and
actual performance which require further review, analysis, or
action [Ref. 4:p. 519].
Statement of Work - That portion of a contract which
establishes and defines all non- specification requirements,
either directly or by cited documents [Ref. 83:p. B-95]
.
Subsequent Application Review (SAR) - Visit by Government
personnel to a contractor's facility to determine whether the
contractor has properly applied the management control system
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previously accepted as meeting the requirements of C/SCSC to
a new contract [Ref. 6:p. 7-1].
Surveillance Plan - A document that establishes the procedures
for accomplishing C/SSR surveillance [Ref. 6:p. 5-5].
Thresholds - Monetary or time reference points determined by
the government project manager to track contract progress,
which if breached, require analysis by the contractor [Ref.
4:p. 521]
.
Undistributed Budget - The amount of budget applicable to the
contract which has not been identified to work breakdown
structure elements at or below the reporting level [Ref. 4:p.
521] .
Work Breakdown Structure - A family tree division of hardware,
software, services, and project tasks which organizes,
defines, and graphically displays the product to be produced,
as well as the work to be accomplished to achieve the
specified product. Also called the contract work breakdown
structure [Ref. 4:p. 522],
Work Packages - Detailed short span jobs, or material items
which have assigned budgets for accomplishing the work
required to complete the contract [Ref. 4:p. 522].
Work in Process - Work tasks that have started, but are not




AAE - Army Acquisition Executive [Ref. 83 :p. A-l]
ACAT - Acquisition Category [Ref. 83 :p. A-l]
ACQ - Administrative Contracting Officer [Ref. 83 :p. A-l]
ACWP- Actual Cost of Work Performed [Ref. 83 :p. A-l]
AFIT- Air Force Institute of Technology [Ref. 83 :p. A-l]
ASN (RD&A) - Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research,
Development, and Acquisition [Ref. 83 :p. A- 2]
ATF - Advanced Tactical Fighter [Ref. 54:p. 1]
.
BAC - Budget at Completion [Ref. 83 :p. A- 3]
BCWP - Budgeted Cost of Work Performed [Ref. 83 :p. A- 3]
BCWS - Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled [Ref. 83 :p. A- 3]
CAP - Contract Administration Office [Ref. 83 :p. A- 3]
CAPPS - Contract Appraisal Module [Ref. 35:p. 1]
.
CBB - Contract Budget Base [Ref. 4:p. 505]
CDRL - Contract Data Requirements List [Ref. 4:p. 505]
CPA - Cost Performance Analysis [Ref. 56:p. 4].
CPAWG - Cost Performance Analysis Working Group [Ref. 56 :p. 4]
CPI - Cost Performance Index [Ref. 4:p. 507]
.
CPM - Cost Performance Measurement [Ref. 56:p. 4].
CPMC - Contractor Performance Measurement Course [Ref. 44].
CPR - Cost Performance Report [Ref. 4:p. 507]
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CPR-EZ - Cost Performance Report EZ [Ref. 36:p. 34].
C/SCSC - Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria [Ref. 4:p.
507] .
C/SSR - Cost/Schedule Status Report [Ref. 4:p. 507]
.
CV - Cost Variance [Ref. 4:p. 507]
.
CWBS - Contract Work Breakdown Structure [Ref. 83:p. A-5]
.
DAB - Defense Acquisition Board [Ref. 83:p. A-5].
DAES - Defense Acquistion Executive Summary [Ref. 83:p. A-5].
DCAA - Defense Contract Audit Agency [Ref. 83 :p. A-5]
DCMAO- Defense Contract Management Area Operations [Ref.
83:p. A-5]
.
DCMC- Defense Contract Management Command [Ref. 83:p. A-5].
DFARS - Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
[Ref. 83:p. A-6]
.
DID - Data Item Description [Ref. 83:p. A-6].
DLA - Defense Logistics Agency [Ref. 83:p. A-6].
DLSIE - Defense Logistics Studies Information Center [Ref.
83:p. A-6]
DPRO - Defense Plant Representative Office [Ref. 83:p. A-6].
DSMC - Defense Systems Management College [Ref. 83:p. A-6],
DTIC- Defense Technical Information Center [Ref. 83:p. A-7].
EAC - Estimate at Completion [Ref. 83:p. A-7].
ESAR - Extended Subsequent Application Review [Ref. 4:p. 510].
ETC - Estimate to Completion [Ref. 4:p. 509]
.
FAR - Federal Acquisition Regulation [Ref. 83:p. A-7].
G&A - General and Administrative [Ref. 4:p. 511].
IPT- Integrated Product Team [Ref. 54 :p. 2].
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GFE - Government Furnished Equipment [Ref. 83:p. A-8].
JIG - Joint Implementation Guide [Ref. 6:p. i]
.
LRE - Latest Revised Estimate [Ref. 83:p. A-ll].




- Memorandum of Agreement [Ref. 83 :p. A-ll]
.
M/TIS - Management/Technical Information System
[Ref. 54:p. 2]
.
NAE - Navy Acquisition Executive [Ref. 83:p. A- 12].
NAVAIR- Naval Air Systems Command [Ref. 83:p. A- 12]
.
NAVSEA - Naval Sea Systems Command [Ref. 83:p. A- 12].
NSIA- National Security and Industrial Association
[Ref. 57:p. 1]
.
OSD - Office of the Secretary of Defense [Ref. 83:p. A- 14].
OTB - Over Target Baseline [Ref. 4:p. 515].
PA - Performance Analyzer [Ref. 36:p. 33].
PAT- Process Action Team [Ref. 56:p. 4].
PEO - Program Executive Officer [Ref. 83:p. A- 14].
PERT - Program Evaluation and Review Technique [Ref. 83 :p. A-
14] .
PM- Program/Project Manager [Ref. 83:p. 516].
PMB - Performance Measurement Baseline [Ref. 83:p. 516].
PMC - Program Management Course [Ref. 44]
.
PMJEG - Performance Measurement Joint Executive Group [Ref.
83 :p. 516]
.
R&D - Research and Development [Ref. 83:p. A- 16].
RFP - Request for Proposal [Ref. 83:p. A-16]
.
SAR - Subsequent Application Review [Ref. 6:p. 7-1].
191
SARDA - Assistant Secretary of the Army, Research,
Development, and Acquisition [Ref . 44] .
SPI - Schedule Performance Index [Ref. 4:p. 520].
SV - Schedule Variance [Ref. 4:p. 520]
.
SOW - Statement of Work [Ref. 83:p. A-17].
SYSCOMS - Systems Commands [Ref. 83:p. A-18].
TAB - Total Allocated Budget [Ref. 4:p. 520].
TCPI - To Complete Performance Index [Ref. 4:p. 521].
TOM - Total Quality Management [Ref. 83:p. A-19].
USD (A) - Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) [Ref. 83 :p
A-19]
.
VAC - Variance at Completion [Ref. 4:p. 521].
WBS - Work Breakdown Structure [Ref. 4:p. 522].
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APPENDIX C
DOD FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION SUPPLEMENT
CONTRACT CLAUSE
252.234-7001 Cost/Schedule Control Systems. As prescribed in
234.005-70, use the following clause:
COST/SCHEDULE CONTROL SYSTEMS (DEC 1991)
(a) The Contractor shall establish, maintain, and use in the
performance of this contract cost/schedule control
systems (C/SCS) meeting the criteria of DoDI 5000.2,
Defense Acquisition Management Policies and Procedures.
(b) Within 90 calendar days of contract award, or a longer
period if the Contracting Officer agrees, the Contractor
shall:
(1) Furnish the Contracting Officer a description of the
C/SCS applicable to this contract. The description
shall:
(i) Be in the form and detail as indicated by the
AFSCP 173-5, AMC-P 715-5, NAVSO P3627, DLAH
8400.2, DCAA P7641.47 Cost Schedule Control
Systems Criteria Joint Implementation Guide (the
Guide) ; or
(ii) Be in the form and detail required by the
Contracting Officer.
(2) Be prepared to demonstrate the operation of the
Contractor's C/SCS to the Government for compliance
with the criteria of DoDI 5000.2
(c) The Contracting Officer shall reference the description
of the accepted C/SCS in the contract. The Contractor
shall maintain and use the accepted C/SCS in the
performance of this contract.
(d) The Contractor shall submit proposed changes to the
accepted C/SCS to the Contracting Officer for review and
approval. The Contracting Officer shall advise the
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Contractor of the acceptability of such changes within
60 days after receipt.
(e) When systems existing at time of contract award do not
comply with the criteria, the Contractor shall make
adjustments necessary to ensure compliance at no change
in contract price or fee.
(f) The Contractor agrees to provide access to all pertinent
records and data requested by the Contracting Officer or
duly authorized representative. Access is for the
purpose of reviewing the demonstration in paragraph (b)
of this clause and also to permit Government
surveillance to ensure continuing application of the
accepted systems to this contract.
(g) The Contractor shall correct deviations from accepted
systems discovered during contract performance, as
directed by the Contracting Officer.
(h) The Contractor shall require that each selected
subcontractor, as agreed to by the Contracting Officer,
shall meet the C/SCS criteria as set forth in the Guide.
All such subcontacts shall have provisions for
demonstration, review, acceptance, and surveillance of
systems, to be conducted by the Government, at its
option, when requested by the Contractor or
subcontractor
.
(i) If the Contractor or subcontractor is utilizing C/SCS
which have been previously accepted, or is operating
such systems under a current Memorandum of
Understanding, the Contracting Officer may waive all or





COMPREHENSIVE C/SCSC COMPLIANCE PLAN
SOLICITATION PROVISION
252.234-7000 Notice of Cost/Schedule Control Systems. As
prescribed by 234.005-70, use the following provision:
COST/SCHEDULE CONTROL SYSTEMS (DEC 1991)
(a) The Offeror shall submit a comprehensive plan for
compliance with the cost/schedule control systems
criteria of DoDI 5000.2, Defense Acquistion Management
Policies and Procedures. The plan shall:
(1) Describe the cost/schedule control systems (C/SCS)
the Offeror intends to use in performance of the
contract
.
(2) Distinguish between the Offeror's existing
management systems and modifications proposed to
meet the criteria.
(3) Describe the management systems and their
application in all major functional cost areas in
terms of
:






(vii) Measurement and reporting of cost and
schedule performance,
(viii) Variance analysis, and
(ix) Baseline control.
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(4) Describe compliance with each of the criteria.
(Preferably, cross-reference appropriate elements in
the description of systems with the items in the
checklist for the C/SCS criteria in AFSCP 173-5,
AMC-P 715-5, NAVSO P3627, DLAH 8400.2, DCAA
P7641.47, Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria
Joint Implementation Guide)
.
(5) Identify the major subcontractors, or major
subcontracted effort if major subcontractors have
not been selected, planned for application of the
criteria.
(6) Describe the proposed procedure for administration
of the criteria as applied to subcontractors.
(b) If the Offeror is using C/SCS which have been accepted
by the Government, or is operating C/SCS under a current
Memorandum of Understanding, the Offeror may submit
either instead of the comprehensive plan.
(c) The Offeror shall provide information and assistance as
requested by the Contracting Officer for evaluation of
compliance with the cited criteria.
(d) The Government will evaluate the Offeror's plan for
C/SCS before contract award.
(e) The prime contractor and the Government shall agree to
subcontractors selected for application of the C/SCS
criteria. The Contractor will contractually require the
selected subcontractors to comply with the criteria. If
either the prime or subcontractor requests, the
Government, at its option, may conduct demonstrations






CPR FORMAT ONE EXAMPLE






—WW 0W» tarcMTMrm.1 M _ J 1'*— CWMUfn« t» f*Tl





















































<MM itir» taajM t»»*> (4MI MTtt r*Mf IIIM OWII HWTW
MCQMCSJATW4I TO O0*T4*CT I
CPR Formatl-Work Breakdown Structure
197
APPENDIX F








CUMULATIVE PLAN/ STATUS GRAPH




EAC- Estimate at Completion
ACWP- Actual Cost of Work Performed
BCWP- Budgeted Cost of Work Performed




Interview between Mr. Wayne Abba, Program Analyst, Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) , and the
researcher, 30 January 1992.
Interview between Mr. Larry Brewer, President, Brewer and
Brewer Inc. Automated Systems, and the researcher, 29 October
1991.
Interview between Mrs. Adeliza Cordis, Chief Systems
Engineering Branch, Defense Contract Management Area
Operation, San Francisco, and the researcher, 26 April 1991.
Interview between CPT Jim Curl, Program and Technical Support,
DCMAO Los Angeles, California, and the researcher, 29 October
1991.
Interview between Mr. Gerald Dockins, Business/Financial
Manager, Longbow-Apache Program, Army Aviation Systems
Command, and the researcher, 5 August 1991.
Interview between Mrs. Char Ellington, Procurement Production
Analyst, Army Aviation Systems Command, and the researcher, 8
August 1991.
Interview between Mr. R.L. Endicott, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Army, RD&A, and the researcher, 4 February
1992.
Interview between COL David R. Forville, U.S. Army, Program
Manager, Longbow Apache Program, Army Aviation Systems
Command, and the researcher, 6 August 1991.
Interview between Mr. Howard Gilby, Program Management and
Operations Division Manager, Light Helicopter Program, Army
Aviation Systems Command, and the researcher, 9 August 1991.
Interview between Mr. Ward Gillespie, Division Chief, Cost and
Economic Information System Division, Army Aviation Systems
Command, and the researcher, 9 August 1991.
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Interview between Mr. Ron Gormont, Deputy Program Manger,
Utility Helicopter Program, Army Aviation Systems Command, and
the researcher, 5 August 1991.
Interview between BG Otto J. Guenther, U.S. Army, Program
Executive Officer, Communications Systems, and the researcher,
29 January 1992.
Interview between Mr. Robert Hubbard, Deputy Program Manager,
Light Helicopter Progam, Army Aviation Systems Command, and
the researcher, 7 August 1991.
Interview between COL James Huey, U.S. Army, Program Manager,
Army Helicopter Improvement Program, Army Aviation Systems
Command, and the researcher, 8 August 1991.
Interview between Mr. Larry Johnston, Program Manager,
Avionics Program, Army Aviation Systems Command, and the
researcher, 5 August 1991.
Interview between Ms. Shamim Khan, Surveillance Monitor,
Defense Contract Management Area Operation, San Francisco, and
the researcher, June 1991.
Interview between Mr. Earl Krueger, Operations Research
Analyst, Blackhawk Program, Army Aviation Systems Command, and
the researcher, 6 August 1991.
Interview between Dr. David V. Lamm, Academic Associate,
Defense Systems Analysis (Acquisition) , Department of
Administrative Sciences, Naval Postgraduate School, and the
researcher, 15 January 1992.
Interview between Mr. Gary Luker, Program Branch Manager,
Light Helicopter Program, Army Aviation Systems Command, and
the researcher, 7 August 1991.
Interview between BG Orlin Mullen, U.S. Army, Program Manager,
Light Helicopter Program, Army Aviation Systems Command, and
the researcher, 7 August 1991.
Interview between Mr. Harold W. Nelson, Project Manager,
Ebasco Services, and the researcher, 28 December 1991.
Interview between LTC William Pekny, U.S. Army, Deputy Program
Manager, Avionics Program, Army Aviation Systems Command, and
the researcher, 5 August 1991.
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Interview between COL Thomas Reinkober, U.S. Army, Aircraft
Survivability Equipment Program, Army Aviation Systems
Command, and the researcher, 5 August 1991.
Interview between LTC Bob Reuter, U.S. Army, Office of
Acquisition Policy, Program Integration, and Cost Management,
and the researcher, 31 January 1992.
Interview between Mr. Dave Robertson, Management Analyst,
Defense Contract Management Command, and the researcher, 30
October 1991.
Interview between Mr. Chuck Sell, U.S. Navy C/SCSC focal
point, and the researcher, 30 October 1991.
Interview between Mr. Jim Smith, Program Branch Cost Analyst,
Light Helicopter Program, Army Aviation Systems Command, and
the researcher, 7 August 1991.
Interview between Mr. Larry Stone, Chief of the Contract Cost
Performance Division, Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource
Management, HQ, U.S. Army Materiel Command, and the
researcher, 29 October 1991.
Interview between Mr. Rick Sylvester, Assistant Deputy
Director for Acquisition Policy, Office of the Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition), and the researcher, 15 August 1991.
Interview between Ms. Francis Velore, Professor, Cost
Performance Measurement Curriculum, Defense Systems Management
College, and the researcher, 29 October 1991.
Interview between RADM William Vincent , U.S. Navy, Commandant,
Defense Systems Management College, and the researcher, 5
February 1992.
Interview between Mrs. Chris Waddell, Cost Analyst, Longbow-
Apache Program, Army Aviation Systems Command, and the




Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria National Workshop,
Falls Church, Virginia, 28-30 October 1991.
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